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L ong before the arrival of the current "war on terrorism" re-
newed concerns about the collateral repression of secular,
leftist radicals, and long before even the infamous persecution of
communists and other leftists in the 1940s and 1950s, federal and
state governments in this country embarked on an intensive cam-
paign aimed specifically at stifling the politics of economic radi-
calism. During the course of this campaign, which reached its
apogee in the 1910s and 1920s, men and women who dared to
challenge the increasing hegemony of industrial capitalism in
American society, change the social order that accompanied this
development, or make militant demands within the existing eco-
nomic framework, faced arrest, imprisonment, and even death at
the hands of federal, state, and local government officials for
whom radicalism of this sort was un-American and thoroughly
unacceptable.1
This campaign to thwart the politics of economic radicalism
reached all representatives of the American left: socialists and
anarchists, communists, feminists, and even liberals who strayed
too far from establishment norms. But the campaign was focused
on one organization above all others: the Industrial Workers of
the World, or IWW. Formed in Chicago in 1905, the IWW in the
1910s and 1920s represented the most prominent organ of leftist
radicalism in American life. From its inception, the IWW dedi-
cated itself to the causes of industrial unionism, economic social-
ism, and radical social equality, which it advanced with militant
rhetoric and confrontational tactics.2 The organization sought no
less than the outright abolition of capitalism as a social system.3
For prosecuting such views, the IWW and its membership paid an
enormous price.
This repression took many forms. In some instances it in-
1 See infra Part III.
2 See infra Part I.B.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 122-33.
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volved authorities' manipulation of laws of general relevance.
Such was the case, for example, with the large scale and totally
unfounded prosecution of IWW members for conspiracy to inter-
fere with the war effort. In 1918, over 100 members, including
most of the union's top leadership and a handful of supporters
and ex-members, were convicted of these charges and, in most
cases, sentenced to substantial terms of imprisonment. Hundreds
of other members and affiliates were subjected to deportation
and other forms of immigration-related harassment because of
their links to the organization. A less intensive, though more
pervasive, pattern of legal repression occurred with the use dur-
ing this period of vagrancy laws, "tramp acts," and other rela-
tively minor laws against IWW members and organizers. During
the first few decades of the organization's existence, IWW mem-
bers were arrested and charged by the tens of thousands with
these crimes in countless incidents scattered throughout the
country.4 Such charges were used time and again to run mem-
bers out of town, initiate beatings and other indignities, and pre-
empt organizing and strike efforts. In still other instances, the
repression of the IWW during this period went beyond legal arti-
fice and selective prosecution to entail patently extralegal prac-
tices: official lawlessness as well as official complicity in private
acts of antiradical vigilantism.5 Countless members were beaten
and on occasion even killed by American Legionnaires, Ku Klux
Klansmen, private detectives, and other self-nominated protec-
tors of "true" Americanism.6
The IWW obviously failed to realize its audacious project of
economic equality and social justice. Few today who are not
union organizers or labor academics know much about the or-
ganization, if they know of it at all. Such has been the IWW's
decline. By the arrival of the New Deal, it had already surren-
dered its lead role in leftist politics to the Communist Party and
other groups, and had largely faded from the forefront of labor
organizing.7 By most accounts, the reasons for this are diverse:
4 See infra Part I.C.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 156-60.
7 On the IWW's decline, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A His-
TORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 255-66 (Joseph A. McCartin
ed., abr. ed. 2000). The rising influence of the Communist Party in the 1930s is
addressed most thoroughly in FRASER M. OTIANELLI, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE DEPRESSION TO WORLD WAR II (1991).
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the union's organizational shortcomings, ideological inadequa-
cies, and flawed strategies; changes in economic and social struc-
ture; and, of course, the role of relentless official repression of
the kinds just described.8 Scholars of the IWW have done much
to draw out the role of these factors in undermining the IWW
and reshaping the landscape of economic radicalism in twentieth-
century America; they have done a good job in uncovering the
important role of government and law in this process.9
In a very important respect, however, accounts of the role of
government repression in influencing the fate of the IWW re-
main incomplete. Legal scholars and professional historians
alike have largely ignored what is perhaps the most explicit,
straightforward, and altogether remarkable effort in modern
America to use the power of the state, backed by law, to stamp
out a radical organization. In the late 1910s and early 1920s, al-
most half of American states and territories enacted criminal
syndicalism laws that essentially criminalized any sort of chal-
lenge to industrial capitalism.' ° These laws did this under the
guise of criminalizing advocacy of "political or industrial change"
by means of "sabotage," "terrorism," and other criminal con-
duct.1 In practice, it mattered little that the targets of these laws
seldom, if ever, actually advocated such conduct as means of so-
cial change, or that key terms in the statutes, like sabotage, were
only vaguely and ambiguously defined. What mattered instead
was the ability to use these laws to outlaw the advocacy of social
change itself, a purpose for which the statutes' ambiguities were
well-suited and its targets' legal innocence was irrelevant.
12
Indeed, it was the purpose and the function of criminal syndi-
calism laws to effectively criminalize mere membership in the
8 On the history of the IWW and its encounters with state-sponsored repression,
see generally DUBOFSKY, supra note 7; ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL RE-
PRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 105-91 (Univ. of Iii. 2001)
(1978); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION
OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (2d ed. 1994); NIGEL ANTHONY SELLARS, OIL, WHEAT &
WOBBLIES: THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD IN OKLAHOMA, 1905-1930
(1998); and Robert L. Tyler, Rebels of the Woods and Fields: A Study of the I.W.W.
in the Pacific Northwest 114-43 (June 1953) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Oregon) (on file with the University of Oregon library).
9 See generally sources cited supra note 8.
1o See infra Part II.B and text accompanying notes 291-95.
11 ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LEGISLA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 18-20 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and
Political Sci., Series 57, No. 1, 1939).
12 See infra Part III.
[Vol. 85, 649
The Crime of Economic Radicalism
IWW and thereby challenge its continued existence as a function-
ing institution. Thousands of IWW members and supporters
were arrested on charges of criminal syndicalism; hundreds of
these were ultimately tried and convicted, in many cases going on
to serve time in state prisons. The IWW itself incurred huge
costs in its efforts to provide members with legal representation
at trial and on appeal, and imprisoned workers with aid and com-
fort.1 3 While the organization defiantly adhered to its radical
ideals in the face of this campaign, in the end, such impositions
played a key role in undermining the IWW, rolling back signifi-
cant organizing gains made by the union in the late 1910s, and
eventually reducing the IWW by the late 1920s to a shell of its
former self.
Only at this point, when the IWW had lost much of its capacity
as a viable agent of labor representation and radical agitation,
did the enforcement of criminal syndicalism laws really recede;
however, it resurfaced in the 1930s as a foil against communists,
socialists, and other leftists. It was not until 1969, in Branden-
burg v. Ohio, that the United States Supreme Court imposed
real limits on how these laws could be enforced. 4
Scholars have not completely neglected the role of criminal
syndicalism laws in influencing the fate of the IWW and early
twentieth-century radicalism more generally. However, they
have come close. Despite its obvious relevance to the topic,
many important accounts of the evolution of modern civil liber-
ties ignore completely the history of criminal syndicalism. 15
Those that do deal with criminal syndicalism tend to reduce the
relevance of these laws to their impact on the development of
rights of speech and association and to focus more on these laws'
influence on the evolution of constitutional doctrine than on
their social meaning. 16 This perspective diminishes the fact that
13 See infra Part IV.
14 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
15 For example, in his recent book, Geoffrey Stone discusses important criminal
syndicalism cases like Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), without mentioning the underlying crime at all. See
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDI-
TION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 522-24 (2004). Though Stone does
mention briefly the IWW, he misidentifies it as the International Workers of the
World. Id. at 222.
16 Among the better examples of this-and a very useful one-is the work of
speech scholar Zechariah Chafee. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 326-54 (Atheneum 1969) (1941). The limitations of Chafee's
20061
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these were serious criminal laws concerned far more with de-
stroying the IWW and punishing its members for their radicalism
than with regulating speech and association rights in any ab-
stractly juridical sense.
Criminal syndicalism laws are also mentioned in dedicated his-
tories of the IWW, but typically only briefly and in a manner that
subordinates their influence among instruments of legal repres-
sion to better-known phenomena like the conspiracy trials men-
tioned above. 7 This practice ignores significant questions of
legal doctrine that speak to the nature of these statutes. Equally
typical of these treatments of criminal syndicalism is a tendency
to assume that by the time these statutes really came into play,
the IWW had already been effectively destroyed. This assump-
tion is false. The IWW remained for quite a while active in pre-
cisely those jurisdictions that made the most aggressive use of
their criminal syndicalism statutes against the organization.
Moreover, the persecution of the IWW with these statutes re-
ceded in these jurisdictions only when, by the mid- and late
1920s, the IWW had obviously fallen into wholesale decline eve-
rywhere in the country.
Besides these limited engagements, the only sustained schol-
arly attempts to understand criminal syndicalism laws consist of a
study of their legislative histories and a handful of relatively brief
accounts of their enforcement in particular jurisdictions.1 8 While
approach are evident not only in his focus on legal doctrine to the exclusion of prac-
tical, political ramifications, but also in his naive view of the origins and functions of
these statutes. Chafee takes the view, completely at odds with that developed in this
Article, that these statutes, though offensive on principle, can be understood some-
what sympathetically as the frustrated reaction of agricultural interests to the sup-
posedly real problems posed by IWW sabotage and other acts of militancy. See id.
at 332-33.
17 For example, Melvyn Dubofsky's leading history of the IWW limits its discus-
sion of criminal syndicalism to only a handful of scattered pages. See DUBOFSKY,
supra note 7, at 218, 254, 257. The same is true of other works. See, e.g., PAUL
FREDERICK BRISSENDEN, THE I.W.W.: A STUDY OF AMERICAN SYNDICALISM 346-
48, 381-86 (2d ed. 1920); JOHN S. GAMBS, THE DECLINE OF THE I.W.W. 29-30, 35
(1932); PATRICK RENSHAW, THE WOBBLIES: THE STORY OF THE IWW AND SYNDI-
CALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 190-92 (Ivan R. Dee pub. 1999) (1967). Even works
of scholarship focusing on the history of the IWW in regions where enforcement of
criminal syndicalism laws was particularly intense, and otherwise doing a good job of
highlighting the influence of government repression on the union, give relatively
little attention to the role of these laws. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 8, at 149-55.
18 See DOWELL, supra note 11, for the study of legislative histories. Among
shorter treatments, see Stephen F. Rohde, Criminal Syndicalism: The Repression of
Radical Political Speech in California, 3 W. LEGAL HIST. 309 (1990); Robert C. Sims,
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occasionally quite well researched (and quite useful to this Arti-
cle), even these works leave unanswered several key questions.
In particular, how were these laws enforced across jurisdictions?
What effect did enforcement on this scale have in undermining
the IWW and the more general cause of economic radicalism?
How did IWW members contend with the hardships and frustra-
tions inflicted on them? And what does the history of these laws
add to our understanding of the nature of the modern state in the
context of class conflict? In answering these questions, this Arti-
cle seeks not only to develop our understanding of the history of
the IWW; it also endeavors to expand our understanding of the
important role of the law in shaping the American labor move-
ment and the American left.
It should be made clear at the outset, however, that although I
regard these laws as politically and morally indefensible, my aim
is not really to critique them on civil libertarian grounds. On one
level, the reason for this simply is that such concerns are outside
the boundaries of what I want to accomplish in this Article. To
adopt the kind of overtly legalistic, typically constitutional focus
that is essential to any civil libertarian critique can only distract
from my ambition to uncover the practical, social meaning of
criminal syndicalism laws and their impact on the history of labor
radicalism in this country, as opposed to using these laws, as
others have, as a template for talking about the evolution of con-
stitutional doctrine. On another, somewhat more fundamental
level, my disinclination to develop a traditional civil libertarian
critique stems from an aversion to the political assumptions im-
plicit in such an approach. A typical civil libertarian argument
against criminal syndicalism laws and their use against the IWW
would tend to cast this episode of repression as either an aberra-
tion or an anachronism in an otherwise fairly progressive devel-
opment toward more articulate and effective legal protections of
speech and association.19 By this reckoning, the use of these laws
Idaho's Criminal Syndicalism Act: One State's Response to Radical Labor, 15 LAB.
HIsT. 511 (1974); Joseph F. Tripp, Reform and Repression in the Far West: The
Washington Legislative Response to Labor Radicalism in 1919, 19 RENDEZVOUS 43
(1983); and Woodrow C. Whitten, Criminal Syndicalism and the Law in California:
1919-1927, 59 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. Soc'Y (n.s.) 3 (1969). With the exception
of Whitten's article, however, none of the foregoing articles is based on a particu-
larly rigorous review of the sources; even Whitten's article is limited by its focus on
California. All of this scholarship, it should be added, suffers in varying degrees
from a lack of concern for matters of legal doctrine.
19 See, e.g, ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA,
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against the IWW appears to be an overreaction unrestrained by
adherence to sound constitutional values. This tack is problem-
atic, in my view, in its tendency to distort the relationship among
state, capital, and labor in modern society and the role of law in
regulating this relationship. The history of criminal syndicalism
laws itself helps to demonstrate that the repressive alignment of
the state with capitalist interests, under the guise of upholding
state security and protecting public safety, is in no way anoma-
lous or anachronistic; nor is it subject to any thoroughgoing, let
alone progressively more effective, limitation by law. This condi-
tion of repression is, instead, a fundamentally normal one little
governed in fact by constitutional or other legal strictures, even
in a supposedly open, liberal society. To a degree, law may re-
strain the dynamics of repression, but only where adhering to
civil libertarian principles does not leave unchecked apparent
threats to the existing social order. The fact that the IWW man-
aged actually to threaten both the interests and the ideology of
elites who were invested in the status quo and who also had ac-
cess to organs of state power foreordained the enactment of
these laws, the union's prosecution under them, and the courts'
upholding of these prosecutions. Conspicuously, in this vein, the
thing that ultimately tempered the use of these laws against the
IWW was not a discovery (or rediscovery) of civil liberties princi-
ples by legislatures, police, or judges; instead, by the late 1920s,
the IWW had withered under the enforcement of these very laws
and its successors on the left (in particular, the Socialist and
Communist parties) had, to varying degrees, either tempered
their radicalism or were preparing to enter contingent alliances
with the state.2°
Perhaps inevitably, the account that follows from this is much
more than a legal history of criminal syndicalism focused on
courts and legislatures, statutes and cases, and trials. I intend to
speak to the social meaning of these laws. In order to foster a
better understanding of the nature of the IWW's encounter with
1919-1920 (1955); STONE, supra note 15. For a reflection on this progressivist narra-
tive as it applies to constitutional discourse generally, see, for example, Robert W.
Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123 (1996), and J.M.
Balkin & Sandford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998). See also Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 1, 5-7 (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001) (questioning such narrative as it relates to civil rights).
20 See, e.g., OTTANELLI, supra note 7, at 9-80.
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criminal syndicalism laws, this Article develops a picture of the
social context in which the IWW came into existence and in
which criminal syndicalism laws were enacted and enforced. This
picture centers not only on the dynamics of capitalism, generally,
but also on the particular social and political changes wrought by
industrialization in the early twentieth century, including the
emergence of an intense struggle between employers and work-
ers for control of both the profits of production and sovereignty
over the production process itself.
Part I of this Article begins with an account of the social devel-
opments that gave rise to the IWW and eventually inspired the
enactment of criminal syndicalism laws. It shows how these
forces combined to shape the IWW institutionally and ideologi-
cally as well as to prefigure the form and structure of legal de-
vices undermining and destroying the organization. Criminal
syndicalism laws embodied, of course, one way of destroying the
IWW by use of the law; but they were not the only or even the
first, and nor were they in any sense singularly responsible,
among legal means, for the organization's eventual demise.
Other repressive regimes preceded the advent of criminal syndi-
calism laws and were important, too, in eroding the IWW and in
anticipating how criminal syndicalism laws would look, where
they would emerge, and what they would be called upon to ac-
complish. This part also explores the most prominent of these
other regimes.
Part II describes the process by which criminal syndicalism
laws were enacted. First, it looks at the dominant role played by
local capitalists and their ideological champions in securing the
enactment of criminal syndicalism laws. Second, this part also
looks at the important role played by the organization's own
rhetoric and ideology in shaping these statutes.
Part III uses reported cases (of which there are several score of
real relevance), newspaper accounts from the period, and other
sources, both primary and secondary, to develop an account of
how these laws were actually enforced, the meaning they took on
in this process, and what this says about the role of police, prose-
cutors, and trial courts in the politics of criminal syndicalism. It
divides the analysis by both region and, in one instance, by state.
From this emerges a clear pattern of enforcement characterized
by widespread flouting of legal rules of procedure on the part of
police, prosecutors, and judges; an explicit targeting of IWW
2006]
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members, particularly those actively engaged in organizing or
strike activity; and an indifference to actual criminal conduct,
even as defined by the broad and vague terms of the criminal
syndicalism statutes. It also reveals a view of liability that
equated violation of these statutes with mere membership in the
IWW.
Part IV explores the role of appellate courts in reviewing the
use of criminal syndicalism laws. It stresses how, even though
they occasionally imposed limiting constructions on these stat-
utes and overturned convictions from time to time, appellate
courts generally endorsed the patterns of enforcement that oc-
curred at the levels of arrest and trial. This part shows how the
appellate courts frequently manipulated legal doctrine to pre-
serve the coherence of an ideology of due process, fundamental
fairness, and other notions central to the jurisprudence of liber-
alism and the courts' own legitimacy, while also maintaining the
efficacy of these statutes as means of bludgeoning the IWW out
of existence.
Part V focuses on the corrosive effect that these laws had on
the IWW. It presents these laws as an important, though often
overlooked, cause of the organization's demise while also em-
phasizing the significant ways in which the union and its mem-
bers clung to their ideals in the face of this repression. It also
reflects briefly on the fate of criminal syndicalism laws in the
years since the demise of the IWW.
The conclusion revisits an important issue raised in this intro-
duction: the relevance of the history of criminal syndicalism to
the role of the law and the state in shaping the politics of labor
and class in modern America.
I
THE IWW's RADICAL CHALLENGE TO INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM AND THE LANDSCAPE OF REPRESSION IN THE
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
On March 14, 1917, the State of Idaho enacted a statute "de-
fining the crime of criminal syndicalism and prescribing punish-
ment therefore."21 A relatively brief document, the statute
described criminal syndicalism as the "doctrine which advocates
crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
21 Act of Mar. 14, 1917, ch. 145, 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws 459.
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means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. '2 2 It made
the "advocacy of such doctrine" a felony and then went on to
criminalize not only advocating criminal syndicalism, but also
publicizing criminal syndicalism; 23 "[o]penly, wilfully and deliber-
ately justif[ying], by word of mouth or writing, the commission or
the attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violent methods of ter-
rorism; establishing or holding membership in any organiza-
tion committed to teaching or advocating criminal syndicalism;
25
assembling to teach or advocate criminal syndicalism; 26 and pro-
viding a physical forum for the advocacy of criminal
syndicalism.
27
Within a month, Minnesota enacted a very similar statute.28
Over the next three years, twenty-one states and two territories,
most of which were in the West or Midwest, followed suit with
their own criminal syndicalism laws.2 9 Some of these laws were
virtual copies of the Idaho statute; others varied somewhat in
substance and form. But all, like Idaho's, focused precisely on
the same basic ends: invoking the concept of criminal syndical-
ism to criminalize membership in the IWW; stopping its mem-
bers' advocacy, violent or not, of radical social change; and
relieving businesses of the union's organizing campaigns.
Those who worked to enact these laws would not be disap-
pointed by their efforts. In the half-decade or so following
Idaho's enactment of the first criminal syndicalism law, hundreds
of IWW members, known popularly and among themselves as
Wobblies, were prosecuted under these laws. Many of the organ-
ization's offices effectively closed because of these prosecutions.
22 Id. § 2(1), 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws at 459-60.
23 Id. § 2(2), 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws at 460.
24 Id. § 2(3).
25 Id. § 2(4).
26
1d. §3.
27 Id. § 4.
28 Act of Apr. 13, 1917, ch. 215, 1917 Minn. Laws 311.
29 States enacting criminal syndicalism statutes and the dates of first enactment
(some statutes were subsequently amended, reenacted, or, beginning in the late
1930s, repealed) are as follows: Alaska (1919) (then a territory); Arizona (1918);
California (1919); Colorado (1919); Hawaii (1919) (then a territory); Idaho (1917);
Indiana (1919); Iowa (1919); Kansas (1920); Kentucky (1919); Michigan (1919);
Minnesota (1917); Montana (1918); Nebraska (1919); Nevada (1919); Ohio (1919);
Oklahoma (1919); Oregon (1919); South Dakota (1918); Utah (1919); Washington
(1919); West Virginia (1919); and Wyoming (1919). DOWELL, supra note 11, app. I,
at 147. For further information on the amendment, reenactment, and repeal of these
statutes, see id. app. I, at 147-49.
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The organization incurred huge burdens providing its members
with bail, legal counsel, and support in prison. By the later part
of the 1920s, the IWW, which at the dawn of America's entry to
the Great War had captivated the nation and terrified establish-
ment figures with what seemed then like a credible bid to organ-
ize the industrial proletariat and serve up a real challenge to the
economic, political, and cultural hegemony of industrial capital,
would shrink from the landscape. And while a number of other
instruments of repression were also instrumental in the IWW's
defeat, criminal syndicalism laws played a significant, though
often forgotten, role in this tragedy.
. The story of criminal syndicalism laws is inextricably inter-
twined with the rise of the IWW and its bold challenge to indus-
trial capitalism. Had there been no IWW, had it not frightened
the privileged and powerful with its bids to organize their work-
ers against them and ultimately change the world, there would
have been no criminal syndicalism laws. Once the IWW ceased
to exist as a viable organization, criminal syndicalism prosecu-
tions faded considerably. In fact, the relationship between the
development of criminal syndicalism laws and the IWW runs
even deeper than this. Criminal syndicalism laws were not only
enacted as anti-IWW devices; the very substance of these laws
was conditioned in various ways by repressive, anti-IWW cam-
paigns already underway when states began to enact criminal
syndicalism laws.
A. Industrialization, Labor, and the Origins of the IWW
America of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was defined, above all, by the rise of industrial capitalism.
Marked by an unprecedented penetration of capitalist norms and
structures throughout American society, industrialization wit-
nessed a number of fundamental social transformations encom-
passing class structure and the labor process. Industrialization
transformed the workplace and work-life, generally, creating an
enormous, largely impoverished industrial workforce, much of
which was composed of unskilled (or de-skilled) and often transi-
tory workers, and little of which was unionized at the time the
IWW arrived on the scene. Industrialization eroded the rela-
tively stable structures and norms of republican and antebellum
America, leaving a domain of work and class increasingly un-
governed and unmoored by traditional norms, and increasingly
[Vol. 85, 649
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dominated by the nakedly anonymous conflict of the wage-labor
system. This voiding force converged with the unique features of
capitalist production in the industrial context-its scale, its com-
petitive structure, and its reliance on automation-to prompt a
radical reorganization of business structure and practices, cen-
tered in the rise of the modern corporation, and the advent of
evermore sophisticated techniques for controlling labor and en-
hancing its exploitation. In these ways, industrialization set the
stage for an intense, broad-ranging struggle between employers
and workers for control of the production process, ownership of
the fruits of production, and ultimately a dominant place in de-
ciding the structure of the social order itself.
Broad changes swept American society in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. Some were quite dramatic, reflecting a society in the
midst of a chaotic transformation of culture and social structure.
Overall, the country's population increased from about 50 mil-
lion in 1880, to 76 million in 1900, to 106 million in 1920.30
Driven in significant part by immigration, this increase was over-
whelmingly concentrated in urban areas, reflecting the spatial fo-
cal point of industrial production.31 It occurred, too, in areas of
the West and Midwest where IWW activity and criminal syndical-
ism enforcement would be concentrated.32
Equally dramatic changes took hold of labor and the work-
place. The total size of the workforce expanded from 17.4 mil-
lion in 1880, to 29 million in 1900, to about 41.6 million in 1920.33
Even more revealing are changes in the distribution of employ-
ment during this period. In 1880, about 3 million people over 10
years of age worked in manufacturing; by 1900 the number had
30 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 8 ser. A 6-8 (1976); see also THOMAS J.
SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE,
1876-1915, at 28 (1991).
31 For example, in 1880 only about 1.2 million people lived in urban areas of more
than 1 million inhabitants; by 1900, this figure had leaped to 6.4 million, and by 1920,
to over 10 million. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 30, at 11-12 ser. A 57-72.
32 Between 1890 and 1910, the population of California nearly doubled from
about 1.2 million to nearly 2.4 million; by 1920, it would reach 3.4 million. Id. at 25
ser. A 195-209. In Washington state, the rate of increase was even greater: the pop-
ulation increased from 357,000 in 1890 to 1.1 million in 1910. Id. at 36 ser. A 195-
209. In both states, as well as in others important to the history of criminal syndical-
ism, this overall increase accompanied a decisive shift from rural residency to urban
residency. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE AMERICAN WORKER,
1865-1920, at 3 (2d ed. 1985).
3 3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 30, at 127 ser. D 11-25.
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ballooned to nearly 6 million, and by 1920, to around 11 mil-
lion.34 Combined with the penetration of industrial production
in other domains, this expansion in manufacturing embodied a
massive process of "proletarianization" of the workforce that
reached into areas of production not traditionally associated with
such forms of organization.
These overall increases in industrial employment were accom-
panied by important qualitative changes in the nature of work.
Automation, an inherent feature of industrialization, steadily re-
duced the efficiency of and need for large-scale employment of
skilled labor, replacing such positions by the millions with un-
skilled ones. 3 6 Paradoxically, this very process drove an expan-
sion in the ranks of skilled labor, too, as automation also
increased the need for specialized cadres of trained, experienced
technicians to keep the increasingly complicated machinery of
automated production running.37 One important result of this
process was an increase in material disparity as well as disparity
of social prestige within the ranks of industrial labor, such that
while overall wages increased between 1860 and 1914, this mostly
reflected the improved position of skilled workers.38 A similar
cleavage emerged between blue-collar, wage-earning labor and
salaried, white-collar labor, as the reorganization of business in
accordance with the corporate ideals of rational, bureaucratic
34 Id. at 139; see also DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 3.
35 For example, in 1890 agricultural laborers (as distinct from owner/operator-
farmers) numbered just over three million. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1910, at 225 tbl.137 (33d ed. 1910), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/past-years.html (follow "1901-1950" hyper-
link, then download "Zip" file for 1910) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
1910]. By 1910, that number grew to almost six million. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1920, at 273 tbl.192 (43d ed. 1920),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past-years.html (follow "1901-
1950" hyperlink, then download "Zip" file for 1920) [hereinafter STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF 1920]. For lumbermen, the increase during the same period was from
about 66,000, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 1910, supra, at 225 tbl.137, to just over
161,000, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 1920, supra, at 273 tbl.192. For miners, the in-
crease was from about 387,000 in 1890, to over 563,000 in 1900, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF 1910, supra, at 227 tbl.137, to nearly 1 million in 1910, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF 1920, supra, at 274 tbl.192. And for iron and steel workers, the in-
crease was from 220,400 in 1890, to 290,500 in 1900, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
1910, supra, at 227 tbl.137, to almost 483,000 in 1910, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
1920, supra, at 275 tbl.192.
36 DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 46.
37 DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORK-
PLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925, at 215-16 (1987).
38 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 16-19.
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management of industrial production created more positions of
middle-level management. 39 Of course, the disparities between
these two ranks of labor, which were even greater than those be-
tween skilled and unskilled wage-earners, manifested themselves
in the development of a distinctly bourgeois, middle-class con-
sciousness defined in large part by an aggressively asserted dis-
tance from working-class culture.4 °
In any case, the de-skilling of work that characterized the in-
dustrial age steadily deprived millions of laborers of both influ-
ence over their wages and relative social prestige.4 1 By making
them more fungible and, thus, more easily replaceable, this pro-
cess also rendered workers considerably more vulnerable to dis-
cipline (including replacement by strikebreakers), layoffs, and
outright discharges.4 2 This reality was seldom lost on the work-
ers themselves, who often focused their means of resisting em-
ployers, including strikes, slowdowns, and acts of just plain
quitting the job, on maintaining the relevance of their job skills
to the production process.4 3
These practices corresponded to a more fundamental shift in
the nature and structure of capitalist organization. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an ever-greater portion
of production was controlled by modern corporations, defined by
their segregation of ownership and control, and by rational, bu-
reaucratic structures of internal governance and management.4a
Many of these entities grew to unprecedented size, not infre-
quently to the point of wielding oligopolistic and even monopo-
listic control of whole industries and amassing unprecedented
political power.45 A distinctive aspect of this new business model
was its displacement of management by owners with professional
3 9 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR
AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 293-447 (1974) (discussing the working class and relevant occupations).
40 See STEVEN J. DINER, A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA 155-56 (1998).
41 See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, supra note 37.
42 See id. passim.
43 See id. at 190-97, 203-13.
44 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS
IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); CHANDLER, supra note
39; see also BRAVERMAN, supra note 39.
45 See sources cited supra note 44.
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management, which brought to bear expertise and a certain mea-
sure of objectivity, while also enlarging the middle class.
These features gave modern businesses a unique capacity to
develop and to employ rational means of control over the labor
process and over labor as a class. In some respects, this assertion
of control involved the deployment of naked force, often spon-
sored by police or other representatives of the state. Time and
again, in what had become an escalating campaign of labor re-
pression by the late 1880s, capitalists called on the services of
police, private detectives, militias, and even, on occasion, regular
military personnel to crush strikes.46 From the 1880s through the
1920s, hundreds and perhaps thousands of union members and
their supporters were killed in clashes like these, along with a
substantial (though considerably lesser) number of strikebreak-
ers, private detectives, and government authorities.47 Countless
other people, overwhelmingly from the labor side, were beaten,
maimed, or subjected to other indignities.48
The politics of these practices were obvious. In the words of
famous socialist and IWW founder Eugene Debs, reflecting on
his experience as leader of the American Railway Union in the
Pullman Strike, and how "[a]n army of detectives, thugs and
murderers .. .equipped with badge and beer and bludgeon"
awakened him to socialism: "At this juncture there was deliv-
ered, from wholly unexpected quarters, a swift succession of
blows that blinded me for an instant and then opened wide my
eyes-and in the gleam of every bayonet and the flash of every
rifle the class struggle was revealed. 49
As crude as these methods of control might seem, they drew
on an increasingly intricate and professionalized infrastructure of
coercive social control that was itself a unique product of the in-
dustrial age. Police departments, which had only emerged in
their modern form in the course of the nineteenth century, and
earlier in more urban and eastern jurisdictions than in other
46 
See, e.g., JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 196-97, 202-
03 (1959); ROBERT H. ZEIGER & GILBERT J. GALL, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERI-
CAN UNIONS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 23 (3d ed. 2002).
47 See Philip Taft & Philip Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character,
and Outcome, in THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECrIVES 281, 287-348 (Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr
eds., 1969).
48 See, e.g., id.
49 EUGENE V. DEBs, How I Became a Socialist, in EUGENE V. DEBS SPEAKS 43,
47 (Jean Y. Tussey ed., 1970).
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places, were, by the dawn of the twentieth century, rapidly em-
bracing professional, bureaucratic methods of organization.5 °
But while this transformation tended to rationalize and obscure
the role of the police as agents of class repression, it by no means
negated this function. Several careful studies of early twentieth-
century policing have shown that, if anything, the professional-
ization of the police in this period added an imprimatur of legiti-
macy to its acts of class repression while doing little to actually
diminish its prerogative in this area."1 Professionalization re-
placed what were once crudely obvious acts of class repression
with methods that could be styled as ways of punishing and
preventing crime and maintaining law and order, and thus, as
means of advancing a universal good.
In the course of this transformation, the overall number of po-
lice personnel nationwide increased significantly.52 Also impor-
tant was the expansion and professionalization of public
prosecutors, whose relative authority and numbers also increased
dramatically during this period, and who often played an impor-
tant role in mobilizing and legitimating the class-biased use of
police forces.53 Yet another key development in this period was
a nationwide expansion in both the number and capacity of mili-
tia armories, which markedly enhanced the capacity of states and
the federal government to bring to bear military force in cases of
unrest.54
50 See generally ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920
(1981).
51 See, e.g., SIDNEY L. HARRING, POLICING A CLASS SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE
OF AMERICAN CITIES, 1865-1915, at 44-45 (1983); Helen Boritch & John Hagan,
Crime and the Changing Forms of Class Control: Policing Public Order in "Toronto
the Good," 1859-1955, 66 Soc. FORCES 307 (1987) (discussing how class domination
remained central to policing even as policing embraced crime control as its domi-
nant function); see also MARK NEOCLEOUS, THE FABRICATION OF SOCIAL ORDER:
A CRITICAL THEORY OF POLICE POWER (2000).
52 Between 1890 and 1900, for example, the total number of "watchmen, police,
firemen, etc.," as accounted by the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly doubled, increasing
from 74,629 to 130,590. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 1910, supra note 35, at 226
tbl.137.
53 On the development of public prosecutors see, for example, Allen Steinberg,
From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District At-
torney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568 (1984).
54 The National Guard was reorganized and strengthened twice in the period that
concerns us: first by the Militia Act of 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775, and then by the
National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166. The ability of the federal gov-
ernment to mobilize militias was facilitated by passage of the National Defense Act
of 1916, which, among other things, created the National Guard out of state militias.
See National Defense Act of 1916 §§ 58-63.
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These changes among institutions of state coercion were part
of a larger trend in this period toward an expanded capacity for
state-sponsored social control and the construction of social or-
der more generally. This trend, which flowered fully in the Pro-
gressive Era of the early 1900s, fed an increased appetite among
many sections of society for greater order amid a looming threat
of unrest evident in expressions of class conflict; in ethnic, racial,
and gender interaction, especially in public spaces; and in the es-
sential tendency of capitalist industrialization to erode or confuse
incumbent social norms at the same time that it intensified the
alienating dimensions of the laboring process. In other words,
the desire for control was a direct response to the doubts created
by industrialization. In this vein, both the overall increase in po-
lice numbers and the transformation of their apparent means of
functioning can be situated alongside other overarching develop-
ments, such as the increase in civil service and the expansion of
the court system, or the proliferation of Jim Crow Laws and the
contemporary popularity of eugenics. These developments were
all central to a quest to construct an evermore regulated society,
stabilized around fairly particular notions of race, gender, class,
and social order more generally."
To the extent that the repression of strikes might favor some
greater aura of legitimacy than could be mustered by police or
military intervention, employers in this period could also rely on
courts to issue injunctions against strikes, which would legally au-
thorize their repression by force.56 From the 1870s onward,
courts exercised their powers of equity to issue thousands of la-
bor injunctions.57 These injunctions were issued on a variety of
grounds: that strikes interfered unduly with the flow of com-
merce, that they portended violence (a near certainty in this pe-
riod), or simply that they compromised property rights.58
Frequently, labor injunctions were issued in ex parte proceedings
conducted without adequate notice (if any at all) and on the basis
55 On the relationship between the rise of the regulatory state and the quest for
social order and stability, see JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF
CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920, at 49-52 (2d ed. 1992);
and DINER, supra note 40, at 200-32.
5 6 William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1151 (1989).
57 At least 4300 labor injunctions were issued between 1880 and 1930. Id.
5 8 See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
24-46 (1930).
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of entirely unreliable evidence. 9 Until New Deal labor law dra-
matically curtailed their use, thousands of strikers and labor ac-
tivists, including on more than one occasion Eugene Debs
himself, were charged with contempt of these injunctions.6 °
To a considerable degree, unions in the late 1800s and early
1900s also remained subject to prosecution under the notorious
labor conspiracy doctrine. A derivative of common law conspir-
acy doctrine, the labor conspiracy doctrine as it evolved in
America tended to premise liability on the effects of union activ-
ity on employers or on the overall economy. 61 Thus, a strike
could be illegal and its participants criminally liable under any of
several circumstances: if the strike was unlawful by statute-for
example, by restraining trade in contravention of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887; if it simply impaired the flow of com-
merce to an excessive degree, regardless of any statute; if it was
violent; or if it was excessively coercive of employers' rights.62
Read in this way, the doctrine did not make criminal all strikes or
other acts of labor protest, but what it surely did do was render
just about any such activity on the part of labor potentially
criminal.63
Beginning in 1890, employers could also charge striking unions
and their members with violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which provided for stiff criminal .penalties as well as considerable
damages to be imposed on violators (as well as offering another
underpinning for conspiracy charges or injunctive proceedings).64
This statute was not clearly intended to apply to most of the
union activity it was used to deter and to punish; nevertheless in
the first couple of decades of its enforcement, it was used against
labor more frequently than business entities, its clearly intended
targets.65 Indeed, it mattered little to the courts or those enforc-
59 See id. at 60-81.
60 See id.; Forbath, supra note 56, at 1151, 1162-63, 1181-84, 1187. It was Debs's
distinction, among others, to be the named party in the case by which the U.S. Su-
preme Court most clearly validated the basic practice of using injunctions to foil
strike activity. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
61 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law: 1880-1930,
66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988).
62 See id. at 945-48, 952-57.
63 See id. at 956-57; see also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UN-
IONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 36-49 (1985).
64 See Hovenkamp, supra note 61, at 948-58, 962-64.
65 Id. at 950-51.
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ing these statutes that Congress made clear with the passage of
the Clayton Act 66 in 1914 its intent that the Sherman Act not
apply to most labor union activities. 67 The antitrust statute con-
tinued to be used widely against labor unions until the New
Deal.68 In the meantime, antitrust law functioned with the labor
conspiracy and the labor injunction doctrines to consign labor to
what Christopher Tomlins aptly calls a "legal twilight zone, "69 in
which unions, though not explicitly illegal, verged on illegality
even when functioning in the most conventional and nonviolent
ways.7°
While well-suited for discouraging strikes and other overt
means by which labor sought to resist employer control of the
workplace, these violent methods, legal and otherwise, were not
so apt at asserting employer control within the workplace itself.
For this purpose, there emerged more subtle and, in many ways,
more insidious methods, centered on the program of scientific
management. Conceived explicitly as a means of removing con-
trol of the production process from workers to managers and in-
tensifying the rate at which labor could be exploited, scientific
management was founded on several key themes: subjecting
workers to intensive and ostensibly scientific evaluation of their
performance of production tasks in the workplace; measuring the
performance of such tasks by detailed time and motion studies;
using such measurements to subject the task to critical examina-
tion aimed at rationally identifying and replacing inefficient hab-
its and functions; constructing a pay scheme designed to
encourage workers' compliance with the overall program; and
encompassing all of the foregoing within an overarching, central-
ized production plan.71 The central aim of scientific management
was, in the words of David Montgomery, a project of "comman-
deering the craftsmen's knowledge" and of diminishing workers'
autonomy over the use of their own labor.72 Recognizing how
this not only made work more alienating, but also made them
66 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
67 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (interpret-
ing the Clayton Act to allow injunctive relief in a typical labor dispute).
68 Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (establishing significant limita-
tions on the ability of courts to grant injunctive relief in cases involving labor
disputes).
69 TOMLINS, supra note 63, at 33.
70 See, e.g., id. at 49-51.
71 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 37, at 217.
72 Id. at 233.
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more vulnerable, most workers despised and resisted scientific
management just as thoroughly as employers idealized and em-
braced it.73
In this respect, the scientific management revolution was but
the most salient and intellectualized expression of a broader con-
test for control of the evolving processes of industrial production.
In various ways, industrialization empowered employers to assert
new forms of control within the workplace. Not only did indus-
trialization routinize work, depriving workers of influence; the
increased rationalization and capitalization of business that ac-
companied industrialization-the hegemony of the "Fordist"
production process-also facilitated the adoption of manage-
ment structures compatible with scientific management tech-
niques as well as other forms of surveillance, supervision, and
discipline.74 At the same time, industrialization often either in-
creased competitive pressures on employers or made existing
pressures more acutely felt, in either case informing a greater
urge on the part of workers to reassert control within the
workplace.75
In many ways, this battle for control of the workplace reflected
a larger transformation underway in industrial society: the dis-
placement of traditional norms and structures of production and
labor relations with a more distinctly modern regime of free con-
tract and free labor. As Marx demonstrates, this transformation
was ultimately based in capitalism's progressive reorganization of
labor as wage-labor.7 6 In the development of wage-labor inheres
the redefinition of labor's value in exclusively commodified,
quantitative terms keyed to the relationship between labor's cost
as a commodity and its usefulness in the production of commodi-
ties.77 This process reduces the social value of labor to these
quantified dimensions, in the process rendering obsolete the
more textured values of labor in its traditional forms. Beyond
this, wage-labor invests its life-world with this meaning, creating
73 See DINER, supra note 40, at 37-38, 53-54; see also DAVID MONTGOMERY,
WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOL-
OGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES (1979).
74 See, e.g., DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 84-88 (discussing the intersection of sci-
entific management and welfare capitalism as efforts to exert control over industrial
laborers).
75 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 37, at 44-57.
76 See generally 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
125-280 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 1976) (1867).
77 See id. at 283-306.
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by its own increasing hegemony in capitalist society a structural
basis on which the cultural definitions of truth and meaning
themselves become rooted more and more in anonymous, quan-
tified terms.78 This was Marx's key insight on this topic. It is by
this more attenuated mechanism that wage-labor rewrites the
moral and juridical meaning of labor itself, giving social form to
the concepts of free labor and free contract.79
Though conditioned structurally in the fashion just described,
ideas can also have some autonomous force of their own. And
free labor and free contract functioned ideologically and juridi-
cally to rationalize industrial labor's condition as wage-labor.
80
By offering a convenient means of "reconcil[ing] human auton-
omy and obligation, [of] imposing social order through personal
volition, ' 81 free contract gave both legal and moral sanction to a
social reality of industrial capitalism marked by the increasing
hegemony of anonymous interactions mediated by market trans-
actions. In like fashion, free labor validated the fundamentally
unequal, exploitative, and coercive reality of the industrial labor
market by casting these conditions as the embodiments of auton-
omy, volition, and independence.
This concept of free labor took form juridically as the doctrine
of at-will employment. In theory, at-will employment expressed
the mutual freedom of employers and employees, absent a con-
tractual relationship, to terminate the employment relationship
at any time and for any reason, or even for no reason at all; in
practice, it embodied a largely unidirectional prerogative of em-
ployers to fire or discipline workers as they saw fit.82 Similarly,
free labor confirmed labor's station as beyond the protections of
modern statutes or case law. Along with free contract, the free
labor construct was readily appropriated by government officials
and especially courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s to ground
an interpretation of constitutional doctrine that systematically in-
validated various attempts by Congress and state legislatures to
78 See id. at 125-280.
79 See id; KARL MARX, GRUNDRISSE 135-51, 457-58 (Martin Nicolaus trans., Vin-
tage Books 1973) (1941).
80 See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACr: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION passim
(1998).
81 Id. at 2.
82 On the development of this doctrine, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of
the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
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enact modestly reformist labor legislation.83
The contradictions of free labor ran deeper still. The freedom
in free labor seldom precluded employers from resorting to force
to discipline labor and maintain control of the workplace. If any-
thing, the appeal to free labor was at its strongest when used to
disparage strikes and other acts of labor protest as affronts to the
rights of individual workers, or to justify the legal invalidation of
even modestly protective labor regulations.84 All of these things
were said to violate a (thoroughly mythologized) vision of the
employment relationship, one devoid of any real disparities in
power and any intrinsic conflict, unless, of course, this condition
were despoiled by labor agitators and the like.85 Nor was the
free labor construct, for all its supposed grounding in the ideol-
ogy of contract, widely recognized as validating union aspirations
of concerted activity and collective bargaining.86 The appeal to
the free labor concept was thus quite fraudulent; yet, as an ideo-
logical foil and legal construct, it remained potent through this
period.
In important ways, the benefits conveyed to employers by free
labor were self-realizing, encompassing the right to fire or disci-
pline employees virtually at will; blacklist them if they engaged in
union organizing, acts of protest, or the like; and make them
enter so-called yellow dog contracts by which they foreswore
union membership.87 In other, more ideological ways, free labor
conveyed benefits that had to be cultivated. One important
means by which employers sought to do this was by aggressively
championing the open shop, not simply as a (hoped-for) reality
on their shop floors, but as a grand and worthy ideal in its very
conception.88 The open shop was promoted alike by civic groups,
trade organizations, and newly created political entities, such as
83 This, of course, is the juridical foundation of the so-called Lochner Era. On the
development of free labor ideology and jurisprudence during this time, see William
E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 767.
84 See generally Forbath, supra note 56.
85 See TOMLINS, supra note 63, at 36-52 (describing the development of a legal
ideology that located in unions a threat to the liberty of workers and business own-
ers alike).
86 See STANLEY, supra note 80, at 61-97.
87 See generally Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas: The
Case of the Yellow-Dog Contract, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 235; Daniel Ernst, The Yellow-
Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917-1932, 30 LAB. HIST. 251 (1989).
88 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 37, at 269-75.
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the National Association of Manufacturers, that were dedicated
to promoting employer interests.8 9 The open shop campaign cast
the union-free workplace as the epitome of the free labor ideal
and situated this identity at the center of a thoroughly idealized
conception of American history and American values.9°
The ability of employers to control labor was abetted in still
other ways by structural developments that occurred during this
period. For many employers, increased capitalization not only
afforded access to more elaborate, expensive means of control
(for example, the services of knowledgeable, professional manag-
ers or private detectives); it also enhanced the capacity of these
employers to outlast strikers.91 In other instances, increased con-
solidation and concentration, which characterized much of this
period, provided employers with another useful means of union-
busting: shifting operations around within the business to effec-
tively replace the jobs of union workers, often regardless of
whether they struck or had merely threatened to strike. 92
To businesses of the late 1800s and early 1900s, the essential
validity of these means of controlling labor, as well as the neces-
sity to use them, no doubt seemed self-evident. The same forces
that valorized the concept of free contract and free labor gave
equal sanction to self-validating myths about the virtues of com-
petition and entrepreneurship.93 Indeed, for workers this regime
of employer prerogative made itself felt in very practical ways,
including layoffs and unemployment, particularly during periods
of economic recession.94 Although the business cycle was a pro-
nounced feature of capitalism from the early nineteenth century
onward, it was characterized by increasingly serious recessions in
the last decades of that century, a phenomenon likely attributa-
ble, in part, to industrialization's dramatic attenuation of the link
between production and consumption.
95
Industrial laborers, by their penchants for direct action in the
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 270-71.
92 See, e.g., id. at 206-10, 269-81.
93 See generally Forbath, supra note 56.
94 
DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 23.
95 Id. The late 1800s and early 1900s witnessed several quite significant panics:
those of 1873-1878, 1893-1897, and 1908-1909. Id. In each instance, oversupply
and overproduction combined with competitive dynamics to pressure employers to
reduce production costs, something normally accomplished by some combination of
job cuts and increased efficiency and productivity. See id. at 23-24.
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workplace, unionism, and radical politics, provoked employers to
assert control over them, thus contributing themselves to the vol-
atile climate in the labor world. To a degree, these tendencies of
workers to protest their conditions no doubt reflected an inher-
ent, human appetite for control of the circumstances of our own
labor, one that operates amid all kinds of circumstances. At the
same time, the actual conditions of labor in industrial America
did little to discourage them. The realities of industrial labor
mentioned above-the appropriation of control over the produc-
tion process by employers, often by authoritarian means, em-
ployers' forceful repression of strikes and other forms of protest,
and the routinization and de-skilling of labor-were not only in-
dependent inspirations to protest. These conditions reflected
themselves in a work-life that was, for many workers, nothing
short of a living hell: unremunerative, physically dangerous, and
devoid of any intrinsic meaning. In mines, mills, and factories
throughout the country, workers toiled long hours for meager
pay, often in places far too hot or cold, amid noisy machinery,
suffused in noxious gasses and dust, in dank and darkness, and
under the control of evermore rigorous and authoritarian struc-
tures of control.96 This reality was overlaid by more immediate
causes of dissatisfaction with the lived experience of industrial
capital: chronic poverty, which was often reflected in inadequate
housing, malnutrition, and exposure to disease; disenfranchise-
ment, ghettoization, and other forms of social exclusion; and, for
many, a recognition that the social and legal order was designed
not to uplift and enlighten them, but to facilitate their utter
exploitation.97
One very common response of workers to these conditions was
to devalue work in exactly the ways that it devalued them. Usu-
ally this meant something very simple: to quit work at a whim
and look for employment elsewhere. 98 In fact, many workers
submitted to, and in some cases even embraced, the employment
insecurity characteristic of the new order, quitting work when it
became too oppressive and accepting a hand-to-mouth existence
and a life on the road as their lot.9 9 In other cases, this kind of
96 See id. at 20-23.
97 See generally WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A
HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 47-252 (6th ed. 1998).
98 MONTGOMERY, supra note 37, at 131-35.
99 KENNETH L. KUSMER, DOWN AND OUT, ON THE ROAD: THE HOMELESS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 35-72 (2002).
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protest expressed itself in more direct forms, including absentee-
ism, soldiering, and, on occasion, outright sabotage of the pro-
duction process. 100
More rational still was for workers to challenge the conditions
of industrial labor by organizing labor unions capable of pro-
testing these conditions and perhaps even wresting concessions
from employers through collective bargaining. This was by no
means uncommon in industrial America. Indeed, measured in
raw numbers, efforts at unionization in this period were rather
successful, particularly in light of all the impediments mentioned
above. Between 1897 and 1905, union membership grew from
less than 500,000 to over two million, reaching four million by the
end of the Great War.' 01 And many of these workers were will-
ing, in the face of all the repressive devices available to employ-
ers, to strike to achieve their aims. In nearly every year between
1888 and 1905, the Department of Labor counted at least 1000
strikes, with a peak of almost 3500 in 1903, and these involved
hundreds of thousands of workers annually.
10 2
However, despite its evident growth and capacity for strikes,
the labor movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was limited in several key ways. First, to a considerable
degree, its unions chose to survive by conforming themselves to
the political realities around them, adopting fundamentally con-
servative agendas dedicated to achieving marginal improvements
in working conditions." 3 Under the auspices of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and its longtime leader, Samuel
Gompers, the majority of the labor movement, for the most part,
avoided excessively militant tactics and eschewed radical goals
altogether." 4 This meant rejecting socialist or other audacious
demands to change the economic order in favor of a program,
often described as business unionism, which was built around a
commitment to labor peace, a narrow focus on improving the
wages and practical conditions of employment, a view of the la-
bor contract as inviolable, and a deference to business, and to the
corporation in particular, as a model for the internal organization
100 DINER, supra note 40, at 57-58.
101 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 30, at 178.
102 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF 1910, supra note 35, at 224 tbl.145.
103 See generally PAUL BUHLE, TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: SAMUEL GOMPERS,
GEORGE MEANY, LANE KIRKLAND, AND THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN LABOR 17-
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and overall aesthetic of the union itself. °5 This program also
meant accepting uncritically, and in many cases actively support-
ing, the most odious modes of social inequality and exclusion:
rank sexism, Jim Crow racism, and outright xenophobia. 10
6
Throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s, the mainstream labor
movement systematically either shunted women, blacks,
"Orientals," and on some occasions even Jews and other Euro-
pean immigrants who were considered less white into segregated
unions that enjoyed less access to high-wage jobs, or excluded
members of these groups entirely from union membership. 107
The conservatism of the AFL also meant that its opposition to
employer control within the workplace and employers' relentless
repression of strikes would never go much beyond a campaign
for limitations on the state's intervention in labor disputes com-
bined with occasional support for modestly protective labor laws.
A second characteristic of the labor movement in this period,
one that fed its reactionary tendencies, was the movement's con-
centration among skilled and semiskilled workers and its accom-
panying craft parochialism. A centerpiece of AFL ideology as it
emerged in this period was the union's veneration of craft iden-
tity, which championed the class superiority of skilled workers in
the social hierarchy of the working class and valorized bourgeois
social values alongside those of whiteness, Christianity, and
maleness. 108 A necessary corollary of this perspective was the
nearly complete, and quite intentional, exclusion of low-skilled
industrial workers from the ranks of organized labor. Combined
with its social exclusion, this aspect of the labor movement of the
late 1800s and early 1900s left largely unrepresented the most
exploited, alienated, and marginalized workers who were already
industrialization's greatest victims. 10 9
105 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 32, at 89-95.
106 See BUHLE, supra note 103, at 39-40.
107 See id. at 42-46. On the history of racism in the AFL, see, for example, BLACK
WORKERS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
237-373 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds., 1989) (reproducing documentary
records on this issue); and Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers and the Negro Work-
ers, 1886-1914, 40 J. NEGRO HIST. 34 (1955). On the history of sexism in the AFL,
see, for example, ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-
EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 152-59, 202-09 (1982). For a recent,
highly textured, analysis of gender and the AFL, see ILEEN A. DEVAULT, UNITED
APART: GENDER AND THE RISE OF CRAFT UNIONISM (2004).
108 See BUHLE, supra note 103, at 17-19, 39-40, 46-48.
109 In the first years of the twentieth century, the AFL did begin in an inconsistent
way to accommodate a limited degree of industrial organization, a habit that would
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There had been in the 1880s and early 1890s an important ef-
fort to organize industrial workers and to do so in (largely) so-
cially egalitarian ways: that of the quixotic Knights of Labor.
The story of the Knights of Labor's inability to translate grass-
roots enthusiasm for its radical agenda and militant sensibilities
into a viable, sustainable challenge to capitalist hegemony in the
workplace of the 1880s is a familiar one, in which deficiencies in
leadership and organization figure as prominently as cultural, ec-
onomic, and political dynamics. 1 ' The union achieved a maxi-
mum membership of over 700,000 before fading from the scene
in the 1890s and leaving the vast majority of the industrial prole-
tariat entirely unorganized. 1
There were other, isolated exceptions to this inability to
achieve successful organization; a few industrial unions managed
to establish a tenuous hold on the landscape. And it would be
out of a handful of these organizations that the IWW emerged
midway through the first decade of the twentieth century. Partic-
ularly significant in this regard were three unions: the Western
Federation of Miners (WFM), which was founded in Butte, Mon-
tana, in 1893; an offshoot of that organization, the Western Labor
Union, which emerged in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 1898; and the
American Railway Union, of which only remnants existed by the
turn of century. 112 It was not so much that these organizations
gave birth to the IWW, but rather that more militant and radical
elements of their ranks increasingly converged on the idea of
forming a union that would adhere to those sensibilities and ad-
vance them on a broader scale across all industries."13 In this
respect, antecedents of the IWW can also be located among the
membership and leadership of the Socialist Party, then at the
height of its influence.
Initial conversations on founding this new organization were
continue through the 1940s. See generally JAMES 0. MORRIS, CONFLICT WITHIN
THE AFL: A STUDY OF CRAFT VERSUS INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM, 1901-1938 (1958).
At no point until the 1930s were these efforts comprehensive or, outside of particu-
lar industries (notably coal mining), very effective. Id.
110 For the Knights of Labor's rise and fall and the role of organizational and
leadership deficiencies in this process, see, for example, Kim Voss, Disposition Is
Not Action: The Rise and Demise of the Knights of Labor, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
272 (1992).
111 See KIM Voss, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE KNIGHTS
OF LABOR AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 n.3 (1993).
112 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 34-45.
113 Id. at 44-45.
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held in Denver, Colorado, in 1904 at the WFM's annual conven-
tion.' 14 These conversations led to a meeting in Chicago early
the next year that was attended by some twenty-two delegates,
including labor and socialist activists Mary "Mother" Jones, Wil-
liam "Big Bill" Haywood, and Eugene Debs.115 The delegates
agreed to meet again in Chicago that summer to found a new
industrial union that would embrace the concept of class conflict,
dedicate itself to the concept of revolutionary overthrow of the
industrial order, and commit to an open union concept that
would organize workers along industrial lines without regard to
race, ethnicity, or gender.'1 6 With this charge, delegates recon-
vened on June 27, 1905 to establish the new labor union.
17
In launching the union, the IWW's founders conceived an or-
ganization that would transcend the AFL's class parochialism as
well as its stubborn, reactionary habits of social exclusion. They
imagined a union that would confront head-on the inherently ex-
ploitative and alienating nature of industrial capitalism." 8 On
one level, the aim in doing so was simply to redress the everyday
miseries of industrial working class life, including rank exploita-
tion, poverty, and unsafe, often physically abusive working con-
ditions." 9 On another level, the founders' ambition was to
confront the totalitarian control of labor and the production pro-
cess that employers were amassing by means of newer, rational
management strategies and by their overall rationalization of
production. 20 For the IWW's founders, both of these struggles
would remain incomplete and unfulfilled unless they reached the
root of the matter. Reform and accommodation would not be
enough. The quest for a humane, fair, and decent existence for
the working class required that the very structures of ownership,
property rights, and class hierarchy be overthrown. Acutely
aware of the role of the state as an agent of class repression, the
IWW's founders conceived of this revolutionary mission as one
that would have to be accomplished without the support of the
state or its legal system.121 These attitudes and ambitions would
114 Id. at 43-45.
115 Id. at 44-45; see also NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SO-
CIALIST 206-07 (1982).
11 6 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 43-49.
117 Id. at 46.
118 See id. at 46-49.
119 See id. at 87-88.
120 See id. at 87-88, 92-94.
121 Id. at 89.
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manifest themselves very clearly in the organization's ideology
and structure.
B. The Ideology and Practice of Radical Industrial Unionism
The IWW's ideology was, above all, militantly anticapitalist.
Intellectually, this perspective drew on a critique of capitalism
rooted in Marxian notions of the inevitability of exploitation and
class conflict and of the social priority of labor.122 It connected
this critique to the dismal life conditions that were the lot of its
intended membership, contrasting the dynamics of poverty, em-
ployer control, and violent repression with the mandate of work-
ers' autonomy and self-realization.' 23 From the syndicalist
tradition, the IWW took on a political and social vision, a uto-
pian aim, based not on the concept of state socialism, but on the
idea of a workers' commonwealth, which would seize from capi-
talism and the modern state the central role in governing the so-
cial order.124 This syndicalist orientation complemented the
IWW's deep-seated antistatism, unwillingness to compromise
with state power, and tendency to see an inviolable link between
state power and class domination.125 In other words, the syndi-
calist perspective gave intellectual grounding to the IWW's form-
ative skepticism about the role of the state in class relationships.
From its trade unionist progenitors, as well as from an overarch-
ing sense of the futility of quiescent demands for reform, the
IWW also adopted a commitment to militant confrontation with
capital. 126 Tactically, this entailed the concept of maintaining in
122 See id. at 86-87. This critique was, at the time, fairly well-established in Amer-
ican socialist circles, both historically and morally. See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.; see also Francis Shor, The IWW and Oppositional Politics in World War
I: Pushing the System Beyond Its Limits, RADICAL HIST. REV., Winter 1996, at 74,
76-78.
125 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 89-91, 95-97. The IWW's syndicalism, it must be
said, entailed above all a commitment to industrial unionism as the centerpiece of
revolutionary activism. This perspective set it apart from both the political activism
of the Socialist, and later, Communist parties; it also distinguished the IWW from
the dominant strains of European syndicalism, which often reflected a certain orga-
nizational insularity, often coming to resemble the exclusionary tendencies of craft
unionism. For further discussion of the role of syndicalism in the IWW's ideology,
see SALVATORE SALERNO, RED NOVEMBER, BLACK NOVEMBER: CULTURE AND
COMMUNITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD (1989).
126 For an analysis that stresses the IWW's syndicalist tendencies, see, for exam-
ple, SALERNO, supra note 125. On the connection between employer control and
direct action, and on how this connection influenced IWW ideology, see, for exam-
ple, MONTGOMERY, supra note 37, at 310-18.
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the workplace a constant struggle with employers: "direct ac-
tion" at the "point of production," in the form of strikes, slow-
downs, and protests, unmediated by bureaucratic discussions,
unfettered by traditional collective bargaining agreements, and
aimed as much at increasing membership and putting employers
under constant stress as it was at simply improving wages and
working conditions. 127 In this respect, direct action lent itself to
the strategic goal of IWW militancy: the eventual formation of
"one big union" embracing all true workers and poised to use its
gigantic size and tactical militancy to wrest ownership and power
from capitalists and from the capitalist state.
128
This audacious program reflected itself in various subsidiary
positions and themes that would prove significant to the eventual
emergence of criminal syndicalism laws and other stratagems to
defeat the IWW. The organization's anticapitalism was couched
in uncompromising rhetoric. The preamble to its constitution,
which captured well the union's central ideology and political
orientation, began with the following statement: "The working
class and the employing class have nothing in common .... Be-
tween these two classes a struggle must go on until the toilers
come together on the political, as well as industrial field, and
take and hold that which they produce by their labor.' 1 29 Like-
wise, the IWW's critique of state power culminated in a relentless
127 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 90. See generally SALERNO, supra note 125.
128 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 90-91.
129 THE FOUNDING CONVENTION OF THE IWW: PROCEEDINGS 247-48 (1969).
The preamble in its entirety reads as follows:
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common.
There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among mil-
lions of working people and the few, who make up the employing class,
have all the good things of life.
Between these two classes a struggle must go on until all the toilers come
together on the political, as well as on the industrial field, and take and
hold that which they produce by their labor, through an economic organi-
zation of the working class without affiliation with any political party.
The rapid gathering of wealth and the centering of the management of
industries into fewer and fewer hands make the trades union unable to
cope with the ever-growing power of the employing class, because the
trades unions foster a state of things which allows one set of workers to be
pitted against another set of workers in the same industry, thereby helping
defeat one another in wage wars. The trades unions aid the employing
class to mislead the workers into the belief that the working class have
interests in common with their employers.
These sad conditions can be changed and the interests of the working
class upheld only by an organization formed in such a way that all its mem-
bers in any one industry, or in all industries, if necessary, cease work when-
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contempt for law and its institutions, particularly the police and
the courts. 130 "No Socialist," said Big Bill Haywood in a typical
example of IWW rhetoric on this score, "can be a law abiding
citizen."'' At root, this statement reflected an understanding,
well-founded in prevailing realities, that the law and the state
were fundamentally aligned with the interests of capital, and that
it made no sense to expect these institutions to play a positive or
even neutral role in the clash of labor and capital. At the same
time, it is important to note that for the IWW, contempt for the
law and the state did not equal an endorsement of criminality, at
least not beyond defiance of laws and acts of authority used to
limit its right to strike, organize, and peacefully agitate. 132 As
one of its newspapers editorialized, "The I.W.W. does not re-
spect the law, but the I.W.W. keeps the law.
133
Just as remarkable was the length to which the IWW went in
transcending the racist, xenophobic, and sexist politics of the
mainstream labor movement. The IWW was explicitly integra-
tionist at a time of intense racism, inclusive of immigrants at a
time of significant xenophobia, and remarkably committed to
feminist ideals.' The organization also stood out for its strident
appeals to workers to assert their claims against capital uncom-
promisingly, with pride, and with a healthy contempt for middle-
class, bourgeois values of family, war and patriotism, and relig-
ion.'35 While this radical orientation on cultural matters did not
ever a strike or lockout is on in any department thereof, thus making an
injury to one an injury to all.
Therefore we, the working class, unite under the following [constitu-
tional text].
Id. The preamble was regularly reprinted in IWW publications and constantly in-
voked as a reminder of the union's founding principles. See, e.g., Preamble of the
Industrial Workers of the World, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Mar. 1919, at 1, 1;
Preamble of the I. W. W. Constitution, INDUS. WORKER, July 2, 1910, at 1; The 1WW:
A Statement of Its Principles, Objects and Methods, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY,
Nov. 1919, at 36, 36, 38.
130 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 91-92; Law, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 5, 1916, at
2.
131 PRESTON, supra note 8, at 49.
132 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 91-92.
133 The Strike and the Law, INDUS. WORKER, May 9, 1923, at 3.
134 For a concise review of the IWW's politics of inclusion and social equality, see
SOLIDARITY FOREVER: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE IWW 139-43 (Stewart Bird et al.
eds., 1985) [hereinafter SOLIDARITY FOREVER].
135 See, e.g., DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 84-97; Francis Shor, "Virile Syndicalism"
in Comparative Perspective: A Gender Analysis of the IWW in the United States and
Australia, 56 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIsT. 65, 66-67 (1999). The shining
example of the union's commitment to this vision will always be the IWW's success-
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exclude a more immediate and practical focus on wages and
other working conditions, it did define the IWW in the eyes of its
members, supporters, and enemies.
13 6
Although its membership probably never much exceeded
100,000 at any given time, and was often quite a bit smaller, the
IWW always managed to exert influence beyond its mere num-
bers. 13 7 In part, this reflected the characteristics of its member-
ship. Comprised throughout of the rejects of craft unionism, and
in particular of low-wage workers on the debased margins of the
industrial system, IWW members were, by bourgeois standards, a
somewhat indecorous lot.1 38 The typical member was a relatively
young man, impoverished and often transient, accustomed to be-
ing excluded from the cultural institutions of bourgeois life, and
with a penchant for the organization's confrontational and risky
tactics. 39 Indeed, the IWW assimilated the cultural realities of
these life conditions into its ideology, invoking them to stress the
virtues of class consciousness and solidarity, equality, and mili-
tant resistance to the status quo, as well as expectations of physi-
cal and moral courage.140 In order to further this orientation, the
IWW adhered throughout to policies of open membership and
inexpensive dues, and a universally honored membership card. 41
It immersed itself into the cultural forms of its members' margi-
nal, working-class existences, setting itself up in far-flung towns,
skid rows and red light districts, and impromptu hobo jungles.
142
Through its books, newspapers, and songs (including the well-
published Little Red Songbook), it preached constantly of the
need for workers to take pride in their historical condition and
ful efforts under black organizer Ben Fletcher to establish an interracial longshore-
men's union based in Philadelphia. See Lisa McGirr, Black and White
Longshoremen in the IWW: A History of the Philadelphia Marine Transport Workers
Industrial Union Local 8, 37 LAB. HIST. 377 (1995); see also Philip S. Foner, The
IWW and the Black Worker, 55 J. NEGRO HIST. 45 (1970).
136 On the union's tendency to make more immediate and practical demands, see,
for example, Our Immediate Demands, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Mar. 1919, at
17, 17.
137 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 200.
138 See 4 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, 1905-1917, at 115-23 (1965).
See generally SOLIDARITY FOREVER, supra note 134.
139 See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 116-20, 164-66; see also Shor, supra note 135.
140 See Shor, supra note 135, at 66-67.
141 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 85.
142 See, e.g., Ted Grossardt, Harvest(ing) Hoboes: The Production of Labor Or-
ganization Through the Wheat Harvest, 70 AGRIC. HIST. 283, 289-91 (1996).
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their central importance as workers to the human condition, ad-
vance themselves intellectually and politically, and take the fight
to their adversaries, whatever the odds.
143
Structurally, the IWW throughout remained true to its com-
mitment to organize industrial workers along industrial lines.
With very few exceptions, locals were organized on an industry-
wide basis. 144 Although IWW locals were not prohibited from
reaching contingent agreements with employers, the union ad-
hered to its opposition to formal collective bargaining agree-
ments. 145 According to the IWW, such agreements legitimated
the subordinate condition of workers vis-A-vis management and
limited workers' ability to mount effective protests. 46 The union
also remained stridently antibureaucratic, putting most of its al-
ways-slender resources into organizing, protest, and criminal de-
fense. 147 Membership and activism alike were focused in the
West and the Midwest, albeit not exclusively.148 Partly this re-
flected the location of the industries and workers on which the
union focused its organizing efforts; partly it reflected the IWW's
western ancestry.
The IWW was indeed a militant organization with truly radical
goals. At the same time, though, it was also surprisingly commit-
ted to nonviolence and passive resistance. In line with union pol-
icy, Wobblies did not, as a rule, initiate violence or engage in
serious acts of criminality. 149 But neither did the union nor its
members shrink from the use of confrontational tactics that could
and often did provoke such violent and criminal responses from
its adversaries. In fact, the IWW's membership embraced such
tactics and seemed, on occasion, even to relish the responses they
143 On the IWW's basis in working class culture, see generally SALERNO, supra
note 125; and Nicholas Thoburn, The Hobo Anomalous: Class, Minorities and Polit-
ical Invention in the Industrial Workers of the World, 2 Soc. MOVEMENT STUD. 61
(2003). On the origins of the Little Red Songbook and its role in advancing IWW
philosophy, see Richard Brazier, The Story of the I. W. W. 's "Little Red Songbook," 9
LAB. HIST. 91 (1968). On the role of hobo jungles in developing and sustaining
worker solidarity, see D.D. Lescohier, With the I.W.W. in the Wheat Lands,
HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Aug. 1923, at 371. For a review of other accounts of the
sociological underpinnings of IWW organization and politics, see Shor, supra note
124, at 89-90.
144 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 133-34.
145 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 94.
146 See id.
147 See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 115-23.
148 4 id. at 112, 116.
149 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 91-92; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 164-66.
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brought forth.'5 °
Members aggressively practiced the tactics of direct action, in-
cluding, in 1906, the country's first recorded sit-down strike. 51
They engaged in slowdowns and strikes of all sorts.' 5 2 And for a
time, beginning in 1909, Wobblies initiated a number of sensa-
tional free speech fights in cities across the West and Midwest
where potential recruits seasonally congregated: Fresno and San
Diego, California; Minot, North Dakota; Aberdeen and Spo-
kane, Washington; Missoula, Montana; and Kansas City, Mis-
souri.'5 3 In each case, trouble began with the arrest of a few
members delivering fiery soapbox speeches.' 54 Typically, this
was met by more speeches and the arrival in town of additional
IWW members, followed by more arrests, followed by more
speeches and more reinforcements. 155 Typically, too, the Wob-
blies were beaten by police and vigilantes, run through gauntlets,
set upon with dogs, fire hoses, and the like, and ultimately jailed
under horrendous conditions in local lockups and impromptu
"bullpens."' 56 The aim from the standpoint of law enforcement,
American Legionnaires, Ku Klux Klansmen, commercial clubs,
and others of that sort went beyond simply preventing the utter-
ance of radical statements, including readings from the U.S. Con-
stitution or the Declaration of Independence, to entail as well the
purging of Wobblies from their communities.157  From the
IWW's standpoint, the goals were to impress potential recruits
and adversaries alike with its determination and the strength of
its ideology and to propogate a sense of rebellious indomitabil-
150 This dynamic can be seen in the "free speech" fights that Wobblies provoked
in various towns in the first decade of its existence. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at
98-113.
151 This occurred in Schenectady, New York. It should be characterized, more
properly, as the first recorded nonmaritime sit-down strike. See MONTGOMERY,
supra note 37, at 313-14. Long before this, such strikes were common occurrences
aboard ships. See MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE
SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME
WORLD, 1700-1750, at 97-98, 110, 205 (1989); Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard
Strikes, and the Supreme Court's Subversion of New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275 (2004).
152 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, passim; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 134-37, 317-
47.
153 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 98-113; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 191-213.
154 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 100.
155 See id. at 100-03, 105-11.
156 See, e.g., infra note 207 and accompanying text.
157 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 98-113; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 191-213.
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ity."5 I Before all was said and done, scores and sometimes hun-
dreds of Wobblies would be arrested. 59 In several cases,
members disappeared or were killed. 160 But the eventual result
was almost always the same: after a few weeks, a draw based in
mutual exhaustion provided the IWW at least some recognition
of its right to speak and retain a presence in town, and gave the
town some relief from relentless IWW agitation.161
These free speech fights, which defined a period in the IWW's
history, certainly did much to raise the IWW's stature among
friend and foe alike. But these and other confrontational tactics
yielded little in the way of lasting gains in membership and orga-
nizational strength.162 Nor did the IWW's other major organiz-
ing efforts in the first ten years of its existence yield better
results. The IWW attempted to coordinate and ultimately absorb
membership from otherwise spontaneous and disorganized
strikes by steelworkers in suburban Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
(1909); mill workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts (1912) and Pat-
erson, New Jersey (1913); and timber workers in the piney woods
of Louisiana and Texas (1911 through 1913).163 Due to the ulti-
158 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 104-05.
159 See id. at 98-113; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 172-213.
160 See, e.g., 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 197-99, 201-02.
161 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, 98-113; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 191-213.
For detailed accounts of individual struggles, see also FELLOW WORKERS AND
FRIENDS: I.W.W. FREE-SPEECH FIGHTS AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS (Philip S. Foner
ed., 1981); Glen J. Broyles, The Spokane Free Speech Fight, 1909-1910: A Study in
IWW Tactics, 19 LAB. HIST. 238 (1978); Ronald Genini, Industrial Workers of the
World and Their Fresno Free Speech Fight, 1910-1911, 53 CAL. HIST. Q. 101 (1974);
Charles James Haug, The Industrial Workers of the World in North Dakota,
1913-1917, 39 N.D. Q. 85 (1971); Charles Pierce LeWarne, The Aberdeen, Washing-
ton, Free Speech Fight of 1911-1912, 66 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 1 (1975); Tom N. Mc-
Innis, Kansas City Free Speech Fight of 1911, 84 Mo. HiST. REV. 253 (1990); and
Grace L. Miller, The I.W.W. Free Speech Fight: San Diego, 1912, 54 S. CAL. Q. 211
(1972).
162 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 112-13; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 212-13.
1 63 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 114-56. The IWW's involvement in the effort
by black and white men (and a few women of both races) to organize themselves
against avaricious "timber barons" of western Louisiana and eastern Texas offers a
particularly compelling example of the IWW's other organizing efforts, as well as its
commitment to racial and class justice. See James R. Green, The Brotherhood of
Timber Workers 1910-1913: A Radical Response to Industrial Capitalism in the
Southern U.S.A., PAST & PRESENT, Aug. 1973, at 161, 174-82. On the union's
broader commitment to racial justice, see, for example, Frederick A. Blossom, Jus-
tice for the Negro, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Aug. 1919, at 30, 30-31; J.A. McDon-
ald, Race Prejudice Akin to Race Ignorance, INDUS. WORKER, May 6, 1916, at 4; The
. W. W. Is for All Races and Nationalities, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Sept. 3, 1924, at 1;
The I.W.W. Knows No Race or Color Lines, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, July 9, 1921, at 3;
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mate failure of these early efforts, the IWW all but disappeared
as a functional organization, with membership in the mid-1910s
beginning to significantly decline.164 At this time, the union be-
gan to shift its focus away from its early commitment to con-
frontational and opportunistic organizing to the more practical
and fruitful tactic of relying on roving organizers or delegates,
who were often recruited from the workforce that was the target
of organizing efforts, to advance its organizational goals.165 By
embracing this new approach, the IWW was able to make signifi-
cant and steady organizing gains, particularly among migratory
harvest hands in the Midwest and on the Pacific Coast, long-
shoremen at certain East Coast ports, and so-called timber beasts
and miners in both the Great Lakes and Pacific Northwest
regions. 66
C. The Politics of Repression
These gains would take the IWW to its peak membership of
about 100,000 in 1917.67 Remarkably, they were achieved in the
face of extensive and intensifying efforts at repression, much of
which involved relatively unsophisticated efforts of local authori-
ties. From the very outset, Wobblies, especially organizers and
strikers, were routinely harassed, run out of town, and even
forced to work by local officials armed with vagrancy, disturbing
the peace, and other petty charges; this occurred even where the
Wobblies were not involved in free speech fights.' 68 Indeed, ar-.
rests on such charges became a defining feature of the Wobbly
experience. 169 In many cases, such low-level conflict made for a
and The Negro Worker, INDUS. WORKER, June 11, 1921, at 3; Why Negroes Should
Join the I.W.W., INDUS. WORKER, July 30, 1919, at 2. On its attitude toward women,
see, for example, "Equal Pay for Equal Work?" INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 23, 1919, at
2; 1.W.W. Women on Road to Victory, INDUS. WORKER, Sept. 30, 1916, at 4; and
Women in the I.W.W., INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 25, 1928, at 3.
164 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 166-67; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 462; Steve
Golin, Defeat Becomes Disaster: The Paterson Strike of 1913 and the Decline of the
IWW, 24 LAB. HIST. 223, 242-43 (1983). The IWW's retrenchment during this pe-
riod can be understood in large part as a failure of its organizing campaigns in the
East, which has in turn been understood in part as a consequence of its failure to
prevail in the 1913 Paterson, New Jersey strike. See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at
153-67; Golin, supra.
165 See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 227-29, 474-75.
16 6 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 169-70, 181-99.
167 See id. at 200.
16 8 See Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the
Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667 (2004).
169 This experience is described in Wobbly Ralph Chaplin's biography. RALPH
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kind of guerilla war between Wobblies and police and business
interests, with many threats and beatings and the occasional
homicide; it was the Wobblies who almost always paid the higher
price in bruises and blood. 7 °
The line between vigilantism and police repression was often
difficult to make out. The results in any case could be quite seri-
ous. In 1916, in Everett, Washington, as many as thirty Wobblies
were shot and at least five killed in a waterfront ambush by depu-
tized businessmen committed to stopping them from assembling
and speaking in town. 171 The year before, an attempt by authori-
ties in Wheatland, California, to disrupt a peaceful assembly of
Wobblies and harvest workers resulted in a melee in which two
workers, a deputy sheriff, and the district attorney were killed.
172
Adhering to what was by then already a common approach to
labor violence, authorities seized the opportunity to prosecute
the workers for the deaths.173 One Wobbly and one former Wob-
bly with no apparent connection to the killings other than their
presence at the event were prosecuted and convicted under a
theory of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. 74
Perhaps even more ominous than these developments were
early hints at a campaign to invoke disloyalty, sedition, and other
state security charges against the organization and its members.
In 1911 and 1912, amid unrest following the free speech battle in
San Diego, federal authorities bowed to business agitation and
investigated a supposed bid by the IWW to extend the Mexican
CHAPLIN, WOBBLY: THE ROUGH-AND-TUMBLE STORY OF AN AMERICAN RADICAL
88-89 (1948).
170 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 124-27, 168-99; Green, supra note 163, at 180-
81, 196-98.
171 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 196-97; Donald M. Barnes, The Everett Massacre:
A Turning Point in I.W.W. History, 1 ORGANON 35, 35 (1969).
172 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 171; see also Cletus E. Daniel, In Defense of the
Wheatland Wobblies: A Critical Analysis of the IWW in California, 19 LAB. HIST.
485, 488-91 (1978).
173 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 171-73; Daniel, supra note 172, at 490.
174 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 171-72; Daniel, supra note 172, at 491, 494-95.
The IWW mounted a massive and perhaps counterproductive campaign to cause the
governor to free the two defendants. Daniel, supra note 172, at 496-505. They were
eventually paroled after more than a decade in prison. Id. at 506 n.47. Another
example of this style of prosecution occurred in 1912, when IWW leaders Joseph
Ettor and Arturo Giovannitti were indicted for murder in the death of a woman
striker shot and killed, likely by the police, in a melee at Lawrence, Massachusetts.
DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 144. Ettor and Giovannitti, who were eventually tried
and acquitted, were nowhere near the killing. Id. at 144, 148; see also 4 FONER,
supra note 138, at 335-37.
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Revolution into Southern California. 175 Fortunately for the
Wobblies, the investigation was desultory and came to nothing.
176
In 1913, amid Wobbly involvement in the Paterson, New Jersey
mill workers strike, a Wobbly named Alexander Scott was con-
victed on state charges of sedition. 77
This practice of charging Wobblies with violating state security
provisions became increasingly commonplace in the lead-up to
American involvement in World War I. One important reason
for this was the IWW's rhetoric, which persistently invoked the
idea of radical social change and the use of militant tactics to
accomplish this end. Most significant in this regard was the con-
cept of sabotage, which was central to IWW ideology and propa-
ganda, and which reflected very clearly the union's resistance to
accelerating attempts by employers to assert totalitarian control
in the workplace. From its inception until about 1917, the union
indulged a blusterous, confrontational appeal to the concept of
sabotage that, while never explicitly advocating destruction of
property, and perhaps never intending to convey a support for
destruction and violence, could be construed in such terms.
178
After 1917, though, the union was increasingly careful to explain
that its embrace of sabotage encompassed nothing more than an
affinity for tactical, on-the-job slowdowns, quickie strikes, and
the like, as opposed to actual acts of violence and destruction.1
79
Despite these attempts at disavowal, and despite the fact that
even unauthorized acts of sabotage by members were probably
extremely uncommon, the union's association with sabotage
175 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 111-12.
176 Id. While the charge itself was totally preposterous, there was a tenuous link
between the IWW and the Mexican Revolution: a number of Wobblies, including
the famous songwriter Joe Hill, who was executed in Utah in 1915, had fought in the
Revolution. See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 188; RENSHAW, supra note 17, at 147;
SALERNO, supra note 125, at 34-35.
177 See State v. Scott, 90 A. 235, 236 (N.J. 1914) (discussing the proceedings be-
low). The conviction was reversed on appeal. Id. at 237. Among other arrests and
prosecutions stemming from this affair was the conviction and jailing of Big Bill
Haywood on disorderly conduct charges. See Half Year in Jail for W.D. Haywood,
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 1, 1913, at 17; Plan to Welcome Haywood, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Apr. 28, 1913, at 5.
178 See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 160-64.
179 See, e.g., Sabotage, INDUS. WORKER, June 10, 1916, at 3. On the union's view
of sabotage, see DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 92-93; and SOLIDARITY FOREVER,
supra note 134, at 42-43, 194-96, 210-11. On the union's disclaimer of violence as a
means of social change, see, for example, The I. W. W. Does Not Plan Armed Insur-
rection; Will Control Through Job Power, INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 4, 1922, at 2; and
Where the I. W. W. Stands on Violence, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 3, 1920, at 3.
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proved both durable and easy to manipulate.18 ° More than any
other, this word would provide the IWW's adversaries with a foil
that they would use with great effect to secure the passage of
criminal syndicalism legislation.1 8 Even more tragically for the
union, its attempts to disclaim support for sabotage and violence
did nothing to avert the enforcement of these statutes against
IWW members based on the theory that individual culpability
followed from the union's alleged support for such means of so-
cial change.
182
Aggravating this dynamic was the magnitude of IWW organiz-
ing success in the lead-up to war. Even before America's actual
entry into the conflict, the war created localized labor shortages,
increased demand for minerals, lumber, and grain, and disrupted
European production of and access to these commodities. Com-
bined with better organizing methods (in particular, the traveling
delegate system mentioned above), these developments led the
union to its peak membership levels.183 At the same time,
though, these conditions raised the ire of industrial business in-
terests concerned about having to yield concessions to a militant
and increasingly well-organized and well-positioned labor force;
they also allowed these interests to present these concerns to the
federal and state governments and to the public in repackaged
form as a fear of IWW disruption of production in key wartime
industries.' 84 Opposition to the IWW was thus styled as a patri-
otic obligation in support of the war. For good measure, the or-
ganization's foes increasingly described a supposedly collusive
relationship between the IWW and the Axis powers. The notion
was totally preposterous on its face, but sadly, for the IWW, it
was often believed by a credulous public whipped into a pro-war,
180 On the meaning of sabotage for the IWW and for its adversaries, see, for ex-
ample, BRISSENDEN, supra note 17, at 279-81; and FRED THOMPSON & PATRICK
MURFIN, THE I.W.W.: ITS FIRST SEVENTY YEARS, 1905-1975, at 80-87 (1976). See
also Revival of Sabotage, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1917, at 114 (discussing the way the
term was used against the union).
181 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 37.
182 See infra Parts IV and V.
183 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 200; SOLIDARITY FOREVER, supra note 134, at
120-21. Another measure of the organization's success was a substantial increase in
income during this period from dues, initiation, and other sources. See Philip Taft,
The Federal Trials of the IWW, 3 LAB. HIST. 57, 58 (1962). Labor historian Philip
Taft estimated that the magnitude of increases in income reflected the addition of
32,000 new members between April and September 1917. Id.
184 See 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 557-58; Shor, supra note 124, at 75, 87-88.
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anti-German frenzy. 18 5 Of course, it did not help the Wobblies
that the IWW had been stridently opposed to America entering
the war, which it saw as a senseless clash of imperialist interests
paid for in workers' blood. 86 Although the organization was in-
creasingly careful to confine its antiwar agitation to written and
spoken advocacy and took no official position urging its members
to avoid the draft,'87 it is also clear that the union remained
throughout opposed to the war in its conception.
188
Beginning in 1917, the federal government began to heed the
call of influential businessmen and allow the use of regular army
troops, as opposed to state militias, many of which were being
called up for war duty, to suppress IWW strikes in western
states.189 At the same time, the military began a practice of tak-
ing control of western railroads, utilities, and other production
facilities under the guise of forestalling enemy sabotage and espi-
onage.' 90 Eventually constituting a state of localized martial law,
these military interventions were accompanied by the use of
Army and Navy intelligence resources to spy on IWW
activities.' 91
That year also saw the intensification of government use of im-
migration laws to attack the IWW. Drawing on the political tests
explicitly ingrained in immigration statutes passed in the wake of
the 1901 assassination of President William McKinley by an (al-
leged anarchist) immigrant, 192 and invoking the concept of "ideo-
logical ineligibility," the government had already by 1912
occasionally singled out some foreign-born Wobblies for exclu-
sion and deportation. 93 With America's entry to the war, this
campaign took on a much more aggressive tenor. Armed with
new legislation that was even more explicitly ideological, 94 the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice detained
185 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 215-27.
186 See Shor, supra note 124, at 78-84.
187 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 203-05.
188 See Shor, supra note 124, at 78-84.
189 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 103-17.
190 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 230.
191 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 161-62; see also JOAN M. JENSEN, ARMY SUR-
VEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, at 137-39 (1991); David Adams, Internal Mili-
tary Intervention in the United States, 32 J. PEACE RES. 197, 206-07 (1995).
192 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 66-68; see also Naturalization Act of 1906, ch.
3592, 34 Stat. 596; Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
193 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 63-87.
194 See Immigration Act of 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012; Immigration Act of 1917,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
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scores of Wobblies. 195 While relatively few were actually de-
ported, those who escaped this fate had to struggle mightily to do
so and endure huge disruptions of their lives and service to the
IWW cause.196 And, of course, many more who were never ar-
rested were likely put in fear of this fate and may have come to
rethink their commitment to radical industrial unionism.
All of this occurred in the context of continued vigilantism.
While this undoubtedly involved hundreds of incidents all over
the country, several events from the period are particularly nota-
ble. In the early hours of August 1, 1917, a leading Wobbly orga-
nizer named Frank Little was abducted from a boarding house in
Butte, Montana. 197 His abductors beat him, dragged him behind
a car until his kneecaps were scraped off, and hanged him from a
railroad trestle. 198 Little, a leader of the IWW's more radical
wing, had come to Butte to organize miners shortly before his
murder.199 Just before his death, he had delivered several fiery
speeches in which he not only denounced the mining companies,
the government, and capitalism generally, but also recounted a
statement he had made to the Montana governor: "I don't give a
damn what country your country is fighting, I'm fighting for the
solidarity of labor."2 0 Although the crime was hardly investi-
gated and never solved, it is pretty clear that Little was murdered
by agents of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company, whose
workers Little had come to help organize.210 Little's killing was
but the most serious example of a pervasive pattern of vigilante
persecution directed at Wobblies under the guise, quite often, of
patriotism and Americanism. °2
If such events were often notable for their savagery and pre-
meditation and, in the case of Little's lynching, the elimination of
195 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 181-207.
196 See id.
197 Arnon Gutfeld, The Murder of Frank Little: Radical Labor Agitation in Butte,
Montana, 1917, 10 LAB. HIST. 177, 177-78 (1969).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 178.
200 Id. at 183-84. These statements were eventually used against Wobblies in fed-
eral conspiracy prosecutions after Little's murder. Recite Threats and Fiery Talk of
Hanged IW.W., CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 24, 1918, at 9.
201 See Gutfeld, supra note 197, at 184-88; see also Butte Copper Strike Leads to
Barbarous Murder, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 4, 1917, at 1; Little Murder Result Long
Series Assaults, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 8, 1917, at 1.
202 For a detailed account of how this played out in a small town, see, for example,
Art Lee, Hometown Hysteria: Bemidji at the Start of World War 1, 49 MINN. HIST.
65, 71-75 (1984).
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one of the Wobblies' most capable organizers, vigilantism in Bis-
bee, Arizona in the summer of 1917 must stand out for its sheer
scale and audacity. Amid a miners' strike, county sheriff Harry
Wheeler and some 2000 so-called deputies captured at gunpoint
over 1000 men and, deeming them IWWs or otherwise subver-
sive, deported them by train to the New Mexico desert.2 °3 Al-
though such deportation of Wobblies was not altogether
uncommon, 204 none matched this one in size, brazenness, and
just plain recklessness. Many of the deportees, it turned out, had
absolutely nothing to do with the IWW or any militant positions
at all.205 Soldiers at a nearby encampment saved the deportees
from death by exposure, but most of them, including many per-
manent Bisbee residents, were never allowed to return to that
town.20 6 In similar episodes in a number of places during this
time, large groups of Wobblies were beaten, tarred and
feathered, and stripped and run through gauntlets. 207  Such as-
saults at the hands of police, American Legionnaires, Klansmen,
and members of commercial clubs were as much a part of the
Wobbly experience as arrests by the actual police.
It was in the context of this widespread repression that the De-
203 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 220-21.
204 Only a few days prior to the Bisbee affair, sixty-seven Wobblies were deported
from Jerome, Arizona. Whitten, supra note 18, at 16. On other deportations, see,
for example, Lee, supra note 202, at 74-75; and White supra note 168, passim.
205 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 221.
206 See id. at 220-23; see also Army to Feed I.W.W. Exiles from Arizona, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., July 14, 1917, at 3; Deported Miner's Story of Bisbee Outrage and Its
Causes, INDUS. WORKER, July 30, 1917, at 4.
207 In one infamous incident in November 1917, seventeen Wobblies were beaten
and tarred and feathered in Tulsa, Oklahoma. See James H. Fowler II, Tar and
Feather Patriotism: The Suppression of the Dissent in Oklahoma During World War
One, 56 CHRON. OKLA. 409, 425-30 (2003); Vigilantes Mob . W.W. in Oklahoma,
INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 17, 1917, at 1. Actually one of many episodes of vigilantism
during that period, this incident was typical (like Little's murder) of the way pro-war
hysteria was exploited by business interests (in Tulsa, the oil industry) to enable the
repression of IWWs. On this dynamic in Oklahoma, see SELLARS, supra note 8, at
119-212. Two years later, on Armistice Day 1919, armed Legionnaires launched an
unprovoked attack on an IWW hall in Centralia, Washington. DUBOFSKY, supra
note 7, at 259-60. Although the Wobblies inside fought back, killing four, one of the
Wobblies, a distinguished veteran of the Great War named Wesley Everest, was
eventually captured and murdered. Id. at 260; Tom Copeland, Wesley Everest, IWW
Martyr, 77 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 122, 125-26 (1986). For other examples of the mob
violence perpetuated by vigilantes see, for example, Mob Action Breaks Out Against
I.W.W. in Wyoming, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, May 13, 1922, at 1; and 8 Women Gloat
While Naked Men Are Clothed in Tar and Feathers by Fiends in Barbarous Califor-
nia, INDUS. WORKER, July 5, 1924, at 1.
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partment of Justice began in the summer of 1917 to consider seri-
ously the mass prosecution of IWW members for crimes in
violation of state security.20 8 Ironically, a deciding factor in this
development appears to have been the IWW's own frustration
over escalating persecution. Although this never entailed any
widespread violent retribution-which, it must be said, would
perhaps have been justified-the rhetoric of revenge fueled
claims that the organization posed a real threat to state secur-
ity."°9 Likewise, IWW calls for protection by the federal govern-
ment from episodes like the Bisbee affair fell on deaf ears. 10
Another factor leading to federal prosecutions was the unrelent-
ing agitation of capitalists and their champions in the media.
Fearing that vigilantism and other efforts at control had not
worked and that the IWW was steadily building momentum,
these interests clamored for federal action.
211
That summer saw a number of elements within the Justice De-
partment plotting the total destruction of the IWW. Ginned up,
in part, by ludicrous suggestions that the IWW was holding a
massive hoard of German gold that it would use to undermine
the draft,2 1 2 the Department's campaign against the union un-
folded with a series of late summer raids on IWW offices across
the country.2 13 Indictments were eventually obtained in Chicago,
Omaha, Fresno, Sacramento, and Wichita. 21 '4 About 200 Wob-
blies, including virtually the entire IWW leadership, were directly
implicated in a vast array of conspiracies.21 5 That the purpose of
all of this was to destroy the union was openly acknowledged by
some in the Justice Department.216
208 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 226; PRESTON, supra note 8, at 194-200.
209 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 222-26.
210 Id. at 222.
211 Id. at 225. One United States Attorney said the aim was "to put the I.W.W.
out of business." Philip S. Foner, United States of America vs. Wm. D. Haywood, et
al.: The I.W.W. Indictment, 11 LAB. HIST. 500, 500 (1970).
212 This ridiculous claim was refuted by the Department of Justice's own account-
ant, and yet still played a role in bringing about the prosecutions. See Taft, supra
note 183, at 60.
213 See, e.g., More Breeders of Sedition Face Drastic U.S. Action, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Sept. 7, 1917, at 2; Raid Results: Vast Extent of l.W.W. Raids Indicated by
Reports from Many Cities, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 6, 1917, at 1; U.S. Opens War on
I. W. W. Strike: Soldiers Jail 27 as 4 States Face Tie-Up, CHI. DAILY TRm., Aug. 20,
1917, at 1.
214 See Taft, supra note 183, at 57, 76.
215 Id. at 57.
216 Foner, supra note 211, at 501.
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In essence, these prosecutions involved two basic charges:
conspiracy to hinder federal laws relative to the production and
distribution of wartime goods and government adherence to war-
time contracts; and conspiracy to thwart enforcement of the
draft, encourage desertion, undermine the morale of service
members, and frustrate other policies involving the mobilization
of the wartime military.217 While sabotage, threats, and the like
were advanced by the government as means by which the IWW
supposedly sought to complete these conspiracies, the govern-
ment's theory reduced to the notion that the IWW's propensity
to strike, combined with its generally militant attitude toward
capitalism, the war, and the government, sufficed to prove
guilt.218 And given that the charges were all based in conspiracy
doctrine, the government did not need to prove that any of these
supposed means were actually brought to bear. All the govern-
ment had to prove was an agreement to achieve the alleged crim-
inal aim and the commission of some overt act in furtherance of
such aim.219
Despite the thin requirements of conspiracy liability and the
inherent vagueness of these charges, there was no genuine proof
of guilt in these cases. There could be none, as the organization
and its members were totally innocent of the charges. As it was,
the only overt acts the government could identify to support the
conspiracy charges were general statements of policy, philoso-
phy, and personal opinion, which did nothing to prove any con-
nection between the alleged aims of the conspiracies to foil the
draft and disrupt war production, and any action or belief on the
part of the organization or its members.22° Equally lacking in
217 See, e.g., id. at 506-30 (providing the Chicago indictment in its entirety); Clay-
ton R. Koppes, The Kansas Trial of the IWW, 1917-1919, 16 LAB. HIST. 338, 343
(1975). More precisely, the core of the allegations involved conspiracies to "prevent,
hinder, and delay the execution of" various federal statutes, including the Espionage
Act of 1917, the Selective Service Act of 1917, and various wartime appropriations
acts, as well as the Declaration of War against Germany, and various other congres-
sional and executive policies. See, e.g., Foner, supra note 211, at 507-09.
218 Typically, all manner of IWW propaganda, however hyperbolic or dated, was
dredged up to show guilt in this fashion. Koppes, supra note 217, at 351.
219 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 119-21.
220 See id. at 120; Foner, supra note 211, at 505. The overt acts named in the
Chicago indictment were limited to the following: reprinting of the preamble of the
IWW's constitution with its call for the abolition of the wage labor system and the
like in the IWW's newspaper, Solidarity; publication of other statements of general
revolutionary purpose and opposition to the war in Solidarity; publication of pam-
phlets and circulars containing general statements of revolutionary purpose and op-
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every case was any real evidence of agreement to bring about the
alleged aims of the conspiracy.221 In fact, the basic weakness of
the charges as well as their true basis in the politics of class domi-
nation can be seen in the fact that the IWW actually led far fewer
strikes during the war and its lead-up than its conservative rival,
the AFL.222 Furthermore, its institutional opposition to the war
was much less substantial than that of the Socialist Party, which
had severed ties to the IWW as early as 1913.23 Nevertheless,
the AFL and the Socialist Party, with the exception of a handful
of left-wing figures such as Eugene Debs (who had since left the
IWW), largely escaped persecution. 24
In any event, when the IWW cases came to trial, most defend-
ants were convicted. 5 The only major exception was in Omaha,
where the government, stalled by its own doubts about the value
of the prosecution's case, eventually dropped charges against all
defendants.2 26 Elsewhere the nature of the charges combined
with biased juries and judges to ensure easy convictions. 7 In
Chicago, for example, the jury took fifty-five minutes to convict
100 defendants of some 400 total counts.2 28 The jury in the Sac-
ramento and Fresno cases, which had been consolidated, also de-
position to the war; mailing private letters and dispatching private telegrams of
revolutionary, antiwar, or pro-labor content; and various activities involving the
shipment of a book by Emile Pouget entitled Sabotage. See Foner, supra note 211,
at 505-06.
221 On the weakness of the charges in the Chicago trial, even by the prosecution-
friendly standards of conspiracy law, see Foner, supra note 211, at 505-06. In fact,
much of the evidence put on by the prosecution in the Chicago trial tended to
demonstrate that the IWW's leadership often sought to discourage antiwar and an-
tidraft militancy. See Taft, supra note 183, at 65-68.
222 Shor, supra note 124, at 86-87.
223 Taft, supra note 183, at 73-74.
224 See id. On congenial relations between the AFL and the federal government,
and likely collusion of the two against the IWW during the war, see GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 8, at 121-25. Debs was convicted in 1918 of violating the Espionage Act
of 1917 (as amended) by delivering an antiwar speech in Canton, Ohio, in June 1918.
See SALVATORE, supra note 115, at 291-96. Of course, other groups were subjected
to government persecution for their opposition to the war, but not in such great
disproportion to their activities. See, e.g., H.C. PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OP-
PONENTS OF WAR, 1917-1918 (1957).
225 Taft, supra note 183, at 57.
226 PRESTON, supra note 8, at 136-38.
227 See id. In the words of William Preston, the IWW conspiracy juries "turned
out to be frightened, jingoistic, and vindictive, [and] all in all thoroughly sympathetic
to the government's aims." Id. at 122.
228 See Taft, supra note 183, at 74; Convict 100 LW.W. Chiefs, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Aug. 18, 1918, at 1. The 400 counts entailed some 10,000 allegations of criminal acts.
DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 250.
[Vol. 85, 649
The Crime of Economic Radicalism
liberated for only about an hour to convict some sixty
defendants.229 And in the Wichita case, where the presiding
judge assisted the United States Attorney in drafting up a new
indictment after the first two were found to be substantively
flawed,23 ° the jury took all of twenty hours to deliberate, "to be
sure."
23'
Characteristically, the IWW publicly denied that these prose-
cutions undermined its efforts; indeed, it argued that it was
strengthened by the adversity.2 32 But even before convictions
were secured, the conspiracy prosecutions had a devastating ef-
fect on the organization. Most of the union's leadership was pre-
occupied with defending themselves against these charges.233 In
fact, many defendants were unable to secure bail and were held
in often harsh conditions awaiting trial; five defendants in the
Sacramento case died in jail before trial.234 Other members who
had not been indicted lived in real fear of prosecution, particu-
larly if they assumed any leadership roles. Moreover, govern-
ment raids totally disrupted normal business functions at IWW
offices across the country.235 In some instances, in fact, Wobbly
offices were occupied by government agents for the duration of
the prosecution.236 Records were often seized.237 Union mail
was searched. 238 And IWW literature was essentially barred
from the U.S. Mail by the discretionary conclusion of the post-
master that the union's literature was indecent or subversive.239
So absurd were these controls that mail using the word "sabo-
tage" was barred, even where the word was used in correspon-
dence denouncing sabotage.240 Amid all these disruptions and in
such an overarching climate of antiradical fear, the organization
229 PRESTON, supra note 8, at 135.
230 Koppes, supra note 217, at 342-43. Notably, Judge John C. Pollock advanced
the theory to the U.S. attorney that the indictment should present the IWW itself as
"an unlawful organization, that is, that the organization itself constitutes a conspir-
acy to violate Federal laws." Id. at 343.
231 Id. at 354.
232 See, e.g., Wholesale Jailing of "Leaders" Causes Wave of Resentment but Fails
to Quell Organization Activities, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 3, 1917, at 1.
233 PRESTON, supra note 8, at 141-42.
234 Taft, supra note 183, at 77-78.
235 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 141-42.
236 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 247.
237 Id.; Foner, supra note 211, at 501.
238 PRESTON, supra note 8, at 148.
239 See id. at 144-48.
240 Id. at 147.
2006]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
and its supporters found it increasingly difficult to raise the nec-
essary funds to mount competent defenses, let alone sustain or-
ganizing momentum.241 Indeed, in the words of one authority,
the prosecutions reduced the IWW to a "defense rather than a
labor organization.
' 242
In the end, about 170 Wobblies, including much of its leader-
ship, were convicted and in most cases sent to prison, with many
defendants receiving quite severe sentences. In the Chicago case,
forty-eight defendants received at least ten-year sentences, an-
other thirty-five got five-year sentences, and total fines in that
case exceeded two million dollars.243 In the Sacramento case,
where the majority of defendants refused to offer a defense and
were not represented by counsel, all were convicted and received
jail or prison terms.244 And in the Wichita case, all twenty-seven
defendants were convicted and only one escaped a prison sen-
tence.245 In the face of a significant campaign for amnesty waged
by civil libertarians and leftists of various stripes, over the next
five years or so all of these defendants were eventually pardoned
or otherwise granted early release.246 But the damage had been
done. The trials and convictions combined with vigilantism and
other forms of repression to leave the IWW substantially weak-
ened from its more promising position of just a few years earlier.
As all of this unfolded, the IWW was overtaken by another
critical development: the Red Scare of 1919 to 1920. By 1919,
currents of xenophobia and jingoism generated by official war-
241 On the difficulties faced by the Wichita defendants in these regards, see Kop-
pes, supra note 217, at 344-48. On this and other corrosive effects of the conspiracy
prosecutions, see PRESTON, supra note 8, at 141-51.
242 Id. at 141. Although much of the defendants' representation was pro bono,
the defense efforts were hugely expensive. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 183, at 70. In
addition, the drain on funds was compounded by the inability of the membership to
move and speak freely and therefore to either raise money or maintain membership.
PRESTON, supra note 8, at 14143.
. 243 Foner, supra note 211, at 502; see also Taft, supra note 183, at 75; The Penalty:
L W.W. Members Sentenced and What Each Man Got, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 31,
1918, at 5. Most of the convictions were upheld on appeal. See, e.g., Haywood v.
United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920) (upholding conviction on most counts
against Chicago defendants).
244 Taft, supra note 183, at 78-79; see also Find 46 L W. W. 's Guilty in Trial at Sacra-
mento, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 17, 1919, at 5; L W.W's Prison Terms Run from I to 10
Years, CHI. DAILY TPIB., Jan. 18, 1919, at 8.
245 See Taft, supra note 183, at 80.
246 See id. at 80-91. Exceptions included Big Bill Haywood, who fled to the
USSR, where he died in 1926, and several other Chicago defendants, who jumped
bail in 1920.
[Vol. 85, 649
The Crime of Economic Radicalism
mongering dovetailed with growing anxieties, especially among
government and business interests, about the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion and the threat that similar upheaval would extend to the
United States.247 For the establishment, this sense of threat was
given an extra realism by a resurgent wave of industrial discon-
tent and radicalism (including organizations other than the
IWW) that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the war.248
And, of course, American troops were then deployed in parts of
Russia against the Bolsheviks.249 All of this worked against the
Wobblies. Not only did they embody the essence of American
radicalism and industrial protest; their organization's program of
radical industrial unionism was mistaken for an appendage of
Bolshevism.25 ° To a considerable degree, this reflected the rank
ignorance and indifference of the organization's enemies to the
IWW's institutional distinction from, and its ideological incom-
patibility with, the Leninist program.251 But it also reflected the
IWW's tendency to applaud the Bolsheviks' apparent victory
over capitalism and feudalism, however contingent this enthusi-
asm may have been.252
In any event, the Red Scare also found fuel in a number of
discrete episodes from this period. The year 1919 featured an
enormous wave of strikes involving over four million workers.253
Strikes in the soft-coal and steel industries that year each in-
volved over 300,000 workers.2 54 Both were defeated by manage-
ment after considerable violence and amid claims of Bolshevik
infiltration.255 Seattle was the scene of a general strike that was
crushed in some part, at least, by the efforts of its mayor, Ole
Hanson, who would soon after find his calling in an obsessive
prosecution of Wobblies on criminal syndicalism charges.256 A
number of bombings and bomb plots, too, characterized the year;
247 See generally MURRAY, supra note 19.
2 4 8 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 139-63.
2 4 9 See MURRAY, supra note 19, at 44-45.
25 0 See DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 258-59.
251 On the complex and sometimes antagonistic relationship between the IWW
and the early incarnations of Bolshevism, see, for example, Bolsheviks No More,
ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Apr. 1919, at 46, 46; see also Peter Cole, Quakertown
Blues: Philadelphia's Longshoremen and the Decline of the IWW, LF-vr HIST.,
Spring 2003, at 39.
252 MURRAY, supra note 19, at 39.
253 Id. at 9.
254 See id. at 140, 158.
255 See id. at 144-52, 154-62.
256 See id. at 63-66.
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the supposed intended targets included not only Hanson, but also
figures like United States Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.257 The au-
thors of these plots, real or imagined, were of course invariably
alleged to be radicals of one stripe or another. 8 The problem
for the Wobblies, none of whom were ever credibly linked to the
plots, was that it did not really matter which stripe. Radicals of
all sorts and all levels of culpability were presumed to be
responsible.259
This climate proved especially favorable for the development
of a number of pro-business, antiradical, and just plain reaction-
ary organizations including the Klan, American Legion, National
Association of Manufacturers, and many others who were in-
clined to merge fears of radicalism with support for reactionary
politics and economic self-interests.260  These organizations,
whose Red Scare schemes were sometimes directly abetted by
AFL leaders,26' would prove increasingly important to the en-
forcement of criminal syndicalism laws (some of which were al-
ready enacted) against the IWW.262 Though the Red Scare itself,
at least as conventionally defined, would fade by the end of 1920,
a deeper current of antiradicalism would flow onward, aug-
mented by this briefer episode.
On one level, the politics of these relentless efforts at repres-
sion are very clear, reflecting both the efforts of capitalists to use
the state to protect their interests against those of labor, as well
as the state's internalization of pro-capitalist, antiradical politics
as its own. On another level, though, the politics at work in all of
this are more nuanced, embodying in a complicated way the lib-
eral, Progressive Era tendency to preserve to the state and cer-
tain reformist actors a monopoly on managing the dysfunctions
of industrial capitalism. 263 From this perspective, which came
257 Id. at 69-71.
258 Id. at 80-81.
259 See id. at 71-73, 78-81.
260 See id. at 87-94.
261 See id. at 107-08.
262 See infra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
263 On the complicated, sometimes hostile relationship between early twentieth
century progressive politics and labor, and, in particular, labor militancy, see Fred
Greenbaum, Ambivalent Friends: Progressive Era Politicians and Organized Labor,
1902-1940, LAB.'s HERITAGE, Summer 1994, at 62. On the broader antiradical and,
in many ways, deeply reactionary (e.g., racist) tendencies of Progressive Era politics,
and on how they interacted with the movement's more enlightened tendencies, see,
[Vol. 85, 649
The Crime of Economic Radicalism
into its own in the 1910s and colored the repressive politics of
that period, radicalism of the sort embraced by the IWW was
problematic and worthy of repression not because the lot of in-
dustrial workers was generally good, or because capitalism was
beyond critique, but rather because the IWW's sort of radicalism
subverted a preferred approach to redressing these problems by
means of a reformist, bureaucratic regime of social control in
which the aims and interests of workers themselves were suitably
subordinated to the guidance of professional elites. In other
words, anti-IWW repression in the first couple of decades of its
existence reflected not only the naked class interests of capitalists
themselves and the relatively crude ideology of their intellectual
backers; it also expressed a progressive antipathy to the depth of
the IWW's revolutionary aims, solidly working-class composi-
tion, and commitment to militant methods that transgressed the
boundaries of bourgeois reformism. 264 Progressives wanted very
much to preserve the economic status quo and do so, if neces-
sary, by certain acceptable methods of control.265 They had no
inherent sympathy for the IWW's agenda.266 This situation had
the advantage of exposing the fundamental incompatibility of
IWW and liberal politics of the day and stripping away any illu-
sions among Wobblies (if they were naive enough to have them
in the first place) about the IWW's place in establishment soci-
ety. Furthermore, it made it easier for those ostensibly dedicated
to the principles of civil liberty to put them aside when abetting
the union's destruction at the hands of the state.
This climate of repression promoted the enactment of criminal
syndicalism statutes in several ways. First, the criminal syndical-
ism statutes were steeped in the same basic ideology as the epi-
sodes of repression just mentioned: a rabid resistance to the
IWW's agenda of abolishing capitalism and its social structure by
means of explicitly confrontational tactics among traditional con-
servative elements as well as many representatives of liberal pro-
gressivism. Second, criminal syndicalism laws also emerged amid
for example, MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003).
264 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 55-56.
265 See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETA-
TION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPO-
RATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE
LAW, AND POLITICS (1988).
266 See PRESTON, supra note 8, at 55-56.
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political realities that recast opposition to the IWW as an obliga-
tion of state security, and at a time when the capacity of the state
to repress by legal means had become quite considerable. Third,
criminal syndicalism laws emerged at a time when the IWW was
being weakened by these repressive forces and left less able to
resist their enactment and enforcement, if only by rhetorical
means. Finally, and ironically, a major impetus in the enactment
of criminal syndicalism statutes was a sense that the other means
of repression in play were somehow inadequate and that state
governments in particular could do more to defeat the
organization.
II
THE ENACTMENT OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LAWS
The Idaho criminal syndicalism statute enacted in the spring of
1917 was passed by a vote of 60-0 in the State House of Repre-
sentatives and 32-3 in the Senate.267 Its focus on the IWW was
overwhelmingly evident. State senators were given IWW litera-
ture prior to the vote; in introducing the legislation, its sponsor,
Senator W.G. Walker, styled it as an anti-IWW device.268 The
legislation was not only comprehended as a means of attacking
the IWW; the legislation was also intended to repress the IWWs'
challenge to employer supremacy in that state's industries.
269
And Idaho was not alone in its adherence to this pattern. In
every state that adopted a criminal syndicalism statute, the clear
reason for doing so was the persecution of Wobblies with the un-
derlying aim of protecting business interests against attempts at
IWW organizing, even as such legislation was wrapped up in the
rhetoric of public safety and state security.27°
A. The Process and the Politics of Enactment
In every state that enacted a criminal syndicalism law, the sup-
posed need to prosecute sedition and the threat of violent revolu-
tion were called on as pretexts to justify the repression of
advocacy and organization toward radical social change, however
267 Sims, supra note 18, at 512.
268 Id.; see also 1 E. Foster Dowell, A History of the Enactment of Criminal Syn-
dicalism Legislation in the United States 147 (1936) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University) (on file with Special Collections, Milton S. Eisenhower
Library, Johns Hopkins University).
269 Sims, supra note 18, at 512-13.
270 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 21-23.
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peaceful. The immediate aim was the destruction of the IWW.
During the conspiracy prosecutions and other exercises in anti-
IWW repression, official repression remained on its face an exer-
cise in protecting specific aspects of state security in wartime. In
contrast, with criminal syndicalism the notion of radical social
change, even of a purely economic sort, became a basis of crimi-
nal liability. This feature of criminal syndicalism embodied a
self-serving conception among business interests and govern-
ments that the unrest occasioned by the activism of Wobblies in-
hered in the existence of radicalism itself, and not, for example,
in the social conditions that such radicalism addressed.271
The IWW was not the only target of such legislation. Other
groups targeted by these statutes included, from time to time and
place to place, populist farmers' organizations (in particular the
Non-Partisan League, a group especially active in North Dakota
and Minnesota); militant trade unions, even if not particularly
radical (like the United Mine Workers of America); and, with the
advent of the postwar Red Scare, Socialists and Communists.27 2
Moreover, the local nature of these laws meant that the politics
of their enactment were framed by the particular array of busi-
ness interests in that state, the peculiarities of local ideology, and
the way these factors tended to elevate certain threats above
others.273 So it was that anti-Non-Partisan League sentiments
were especially relevant in the upper Midwest and concerns
about the United Mine Workers uniquely significant in the east-
ern coal belt.274 Yet, in almost every place where these laws were
initially enacted, the dominant threat to business interests and
the most visible specter of intolerable radicalism remained the
IWW. 2 7 5
The politics of class were not only ideologically relevant to the
enactment of criminal syndicalism statutes; they were relevant in
more immediate ways as well. In some instances, the politicians
responsible for the enactment of criminal syndicalism laws were,
as businessmen, themselves the likely beneficiaries of these stat-
271 Dowell puts it: "The economic and social problem[s] [of the time] became an
I.W.W. or Communist problem and led to an attack on unpopular doctrines and
groups." Id. at 46.
272 See id. at 48-49, 92-93.
273 See id. at 48-55.
274 See id. at 48-50, 92-93.
275 Id. at 51.
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utes' destructive effect on radical labor. 6 Even where this was
not the case, legislators and governors were often social intimates
of the owners and managers of business interests, who could then
draw on such connections to advance these bills through the pro-
cess.277 And, in most cases, too, the enactment of these statutes
was also promoted by private groups driven by their own ideo-
logically institutionalized class interests.27s These included attor-
neys and business leaders, business organizations like the
Chambers of Commerce and the various manufacturers' associa-
tions, law enforcement organizations, and patriotic groups like
the American Legion and any number of "Home Guards" and
"Defense Committees." 279 In Dowell's words:
In practically every state where a criminal syndicalism bill
was passed, there is evidence of a bill having been sought by
those interests and industries which were having trouble with
the I.W.W., feared trouble with them, or were apprehensive
concerning the effect of the I.W.W. and radical doctrines on
the more conservative unions in a period of labor unrest.
280
The passage of these statutes was also supported by the main po-
litical parties (more often Republican than Democratic) as well
as the local and national press.28'
At the same time, the politics behind the enactment of crimi-
nal syndicalism laws involved more than simple repression. In-
stead, as with many examples of Progressive Era policy, the
politics of repression were often closely married to the politics of
reform. Criminal syndicalism statutes often emerged in the late
1910s as part of a more comprehensive program geared not only
toward the destruction of radical labor activism, but also toward
a reconciliation of conservative business interests with reformist
labor politics. 282 It was precisely for this reason that labor orga-
nizations of such a political bent sometimes worked to secure the
276 Id. at 54-55.
277 Id. at 55-56.
278 Id. at 56-58.
279 See id. at 51-68. On the lobbying efforts of Chambers of Commerce and other
business groups, see also Whitten, supra note 18, at 26.
280 DOWELL, supra note 11, at 51.
281 See id. at 68-76.
282 On the importance of this dynamic to the passage of Washington's criminal
syndicalism statute, see Tripp, supra note 18, at 43. On this dynamic more generally,
see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 63-101.
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passage of criminal syndicalism legislation.283
In practice, the rhetoric of enactment typically featured a puta-
tive public safety and state security dimension, which took the
form of a great deal of ominous hyperbole about the supposed
danger of the IWW's tactics, associations, and ultimate goals.
Thus, the relevant debates, if they can be called that, often came
to resemble the conspiracy trials in their use of unsubstantiated,
sensationalized assertions about the IWW's practice of sabotage
and use of physical violence, its connections to Imperial Ger-
many and Bolshevik Russia, and (more accurately) its support
for racial justice and gender equality.28 4 Using his 1919 inaugural
address to push the need for anti-IWW legislation, California's
governor denounced the IWW as Bolsheviks; he called them
"skulking wielders of the torch of contemptible setters of time
explosions [and] bitter enemies of all honest workers [who] did
all in their power to aid the enemy. '2 5 With this type of rheto-
ric, the enactment of criminal syndicalism legislation was
presented as essential to the maintenance of state security and
social order and to preventing society's descent into an unthink-
able abyss of destruction, anarchy, and economic ruin.28 6 Conve-
niently absent from the discussion was any confession of these
laws' more genuine and immediate purpose in relieving busi-
nesses of the IWW's radical challenge to their political and eco-
nomic supremacy and in preserving a social system built on
inequality and exploitation. 87
In most cases, this dynamic resulted in the swift passage of
criminal syndicalism legislation, usually without the benefit of
any real debate.28 8 In few cases, too, were amendments added
that meaningfully narrowed the definition of culpability. 28 9 In-
283 This was the case in a number of states, especially insofar as it involved the
machinations of AFL unions. See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 63-64.
284 Id. at 76-79. Not coincidentally, the chief sponsor of Oklahoma's law is de-
scribed by one historian as "[a] well-known racist and Red-baiter who urged the
deportation of leftists." SELLARS, supra note 8, at 135. In California, supporters of
criminal syndicalism legislation invoked the threat of sabotage supposedly made by
Wobblies in the wake of the Wheatland episode; so twisted was the rhetoric that
even serious attempts by the IWW to agitate against sabotage were construed as
coded endorsements of the practice. See Whitten, supra note 18, at 10.
285 Whitten, supra note 18, at 22 (quoting California Governor William D.
Stephens).
286 DOWELL, supra note 11, at 78.
287 See id. at 76-79.
288 See id. at 47, 78-81.
289 See id. at 81-87.
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deed, Idaho's experience in passing its law with only three dis-
senting votes proved typical. In six of the twenty-one states and
two territories to adopt criminal syndicalism statutes, the statutes
were enacted without a single dissenting vote; in eleven other
states, unanimity prevailed in one or the other house; and in only
six states were the votes close.29 °
To be sure, efforts to pass criminal syndicalism laws failed in a
number of state legislatures as well as in Congress.29' In every
case where this occurred, the failure was, predictably, not the re-
sult of counterlobbying or agitation by the IWW or any other
radical group; rather, failure was the product of either the scat-
tered efforts of mainstream labor organizations, farmers' groups,
and civil liberties organizations, or else the halfheartedness of
supporters' efforts.292 Equally notable is that these unsuccessful
efforts at enacting criminal syndicalism laws mostly occurred in
the 1920s and early 1930s, when the apparent threat posed by the
IWW had receded.293
By 1921, criminal syndicalism statutes were in place in the ter-
ritories of Alaska and Hawaii and in twenty-one states: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming.2 94 And like Idaho's, these jurisdictions'
criminal syndicalism laws were serious felony statutes poised to
inflict real damage on the IWW and its cause of economic
radicalism.2 95
B. The Form and Structure of Criminal Syndicalism Statutes
Idaho's statute was the work of a Boise attorney, Benjamin W.
Oppenheim, who had been approached by representatives of the
local lumber industry and law enforcement to write a bill that
could be used to criminalize the IWW.2 9 6 Oppenheim was called
on because his clients' previous attempts to write such a bill on
290 d. at 87-88.
291 See id. at 89-116 (discussing unsuccessful attempts to enact syndicalism laws).
292 See id. at 111-16.
293 Id. at 111. In still other instances, the initial failure to enact a bill was made
good by subsequent successful efforts. See id. app. I, at 148.
294 Id. at 18-19, app. I, at 147.
295 See id. at 18-20.
296 ALBERT F. GuNNs, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CRISIS: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST,
1917-1940, at 37 (1983).
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their own had been greeted with some skepticism by the state's
senate judiciary committee.297 In drafting Idaho's criminal syndi-
calism law, Oppenheim apparently hewed closely to a Wisconsin
antianarchy statute, which was based on the antianarchy statute
New York passed in 1902 in the wake of the assassination of
President McKinley.298 Years later, he would confess that his cli-
ents' aim in getting the legislation drafted and enacted was to
suppress IWW agitation. 99
If imitation is the key measure of success, it must be said that
Oppenheim did an outstanding job, because the statute he
drafted for introduction in Idaho became the template for the
majority of jurisdictions that adopted criminal syndicalism
laws.3 °° The criminal syndicalism laws of several states and terri-
tories, including California, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada,
Ohio, and Washington, were (in their initial form, at least) near
carbon copies of the Idaho measure.3"1 Further, while other leg-
islatures altered the language and form of Oppenheim's original
bill, even they clearly drew their inspiration from it and remained
true to its basic concepts and logic. 30
2
The opening provision of the statute is an attempt to define the
concept of criminal syndicalism. Section 1 provides simply that
"[c]riminal syndicalism is the doctrine which advocates crime,
sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means
297 Id.
298 See id. at 37-38; Sims, supra note 18, at 513; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8,
at 68. Cf VERITY BURGMANN, REVOLUTIONARY INDUSTRIAL UNIONISM: THE IN-
DUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD IN AUSTRALIA 215-28 (1995) (discussing Aus-
tralian statutes passed in 1916 and 1917).
299 Id. at 37; Sims, supra note 18, at 512-13 (citing Letter from Benjamin W. Op-
penheim to E. Foster Dowell (June 4, 1934), in 1 Dowell, supra note 268, at 143-44).
300 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 17 & nn.22-23 (citing the Idaho criminal syndi-
calism statute, which was the first of its kind, for the most common definition of
criminal syndicalism). Kentucky's main criminal syndicalism statute, for example,
paired criminal syndicalism with sedition, and was ultimately quite a bit more elabo-
rate than those that adhered more closely to the model statute. See Act of March
25, 1920, ch. 100, 1920 Ky. Acts 519. Likewise, West Virginia's criminal syndicalism
provision was a brief passage embedded in a law banning the display of red or black
flags. Act of Feb. 13, 1919, ch. 24, 1919 W. Va. Acts 153. Wyoming's statute also
stands out for its brevity. See Act of Feb. 22, 1919, ch. 76, 1922 Wyo. Sess. Laws 110.
301 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 17-19 (examining the typical structure of crimi-
nal syndicalism statutes); see, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1919, ch. 188, 1919 Cal. Stat. 281;
Act of Apr. 29, 1919, ch. 186, 1919 Haw. Sess. Laws 253; Act of Mar. 14, 1917, ch.
145, 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws 459; Act of Apr. 25, 1919, ch. 382, 1919 Iowa Acts 493.
302 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 17-19 (noting the states that modified either
the definition of criminal syndicalism, the structure of the statute, or both).
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of accomplishing industrial or political reform."3 3 Neither in
this section nor anywhere else did Oppenheim attempt to ground
the meaning of criminal syndicalism in the literal concept of syn-
dicalism-that is, in the idea of social change by means of collec-
tive worker action organized along industrial lines. Indeed, by
Oppenheim's draft, syndicalism in this substantive sense re-
mained doctrinally irrelevant to the question of culpability; his
use of the term seems significant only as a means of identifying
the crime rhetorically with the IWW.
Of somewhat greater technical significance are Oppenheim's
attempts in section 2 to lay out the specific means by which crimi-
nal syndicalism might be committed. Section 2 subsection 1 con-
demns as a felon any person who "[b]y word of mouth or writing,
advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."3 °4 Sub-
section 2 criminalizes the printing, publication, editing, distribu-
tion, sale, or display of "any book, paper, document, or written
matter" that either advocates or contains the doctrine of criminal
syndicalism.3" 5 Subsection 3 criminalizes "[o]penly, wilfully and
deliberately justify[ing], by word of mouth or writing, the com-
mission or the attempt to commit" criminal syndicalism. 30 6 In
addition, subsection 4 criminalizes the act of organizing, helping
to organize, becoming a member of, or voluntarily assembling
with "any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to
teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism., 30 7 The
penalty for committing each of these acts outlined in section 2 is
fairly severe: up to ten years in prison, a fine of up to $5000, or a
combination of the two.30 8 Section 3 then provides that any "as-
semblage" for "the purpose of advocating or teaching" criminal
syndicalism is "unlawful" and that "every person voluntarily par-
ticipating therein by his presence, aid or instigation is guilty of a
felony" and may be punished by up to ten years in prison, a fine
of up to $5000, or both.30 9
The essential thrust of these provisions is clear enough: Op-
303 Act of Mar. 14, 1917, ch. 145, § 1, 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws 459, 459-60.
304 Id. § 2(1), 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws at 460.
305 Id. § 2(2).
306 Id. § 2(3).
30 7 Id. § 2(4).
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penheim's statute and all the others patterned after it essentially
defined criminal syndicalism as the advocacy for, publication of,
or participation in a group that seeks to advance the view that
certain prohibited means (including crime, sabotage, and vio-
lence) be employed to bring about industrial or political
change.31° It did not on its face criminalize the abstract belief in
or pursuit of industrial or political change; nor did it define the
range of prohibited conduct (the element of advocacy, broadly
construed) in terms of inherently criminal behaviors. As a result,
what mattered most to the question of liability was whether these
elements of the crime were linked by the defendant's invocation
of the prohibited means: that is to say, where advocacy of social
change entailed an appeal to the prohibited means. It was for
this reason that liability would, formally speaking, turn on just
what those means comprised and just what it meant to urge the
use of crime, violence, sabotage, and the like as ways of achieving
a change in the social order.
The inherent ambiguity of these terms made for real uncertain-
ties about the limits of liability under this legislation and the
other statutes patterned after it. Did strikes and the advocacy of
strikes, for example, constitute prohibited means? Were strikes a
form of sabotage on account of their disruptive effect? Or did
they satisfy the element of violence or crime simply because vio-
lence and crime were frequent results of strike activity? Could
the same be said about terrorism? And was the very concept of
unionism criminal in the same ways? The pitfalls inherent in
these ambiguities were not lost on mainstream opponents of
criminal syndicalism laws, who wondered openly during the legis-
lative process whether a statute drafted in such fashion would
criminalize the activities of mainstream labor unions.31' Nor
were they lost on advocates of free speech, who could hardly ig-
310 A final provision of Oppenheim's statute, adopted in some form by a number
of other jurisdictions, created a separate misdemeanor of providing a forum for the
discussion of criminal syndicalism. Section 4 held that "[t]he owner, agent, superin-
tendent, janitor, caretaker, or occupant of any place, building or room," who either
knowingly permitted that place to be used by persons committing the felony de-
scribed in section 3 or permitted it to be used in that fashion (presumably irrespec-
tive of actual knowledge) "after notification that the premises are so used . . . is
guilty of a misdemeanor" and may be punished by up to one year in the county jail,
a fine of up to $500, or both. Id. § 4, 1917 Idaho Sess. Laws at 460-61.
311 On the (largely futile) expression of this concern by representatives of main-
stream labor organizations, see GUNNS, supra note 296, at 38-41; and Whitten, supra
note 18, at 24-25.
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nore these statutes' explicit criminalization of speech and associ-
ation even where unaccompanied by any other conduct.312
In fact, many jurisdictions would eventually try to define more
clearly the elements of the crime, in particular the concept of
sabotage.313 For example, in 1925 Idaho added a provision defin-
ing sabotage in part as, "improper use of materials; loitering at
work; slack work; slowing down work or production; [and]
scamped work." '3 1 4 In most other jurisdictions, the need to de-
fine sabotage was already anticipated when the initial statute was
enacted. Minnesota's criminal syndicalism law, though enacted
only a month after Idaho's, ventured to define sabotage as "mali-
cious damage or injury to the property of an employer by an em-
ploye[e]. 315 While some jurisdictions followed Minnesota's lead
by adopting similarly terse clarifying language,316 others tackled
the problem with greater verbosity. Montana, for example, de-
fined sabotage as
malicious, felonious, intentional or unlawful damage, injury or
destruction of real or personal property of any form whatso-
ever, of any employer, or owner, by his or her employee or
employees, or any employer or employers or by any person or
persons, at their own instance, or at the instance, request or
instigation of such employees, employers, or any other
person.317
312 See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 18, at 25; Case Comment, Criminal Syndicalist
Act: Constitutional Law: Validity of the Act Under the Free Speech Clause, 10 CAL.
L. REv. 512, 517 (1922).
313 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 18, 83.
314 Act of Feb. 21, 1925, ch. 51, § 1, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws 75, 76. The statute was
amended to avoid the narrow construction of sabotage given by the Idaho Supreme
Court the previous year in Ex parte Moore, 224 P. 662 (Idaho 1924).
315 Act of Apr. 13, 1917, ch. 215, § 1, 1917 Minn. Laws 311, 311.
316 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1919, ch. 118, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 281, 281 (defining
sabotage "as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical
property"); Act of Mar. 23, 1918, ch. 38, § 1, 1918 S.D. Sess. Laws 43, 43 ("Sabotage
means willful and malicious damage or injury to the property of another.").
317 Act of Feb. 21, 1918, ch. 7, § 2, 1918 Mont. Laws 14, 15. Cf. Act of Mar. 15,
1919, ch. 70, § 2, 1919 Okla. Sess. Laws 110, 111; Act of Feb. 3, 1919, ch. 12, § 2, 1919
Or. Laws 25, 25; Act of Feb. 17, 1919, ch. 127, § 2, 1919 Utah Laws 347, 347 (all using
language substantially identical to that in the Montana statute). Another way that
statutes departed from Oppenheim's original model was in overall length and scope.
Some jurisdictions, like Wyoming, opted to condense Oppenheim's statute. The Wy-
oming legislature accomplished this by dropping the provisions on publication and
assembly while retaining the provisions on advocacy. Act of Feb. 22, 1919, ch. 76,
1919 Wyo. Sess. Laws 110; see also Act of May 12, 1919, ch. 255, 1919 Mich. Pub.
Acts 452. Indiana, for its part, adopted a statute that made no specific reference to
criminal syndicalism at all; instead, it incorporated into a flag law a provision prohib-
iting anti-status quo conduct and advocacy only in the briefest, most general terms.
[Vol. 85, 649
The Crime of Economic Radicalism
In California, one legislator tried unsuccessfully another ap-
proach to the problem: removing the word "sabotage" entirely
from the original bill.318
None of the attempts at clarifying the meaning of sabotage did
much to nail down the formal meaning of criminal syndicalism, at
least not in a fashion that would be relevant at the level of police
administration and prosecution. The definition of prohibited
means like sabotage, violence, terrorism, and criminality re-
mained uncertain and subject to very broad interpretation. The
ambiguity that followed was compounded even further by the
fact that the conduct criminalized by these statutes included not
only outright advocacy of the use of the prohibited means to
achieve social change, but also a number of even more passive
conditions: membership in organizations committed to the use of
such means of social change, assemblage for the purpose of crim-
inal syndicalism, publication and distribution of criminal syndi-
calism literature, and so forth.3 19 The same compounding effect
followed from the terms political and industrial change.
Given these layers of uncertainty, it would inevitably fall to
police, prosecutors, and judges to determine who would face lia-
bility. Thus, the antiradicalism of criminal syndicalism laws
would be reflected twice: first, in their enactment, and second, in
the manner of their enforcement. The statutes presented police,
prosecutors, and trial judges with a dilemma of under- and over-
inclusion. Interpreted narrowly, they would not criminalize
much of what the IWW was actually doing, and would fail to
realize their proponents' aim. Interpreted broadly, the statutes
would criminalize many organizations besides the IWW, includ-
ing some that were quite conventional. These officials avoided
Act of Mar. 14, 1919, ch. 125, § 2, 1919 Ind. Acts 588, 589. Arizona also adopted
such a quasi-criminal syndicalism law, embedding the essence of such a law (includ-
ing advocacy, publication, and assemblage provisions) in a sabotage statute. Act of
July 2, 1918, ch. 13, §§ 3-4, 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws 51, 51-52. Kentucky chose the
opposite approach, enacting in 1920 a criminal syndicalism statute of some length
that incorporated several additional bases of criminal liability, including the separate
crime of "sedition"; the criminalization of malfeasance by "peace officers" who
failed to disperse unlawful assemblies under the act; and the addition of a felony
murder component to the statute. See Act of Mar. 25, 1920, ch. 100, 1920 Ky. Acts
519.
3t8 Whitten, supra note 18, at 14; see also Amend Measure on Syndicalism, L.A.
Times, Apr. 19, 1919, at 14; Assemblymen Clash on Syndicalism Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 1919, at 19. The amendment was rejected, as was the bill, which did not
pass that session. Whitten, supra note 18, at 15.
319 See supra text accompanying notes 304-09.
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this dilemma in the crudest fashion: by selective prosecution.
They construed the statutes broadly, such that the prohibited
means could encompass all manner of labor organizing and polit-
ical activity; then they applied the statutes in a transparently se-
lective fashion, criminalizing only the conduct of the IWW and a
few other radical groups. Thus did the criminal syndicalism stat-
utes become, on a very fundamental level, devices for criminaliz-
ing membership in the IWW. In giving these statutes this effect,
the authorities revealed very clearly the depth of their own com-
plicity in the use of criminal syndicalism laws to foreclose radical
challenges to the social order with little regard to technical ques-
tions of liability. The following reaction to the enactment of
Michigan's statute was printed in an IWW publication: "It is not
the bill itself that is any danger to us. It is the use the capitalist
class are going to make of it, through their hirelings in office.
320
III
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LAWS
In the enforcement of criminal syndicalism laws, guilt was
largely premised on the simple fact of membership in or associa-
tion with the IWW, or, to be more precise, on the basis of con-
duct suggestive of such a relationship to the IWW. Speech in the
literal sense was only infrequently a basis for arrest or prosecu-
tion. Criminal syndicalism laws were much more devices for
criminalizing the radical than they were means of undermining
radical speech. Moreover, the criminalization of radicalism in
the enforcement of these statutes had nothing to do with pre-
empting violent acts. No one anywhere in the available records
appears to have been prosecuted under these laws for actually
advocating social change by actual means of sabotage, terrorism,
violence, or anything of the sort.
In the late 1910s and early 1920s, thousands of people were
charged with criminal syndicalism and hundreds were convicted
and sent to prison. The vast majority of this occurred in a hand-
ful of states in the West and Pacific Northwest and in scattered
jurisdictions in the Central Plains and Midwest. Throughout all
320 What an Anti-Syndicalist Law Looks Like, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Aug.
1919, at 45, 45. This sentiment was expressed elsewhere in the same IWW publica-
tion: "[A]s with so many other laws, it isn't the wor[d]ing that decides what they are,
it's the motive behind them and the use they are being put to." The Anti-Syndicalist
Laws, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Apr. 1919, at 9, 9.
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of these areas, too, a definite pattern of enforcement prevailed.
The impetus or logic of enforcement reflected the same key dy-
namics that led to the enactment of these laws: an entrenched
ideology that cast the IWW as a genuine danger to the social
order deserving of obliteration and a more practical desire to
bring the criminal law to bear in undermining the IWW's ability
to organize workers against employers in particular labor dis-
putes. Accordingly, the majority of defendants who were
charged with criminal syndicalism were IWW members or or-
ganizers or were thought to be in league with the organization.
Moreover, American Legionnaires, business groups, or actual
businessmen with immediate interests in the use of these laws
against the IWW frequently instigated enforcement.
A region-by-region review of criminal syndicalism enforce-
ment practices in California, the Pacific Northwest states, and the
Plains and Midwest states provides a sense of just how universal
and pervasive this pattern of enforcement was.
A. California
In California, enforcement of criminal syndicalism laws was
both intensive and widespread. Modeled on Oppenheim's stat-
ute, California's criminal syndicalism law cast a wide net, expos-
ing "to arrest and charge anyone deemed by the authorities to be
spreading dangerous ideas, without any serious deliberation over
whether the technical prerequisites of the law itself had been
met."3 ' Of course, the technical prerequisites of the law dimin-
ished in relevance precisely because of the inherent ambiguity of
the statute itself. In a period of only about five years, beginning
a mere week after the statute's enactment and ending in the sum-
mer of 1924, the state formally charged over 500 defendants with
criminal syndicalism and arrested or threatened countless others
with arrest.3 2 This enforcement campaign focused almost en-
tirely on people connected to the IWW.
The first arrest under California's criminal syndicalism law oc-
curred in San Francisco on May 22, 1919, only a few weeks after
the statute went into effect and amid considerable but unfounded
hysteria about impending IWW terror campaigns and other out-
rages.323 Initial scattered arrests in the Bay Area were followed
321 Rohde, supra note 18, at 316.
322 Whitten, supra note 18, app. at 66.
323 Id. at 26-27.
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by a raid on an IWW hall in Stockton on June 29, in which
nineteen Wobblies were arrested for criminal syndicalism.
3 24
This was followed a few days later by a raid in Oakland, in which
several men and a woman were arrested, and another in San
Francisco, which netted several more people.325 Most of those
arrested were released after a short time and never charged.326
And yet, before the summer was over, authorities in the Bay
Area charged more than sixty people, all but two of whom were
Wobblies or alleged Wobblies.327 In Fresno in June, the union's
secretary for the state was arrested.328 Later that fall and winter,
authorities in Los Angeles followed suit, launching their own
campaign against the IWW.3 29 By February 1, 1920, the Califor-
nia police had arrested ninety IWW members.33 °
Despite their accompanying rhetoric, these enforcement cam-
paigns were hardly spontaneous reactions to any real efforts to
overthrow the social order. The real intent behind them was far
more peremptory: to cleanse these areas of Wobblies. 331 To be
sure, the arrests were backed to some extent by claims that the
IWW was behind isolated bombings and threats of bombings di-
rected at prominent people in the Los Angeles and Bay areas.332
But these acts were never linked to the IWW, least of all in the
subsequent prosecutions of some of the arrestees on criminal
syndicalism charges. Such rhetoric was merely obfuscating, jus-
tificatory, and designed to negate the otherwise obvious and un-
324 Id. at 30.
325 California Syndicalist Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 9, 1919, at 4.
326 Id. ; see also California Cases of Criminal Syndicalism, NEW SOLIDARITY, Sept.
6, 1919, at 3.
327 See Whitten, supra note 18, at 31.
328 State .W. W. Leader Arrested in Fresno, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1919, at 12.
329 Whitten, supra note 18, at 33; see also The Gruesome Story of American Ter-
rorism: Installment No. 4, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, June 1920, at 37, 37 [herein-
after Gruesome Story Installment No. 4]; Jails Yawn for the I.W.W, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1919, at IV14; Urge All Citizens to Watch Radicals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1919, at 12 (describing Los Angeles authorities' appeal to citizens to report sus-
pected radicals for criminal syndicalism prosecution).
330 California and "Criminal Syndicalism," ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Apr.
1920, at 15, 15. On California's initial campaign against the IWW, see also Against
Delay of Red Trials, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1919, at 118; Every Red an Active Criminal,
Say Authorities; Arrests Started, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1919, at I1l; High Price for
Trouble-Making, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1919, at II1; Indicts Three Held as Reds, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1919, at 1112; and Puts I.W.W. in Treason Class, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1919, at Il1.
331 See Whitten, supra note 18, at 28-29.
332 See id. at 27-29.
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comfortable fact, which was pointed out by a contemporary critic
of California's use of this law, "that the accused were, without
exception, inoffensive persons [and] that in not a single instance
were they as individuals shown to be a menace to the peace and
order of the community.
333
Over the next five years or so, local authorities continued to
arrest Wobblies on slender evidence, if any at all, that they
sought to overthrow the social order. Even where the impetus
for prosecution was not rooted in a sense of the organization's
overall strength in a particular locality, as in these initial cam-
paigns, it often concerned a pending labor dispute. In many in-
stances, these prosecutions in California were focused temporally
on moments of apparent upsurge of IWW activity and, more spe-
cifically, on IWW strikes and other organizing activities. In such
cases, enforcement regularly resulted in mass arrests, sometimes
involving dozens or even hundreds of victims. 334 Many Wobblies
were charged with syndicalism after being arrested on the picket
line.335
This was the case in Southern California during the early win-
ter of 1922 at a waterfront strike in San Pedro. The strike devel-
oped when shipowners and stevedore companies blacklisted all
Wobblies in an effort to prevent IWW inroads among longshore-
men.336 Employers and officials "declared war" on the union.
Police would eventually arrest hundreds of Wobblies and sup-
porters, some while engaged in protests.337 Others were arrested
preemptively to stop strikes by raids on union halls.338 One raid
resulted in the arrest of 300 on syndicalism charges.339 Only a
few of these arrestees were eventually charged with criminal syn-
333 GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, A SURVEY OF THE WORKINGS OF THE CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM LAW OF CALIFORNIA 10 (1926).
334 Whitten, supra note 18, at 54-58.
335 See, e.g., Wobbly Suspects Jailed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1922, at II1.
336 Shipowners to Fight L W. W., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1922, at 111.
337 See L.A. Arrests Wob Pickets, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 23, 1922, at 1; 200 Arrests
in Cal. Jury Trials Clog Up Courts; Police Mad, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 6, 1923 at 1;
Unjust Criminal Syndicalism Law Issue in San Pedro Fight, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Dec. 30, 1922, at 1; see also No Justice for LW.W. in Calif., INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 20,
1923, at 1; Thirty-Six Reds Seized in Police Harbor Raids, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,1922,
at II1; Wobblies Grip Marine Union, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1922, at IV14.
338 Forbid Strike Meetings, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1923, at 13; Record Haul of Reds
Caught in Harbor Net, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1922, at 111.
339 The arrests took place over the course of several months. See Raids on Wob-
bly Nest at Harbor Net 300 Reds, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1923, at Ill.
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dicalism.3 4° But in a great example of the Wobbly spirit of soli-
darity, fifteen of those arrested but not charged with criminal
syndicalism, along with fifty other men, demanded (to no avail)
to be charged with criminal syndicalism as well.34 1
Thus, criminal syndicalism arrests often followed when police
found Wobblies in the act of organizing or seized them in raids
on union halls. However, at times, police also made such arrests
on the simple basis of IWW membership.342 In either case, these
arrests were abetted by the work of employers, Legionnaires, or
other reactionary elements.343 In one instance, the Ku Klux Klan
accompanied the police on an April 11, 1924, raid on the San
Pedro hall that resulted in several criminal syndicalism
charges.3 44 Organizer H.M. Edwards was arrested in Fortuna on
July 14, 1921, after the foreman of a lumber camp reported him
to the authorities, who then found IWW literature on his per-
son.3 45 Moreover, Wobblies were often simply arrested in the act
of organizing,346 or when found to possess radical literature.347
Distributing IWW newspapers or other literature on the street
frequently led to arrests as well. 348  Still others were arrested
340 See Whitten, supra note 18, at 58.
341 Id. at 56.
342 See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 226 P. 637, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (noting that
the defendant was arrested by a night watchman and charged with criminal syndical-
ism after an IWW membership card was found on his person).
343 On the role of Legionnaires in enforcement, see Legion Seizes "Red" Library,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1919, at 111; Pledge All to Their Country, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1919, at 13; Slav, Red Papers Seized, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1919, at i1l (reporting that
Legionnaires raided homes armed with "search warrant"); and To Drive Reds from
the City, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1919, at IV14.
344 More Arrests in South Cal., INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 19, 1924, at 1.
345 Criminal Syndicalism Against Live Delegate Is Charged at Eureka, INDUS.
WORKER, Aug. 20, 1921, at 1.
346 See, e.g., Frank Sherman, Justice in California Meted Out to Workers, INDUS.
WORKER, Aug. 6, 1921, at 1.
347 See, e.g., Charge Red Books Fill Store Here, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1920, at 111;
Japanese Arrested as LW.W., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1922, at I1.
348 See, e.g., Arrests in Sacramento; Work Scarce Down There, INDUS. WORKER,
July 2, 1921, at 1; Criminal Syndicalism Charge Is Dismissed; More Trials Pending,
INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 4, 1922, at 2 (describing the policy of basing criminal syndi-
calism arrests on the sale of IWW newspapers); Held as Syndicalist, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1921, at 119; Situation in California Is Now Somewhat Better Than Twelve
Months Ago, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 3, 1923, at 1 (noting that six members were
arrested in Eureka for selling IWW newspapers); cf. Persecution Denounced, INDUS.
SOLIDARrry, July 22, 1922, at 6 (reporting that a Wobbly was arrested for circulating
a petition urging the release of federal prisoners); Port War on I. W. W. Is Raging,
L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1922, at 112 (reporting that a suspected syndicalist leader was
arrested for distributing pamphlets).
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when they appeared as witnesses at criminal syndicalism trials.3 49
In fact, on more than one occasion district attorneys arrested and
charged such people just as soon as they testified, on the grounds
that by admitting membership under oath, they thereby con-
fessed culpability.35 Similarly, the IWW press mentioned at
least one case in which police raided a local IWW hall during a
criminal syndicalism trial for the apparent purpose of frustrating
defense efforts.35' In at least one other instance (and probably
more), employers advertised bounties for "arrest and evidence
leading to [the] conviction of anyone violating" California's
statute. 2
As is always the case with repressive enforcement of the crimi-
nal law, only some of the people arrested for criminal syndical-
ism in California in the late 1910s and early 1920s were ever
formally charged. The number of arrests, not to mention lesser
forms of official harassment predicated on the statute, certainly
far exceeded the 531 people formally charged during this pe-
riod.353 Not all 531 were brought to trial.354 Twenty-seven were
never apprehended.355 Of the remaining 504, only about half
(264) were tried, with 164 ultimately convicted and the majority
of the rest (69) released on account of jury deadlock.356
Needless to say, neither conviction, nor formal charge, nor
even arrest was necessary to accomplish the desired goal of un-
dermining the IWW or thwarting its attempts at organizing and
349 See, e.g., Convict Firey and Casdorf by Jailing the Witnesses, INDUS. WORKER,
Apr. 22, 1922, at 1; Five More to Stand Trial in Los Angeles, INDUS. SOLIDARIrY,
Dec. 17, 1921, at 5; Sacramento Is Preparing to Have More Sacrifices, INDUS.
WORKER, Aug. 29, 1923, at 1.
350 Indeed, in one case, the district attorney was allowed to tell the witnesses in
open court (outside the presence of the jury) that if they admitted under oath to
IWW membership they would be charged with criminal syndicalism. The district
attorney filed an affidavit denying defendants' assertion that the arrests were made
in the presence of the jury but admitting the threat of arrest. People v. Casdorf, 212
P. 237, 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922). For other examples of prosecution of wit-
nesses under such circumstances, see People v. Johansen, 226 P. 634, 634 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1924); and Jails Witness in LW.W. Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1921, at 1113.
351 Nine Facing Eureka Court; Free Press Fight in San Pedro, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Feb. 23, 1924, at 1 [hereinafter Nine Facing Eureka Court].
352 Advertisement by Pac. Elec. Ry. Co., L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1919, at 113 (offer-
ing $250 reward).
353 This reality was related, from time to time, in the IWW press. See, e.g., Police
Brutality Under Fire in Los Angeles, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 12, 1924, at 6.
354 Whitten, supra note 18, app. at 65.
355 See id. (summarizing 504 apprehended of 531 charged).
356 Id. app. at 65-66.
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protest. In California, the threat of arrest and prosecution for
criminal syndicalism could serve, like vagrancy, as a way simply
to run Wobblies out of town at little cost in officials' time and
resources.3 57 Undoubtedly, the latent risk of arrest, prosecution,
and possible conviction, even where not expressed, accomplished
the same disruptive function. In any case, the authorities' pro-
gram often seemed to be to round up every IWW member they
could find, identify the organizers and charge them with criminal
syndicalism, and then either release the rest or charge them with
vagrancy.358
Judicial administration of these statutes reflected not only the
antiradical bias inherent in criminal syndicalism laws, but also the
degree to which prosecutors and trial courts were active in ad-
vancing these laws' antiradical purposes. The first person actu-
ally indicted under California's criminal syndicalism law was
Emanuel Levin, the secretary and business manager of a San
Francisco workers' school and library that was affiliated with the
IVW .3 9 Levin was arrested on May 22, 1919, when he went to
the Hall of Justice to arrange bail for some of his colleagues who
had been arrested for vagrancy.36 His arrest was part of the Bay
Area's initial criminal syndicalism campaign against the IWW.
361
The instrument of indictment identified no particular act or even
any specific word by which Levin supposedly committed criminal
syndicalism; Levin's culpability actually entailed no more than
his association with the IWW.
362
California's first successful prosecution of a defendant on crim-
inal syndicalism charges began in late 1919. The defendant was
James McHugo, the secretary of an Oakland branch of the
IWW. 363 McHugo was charged with committing syndicalism by
dint of membership in the IWW, a fact he conceded.364 In addi-
tion to this, the State put on evidence of McHugo's possession of
357 See, e.g., id. at 33-34.
358 See, e.g., 600 Arrested Strikers Charged with Vag!, INDUS. WORKER, May 23,
1923, at 1 (reporting that two leaders were charged with criminal syndicalism and
the remainder were charged with vagrancy); see California Syndicalist Cases, supra
note 325; More Arrests in Barbarous Cal., INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 18, 1922, at 2 (re-
porting that nine were arrested and two were discharged).
359 Whitten, supra note 18, at 27-28.
36 0 Syndicalism Cases in San Francisco, INDUS. WORKER, July 16, 1919, at 2.
361 Whitten, supra note 18, at 27-28.
362 KIRCHWEY, supra note 333, at 13.
363 Whitten, supra note 18, at 41.
364 Id. at 41-42.
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IWW literature as well as the testimony of several special agents
and former IWW members.365 Insofar as such evidence was in-
voked to demonstrate the IWW's supposed commitment to social
change by unlawful means, it was central to the logic of proving
culpability by membership. Despite a vigorous defense that with
equal logic stressed the essential legitimacy of the IWW and the
lack of specific evidence connecting McHugo to any crimes or
acts of violence, McHugo was convicted by a jury in seven min-
utes and was sentenced to one to fourteen years in prison.36 6
Within a few weeks, three others were tried in the Bay Area; two
were convicted and one acquitted.367
A similar experience awaited Charlotte Anita Whitney, a radi-
cal activist and social worker of patrician background who is
remembered today as perhaps criminal syndicalism's most fa-
mous victim. 36 8 Whitney was arrested in Oakland on November
28, 1919, shortly after delivering a speech before a reformist or-
ganization, the California Civic League.3 69 Though not directly
connected to the IWW, Whitney was accused of being an agent
of that organization.37 ° What Whitney actually did was deliver to
the Civic League a speech on "The Negro Problem" of the
United States in which she advocated civil rights and condemned
365 Id.
366 Id. at 42.
367 Id.; see also Legal Persecution Starts in the West, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY,
July 1919, at 9, 9.
368 Whitney was the "descendant of generations of American patriots, the favored
niece of a [United States] Supreme Court justice [Stephen Field], daughter of a state
legislator and herself a well-known social reformer." Lisa Rubens, The Patrician
Radical Charlotte Anita Whitney, 65 CAL. HIST. 158, 158 (1986). Indeed, Whitney
was a person of great substance: a graduate of Wellesley; an early leader in the
juvenile justice movement; a charter member of the NAACP; an advocate of civil
rights, women's liberation, and civil liberties; and a founding member of the Com-
munist Party. Id. at 160-65. Although a progressive and a liberal from her early
years, Whitney was apparently radicalized by the Wheatland episode and the up-
heaval that accompanied it. Id. at 161-62.
Another famous person arrested for criminal syndicalism in California was social-
ist author Upton Sinclair, who was picked up for reading from the Constitution in
public. Sinclair was never brought to trial on the charge. Sinclair's Arrest-Stupid-
ity in Capitalist Eyes, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, June 2, 1923, at 5; Upton Sinclair Ar-
rested, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1923, at II1. He had earlier testified on behalf of a
criminal syndicalism defendant in California. Upton Sinclair on the Stand, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1920, at 117.
369 Rubens, supra note 368, at 163-64.
370 Whitney's main connection to the IWW appears to have consisted of her play-
ing a role in raising funds to defend the IWW defendants. Id. at 162-63.
2006]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
the lynching of blacks.3 7 ' Whitney's trial began early the next
year.372 Like McHugo and almost all other California criminal
syndicalism defendants, she was charged with syndicalism by
membership, although the State's assertion of Whitney's guilt
was based not on membership in the IWW, but in the California
chapter of the Communist Labor Party.373 The prosecution as-
serted that membership in that organization was culpable under
the criminal syndicalism statute by virtue of its ties to both the
Communist International and the IWW, whose criminality was
presented to the jury as a given.3 74 On this basis, the prosecution
submitted an enormous amount of evidence of IWW radicalism
and alleged wrongdoing,375 much of which took the form of
songs, pamphlets, and other propaganda, as well as informant
testimony.376 Hampered by the midtrial death of her lead attor-
ney at the hands of influenza, Whitney's defense sought vainly to
sway the jury with evidence, much of which was in the form of
her own testimony, of the Communist Labor Party's opposition
to the use of violence, terrorism, or other prohibited means to
advance its agenda of social change.377 The jury took six hours to
convict Whitney on the main count; like McHugo, she received
the statutory sentence of one to fourteen years in prison.378
None of the indictments or bills of information in California's
criminal syndicalism prosecutions during this period spelled out
the specific act by which the defendants were accused of violating
the statute.379 In virtually every prosecution, evidence of guilt
consisted of nothing more than assertions of membership in a
371 Id. at 158, 163-64.
372 Whitten, supra note 18, at 44.
373 See, e.g., id. at 43-44.
374 The prosecution's claim of a link between the Communist Labor Party and the
IWW was premised on one document in which the former organization endorsed the
latter. Rohde, supra note 18, at 320-21.
375 Id. at 321.
376 Whitten, supra note 18, at 46.
377 Id. at 45-47.
378 Id. at 47. On the circumstances of Whitney's arrest and conviction, see
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 363-68 (1927).
379 KIRCHWAEY, supra note 333, at 13. Kirchwey explains that while the indictment
or information might invoke multiple charges-criminal syndicalism by advocacy, by
actual sabotage, and so forth-"in no case was any specific deed or word charged
nor any mention made of the time when or the place where the alleged crime was
committed." Id. While the courts sometimes overturned convictions on this
ground, this was by no means the usual outcome. Id. at 13, 20 (noting that of
twenty-nine cases appealed, twenty were affirmed). In any event, the reported cases
confirm Kirchwey's observation. See People v. Welton, 211 P. 802, 802-04 (Cal.
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prohibited organization,38 ° often augmented by evidence of pos-
session or distribution of radical literature. 381 Similarly, Califor-
nia trial courts typically admitted voluminous evidence designed
to demonstrate the IWW's (or, as in Whitney's and a few other
cases, the Communist Labor Party's) supposed willingness to re-
sort to sabotage, violence, and the like to change the social order.
If not songs, literature, or other union documents,382 this evi-
dence usually consisted of hearsay statements by, and assertions
about, other members of these organizations, all of which was
supposed to demonstrate the guilt of the defendants.383 For good
measure, trial courts often admitted evidence concerning the de-
fendant's patriotic credentials, support for the war effort, or
overall views about capitalism.384 Much of this evidence was
presented not only by way of hearsay, but also by "professional,"
which is to say paid, witnesses. 385 One such witness, a habitual
offender named Elbert Coutts, appears to have testified in al-
most every one of California's criminal syndicalism trials.386 In
1922); People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 79-85 (Cal. 1921); People v. Malley, 194 P. 48, 52-
55 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
380 KIRCHWEY, supra note 333, at 10, 13-14; see, e.g., People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85
(Cal. 1921); People v. Cox, 226 P. 14, 18-20 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
381 See, e.g., People v. Thurman, 216 P. 394, 395-96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923);
People v. Wismer, 209 P. 259, 260 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922); Malley, 194 P. at 52-54.
382 See, e.g., People v. McClennegen, 234 P. 91, 95-98, 102 (Cal. 1925) (describing
how "[g]reat quantities of printed matter consisting of stickerettes, posters, pam-
phlets, booklets, books, songs, and pronouncements advocating the teachings of the
[IWW] were received in evidence" and used to convict some twenty-six defendants);
People v. Roe, 209 P. 381, 385-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (describing the prosecu-
tion of a defendant on the basis of such evidence, following his arrest for distributing
IWW literature on a Sacramento street corner); see also People v. Sherman, 209 P.
1023, 1024 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922). In at least one case, a California trial court
allowed an ex-member to testify at length for the prosecution on the IWW's support
for "free love" and the abolition of marriage. People v. Wagner, 225 P. 464, 468
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
383 See, e.g., People v. La Rue, 216 P. 627, 629-31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923)
(describing the use of such testimony by trial court). On accusations of sabotage at
trial, see, for example, Bombs and Poisons of L W. W. Ravagers Shown, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1920, at 1112; Direct Action Ravages Told, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1920, at
1113; Half Million Loss Through Reds Told, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1921, at 1111; Sabo-
tage Plot Laid to L W. W., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1921, at 113; and State's Sabotage Loss
Put at Fifty Millions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1920, at Il1.
384 KIRCHWEY, supra note 333, at 14-15.
385 See, e.g., California Cases, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 29, 1921, at 5 (reporting
that one such witness admitted to receiving $450 for testimony in two trials); C.S.
Trial in Los Angeles, INDUs. WORKER, Feb. 10, 1923, at 1.
386 See KiRCHWEY, supra note 333, at 16-17; California Cases Still Aggravating,
INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 12, 1924, at 1 ("Mr. Coutts, besides being a petty thief, twice
convicted of burglary, [was] a vandal and arson bug and a perjurer."). Coutts testi-
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fact, Coutts and his colleagues often testified alongside each
other in the same trials.387 Furthermore, trial courts routinely
refused to grant instructions designed to clarify the statute's un-
certainties regarding the conduct necessary to establish culpabil-
ity-for example, on the legal definition of sabotage-and the
boundary between criminal syndicalism and legal forms of pro-
test and advocacy.388 The courts allowed evidence, going to
IWW's alleged criminality, that predated the enactment of the
statute or the defendant's membership in the organization.389
Further, they liberally allowed prosecutors to invoke conspiracy
doctrine in enforcing the statute.39 °
For the IWW, the nature of such proceedings merely proved
what the organization had long recognized: that the law and
those who administered it were nothing more than tools of capi-
tal. The IWW press repeatedly called attention to what it re-
garded as the entrenched unfairness of these trials and
prosecutions. Its writers excoriated trial judges for how they con-
ducted these trials,391 and certain judges became especially fre-
quent targets of such criticism. 392 Prosecutors were likewise cast,
fied against Anita Whitney. Coach Whitney Jury in Lore of LW W's, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1920, at 15. Coutts was quite literally a professional witness: he admitted to
"making his living" by testifying against the IWW. GAMBS, supra note 17, at 29. For
mention of Coutts in the IWW press, see Two . W. W. Trials in California, INDUS.
WORKER, May 12, 1923, at 1. Coutts also testified for the government in the Sacra-
mento conspiracy trial. See HARVEY DUFF, THE SILENT DEFENDERS, COURTS AND
CAPITALISM IN CALIFORNIA 35-40 (IWW 1920). For an example of this type of testi-
mony, described at some length in an appellate opinion, see People v. Taylor, 203 P.
85, 88-89 (Cal. 1921); see also People v. Flanagan 223 P. 1014, 1018 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1924); Wagner, 225 P. at 467-68; Roe, 209 P. at 386-87; and Terrorist on the
Stand, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1920, at Ill.
387 See, e.g., Sacramento Jury Disagrees; Two Released, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, July
14, 1923, at 1; Trio of Stools at L W. W. Trial in Oakland, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 29,
1921, at 1.
388 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 230 P. 221, 224 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People
v. Thompson, 229 P. 896, 898 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People v. Bailey, 225 P. 752,
757-59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People v. Eaton, 213 P. 275 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1923); People v. Wieler, 204 P. 410, 413 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
389 See, e.g., People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 84 (Cal. 1921) (upholding the admission
of evidence of IWW criminality that predated defendant's membership); People v.
Wright, 226 P. 952, 954-55 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (upholding the admission of
evidence of IWW criminality that predated the enactment of the criminal syndical-
ism statute).
390 See, e.g., People v. McClennegen, 234 P. 91 (Cal. 1925); Thompson, 229 P. 896;
People v. Ware, 226 P. 956 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
391 Jury in Los Angeles Trial Finds Nine L W. W. Men Guilty, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Dec. 17, 1921, at 1.
392 Ask Venue Change in Red Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1921, at I110; Eureka
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with a significant degree of truth, as agents of industry.393 Juries
were described as functionaries of local business interests.394
And the entire process of arrest, charge, and indictment in Cali-
fornia was depicted as the embodiment of the entrenched bias of
the State on behalf of capital and of the inevitable function of
law in advancing capitalist interests.395
Not all judges were so uncritically disposed toward this kind of
evidence. In March 1922, the IWW press related with some ap-
proval a ruling by San Francisco district court judge Sylvester
McAtee that mere possession of IWW literature was not a suffi-
cient basis for criminal syndicalism prosecution.396 In June 1923,
the same paper had occasion to mention Judge Paul McCor-
mick's ruling excluding hearsay testimony (by Coutts, no less)
from another criminal syndicalism trial.397  But such scruples
Victims Go to San Quentin; 107 IWW in California's Twin Hells, INDUS. WORKER,
May 7, 1924, at 2 [hereinafter Eureka Victims].
393 This treatment was particularly pronounced in the case of R.V. Cowan, a Sac-
ramento-area prosecutor known for his zealous prosecution of Wobblies under the
statute. I.W.W. Faces New California Battle, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 27, 1924, at 2.
The union's press would eventually delight in Cowan's personal problems, in partic-
ular the collapse of his marriage and his estranged wife's charges of family abandon-
ment; for the Wobblies these developments were especially telling in light of
Cowan's constant invocation of family values in the criminal syndicalism prosecu-
tions. William Cowan Breaks a Home, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Mar. 29, 1924, at 1.
They also accused Cowan, quite plausibly, of using the prosecutions to further his
ambition of becoming a judge. Prosecutor of Wobs Rewarded?, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Jan. 12, 1924, at 6. In the IWW's view, special prosecutors replaced local district
attorneys in some instances in order to ensure sufficient zealousness. See, e.g., Eu-
reka Court Fails to Convict 9 Wobs; Jury Out 66 Hours, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Mar. 1,
1924, at 1; Powell Case Lost in Courts; Labor Must Rescue These Men, INDUS. SOLI-
DARITY, Mar. 18, 1925, at 6. Some district attorneys did refuse to prosecute Wob-
blies simply on the basis of membership. Sacramento I. W. W. Released from Jail,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1923, at IV12.
394 Lumber Company Jury Convicts Nine I. W. W. at Eureka; New Stoolpigeon
Used, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 26, 1924, at 1.
395 The Industrial Worker went so far as develop a lengthy, generalized account of
how a typical defendant or group of defendants went from innocently "trying to
better their conditions" to finding themselves convicted of criminal syndicalism and
penitentiary bound. A Criminal Syndicalism Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 12, 1924,
at 3; see also California Lumber Companies Establish a Reign of Terror, INDUS. SOL-
IDARITY, Apr. 19, 1924, at 3 (likening the climate in California to the Spanish Inqui-
sition); Conviction of 9 in Eureka Was Ordered by Hammond, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
May 3, 1924, at 4.
396 Court Decision on Syndicalist Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 18, 1922, at 2.
397 Hearsay Shut Out Jury Is Doubtful, INDUS. WORKER, June 30, 1923, at 1; cf.
Seek Fair Trial in Venue Change, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 12, 1924, at 1 (giving tenta-




about how prosecutors convinced juries to convict Wobbly de-
fendants were clearly the exception and not the rule in these
cases. In a number of other cases, juries simply acquitted defend-
ants,398 or they were unable to agree on a verdict.3 99 In still other
cases, juries sought ways to ensure that if they did convict, the
defendant would receive a lenient sentence.4°
The fact that any juries acquitted Wobblies in these cases
speaks to the occasional success that IWW defendants had in ex-
posing the tenuous factual bases of the State's cases, particularly
given the apparent tendency of judges to qualify juries with pros-
ecution-friendly jurors.4 ° ' Almost invariably, successful argu-
ments to juries involved an attempt to question the notion that
the IWW was actually committed to the means of social change
prohibited by the statute.4 °2 To this end, Wobbly defendants
often took the stand in their own defense, proudly admitting
membership while trying to underscore the union's fundamental
commitment to peaceful means of change.40 3 On at least one
other occasion, the IWW acknowledged the help of testimony
from a "courageous liberal" in securing the acquittal of a number
398 See, e.g., Acquittal at Eureka Halts Barbarous Syndicalist Law, INDUS.
WORKER, June 2, 1923, at 1; Tom Connors, Masters Losing Their Grip in Prosecu-
tion of Workers, INDUS. WORKER, June 13, 1923, at 1 (noting that "[d]uring the past
month California has registered 30 acquittals or dismissals against six convictions").
Dismissals were not unheard of either, particularly after mistrials or the overturning
of convictions. See, e.g., Five Wob Cases Dismissed, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Sept. 10,
1924, at 1; Hartline Case Now Dismissed, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Nov. 12, 1924, at 1.
399 See, e.g., Eureka Court Fails to Convict 9 Wobs; Jury Out 66 Hours, supra note
393; Hung Jury at Sacramento, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, June 9, 1924, at 6; Jury Refuses
to Convict on Townsend Testimony, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Nov. 4, 1922, at 1. The
hung jury in the Eureka case followed the exclusion of professional witness Albert
Coutts's testimony as hearsay. Nine Facing Eureka Court, supra note 351.
400 See, e.g., Six Industrial Workers Who Conducted Own Case in Oakland Are
Released, INDUs. WORKER, Apr. 22, 1922, at 1 ("The jury recommended mercy, and
there was some suggestion of release on parole.").
401 See, e.g., "Red" Inquiry Task of Jury, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1920, at 112 (report-
ing judge's declaraion that an all-male, "100 per cent American" jury was important
because attempts to overthrow government were prevalent).
402Jury Acquits in Sacramento Cases!, INDUs. WORKER, Jan. 30, 1924, at 1
(describing the use of witnesses "from industry" to attest to the IWW's legitimate
behavior).
403 See, e.g., Defense At Bat in Los Angeles Make Good Impression in Court, IN-
DUS. WORKER, July 11, 1923, at 1. In particular, defendants were keen to point out
that the IWW had not published a word on sabotage since 1917, and only then it had
done so to denounce its literal use. State Rests Case in Eureka Trial, INDUS.
WORKER, Feb. 20, 1924, at 1. The result in the Eureka trial was a hung jury. C.S.
Law Is Worst Brand of Tyranny, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 15, 1925, at 1.
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of defendants. 404 On another occasion, the IWW press attributed
acquittals to the circulation of defense propaganda highlighting
the public costs of criminal syndicalism prosecutions.4 °5
The challenge of defending themselves under such circum-
stances was made all the more difficult by the problems Wobbly
defendants faced in retaining good legal counsel. In some cases,
the union was able to provide capable representation through the
offices of sympathetic attorneys like George Vanderveer and El-
mer Smith. However, this was not only expensive for the union,
it was also risky for the attorneys. Smith was the target of vigi-
lantism and disbarment proceedings and threatened with crimi-
nal syndicalism charges himself for his IWW connections.40 6
Given these realities, many defendants were forced to represent
themselves. Additionally, although the IWW press was keen to
emphasize how capably these lay attorneys performed, such self-
representation probably did not work to their advantage.0 7 An-
other factor hampering defense efforts was the tendency of pros-
ecutors to charge defense witnesses with criminal syndicalism
based on their testimony on behalf of their fellow workers. On
one occasion, ten Wobblies who had testified in a trial were con-
victed on this basis and sent to prison after juries in two previous
trials had failed to reach verdicts.4 °8
Those convicted of criminal syndicalism in California faced the
possibility of an indeterminate sentence of one to fourteen years
404 California Defendants Win Despite High-Handed Proceedings, INDUS. SOLI-
DARITY, Mar. 12, 1923, at 1. The "courageous liberal" was one Fanny Bixby-Spen-
cer, who provided bonds on the defendants' behalf in the amount of $14,500. Id.
405 Two Are Acquitted in California Cases, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Nov. 5, 1921, at 2.
406 California Legion Mob Exiles Centralia Man, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 3,
1922, at 5; Elmer Smith Will Defy Mob and Handle Eureka Defense, INDUS.
WORKER, Apr. 22, 1922, at 1.
407 See, e.g., Courageous Wobs Down Ole Hanson, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 3, 1921,
at 1 (reporting that prosecutors had been taking advantage of self-represented de-
fendants); C.S. Trial in Los Angeles, supra note 385 (describing the self-representa-
tion by thirty defendants in two cases); Defendants at Oakland Convicted, INDUS.
SOLIDARITY, Nov. 5, 1921, at 1 (reporting conviction of six self-represented defend-
ants); Los Angeles Indictment Dropped, INDUS. WORKER, May 31, 1924, at 1
(describing the self-representation of defendants in two other cases); Perjury Con-
victs Eight Wobs in Los Angeles, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 21, 1923, at 1; "Red" Sus-
pects, Facing Court, Spurns [sic] Counsel, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1921, at 116; Return
Conviction Against Wobblies, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 17, 1921, at 1.
408 Ten Witnesses Start Sentence, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Aug. 25, 1923, at 6; Wit-
nesses on Trial Again at Sacramento, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 28, 1922, at 1; Wit-
nesses' Trials Again Postponed, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Dec. 23, 1922, at 5.
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for each count.4 °9 Of the 164 defendants convicted in that state
in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the vast majority-128-was
sentenced to prison.410 Most of those convicted seem to have
received the full indeterminate range. Rarely, though, some un-
fortunate defendants were sentenced to consecutive sentences of
this type.411 On the other hand, a few defendants were convicted
and then simply told to get out town.412 On several occasions,
defendants receiving their sentences reacted with a combination
of pride in their radicalism and contempt for the legal process.
On one such occasion in 1923, twenty-seven defendants who had
just been convicted by a Los Angeles jury "indignantly refused
suspended sentence[s] which [were] offered them if they would
renounce the principles of the organization. '413 A similar epi-
sode unfolded in Los Angeles a couple of years earlier when a
group of defendants who were offered probation if they pleaded
guilty declined outright, telling the trial judge to "do your
worst." '414 In Sacramento in 1923, a group of ten defendants who
had just been convicted defiantly sang the "Workers'
Marseillaise" as they were led away.4" 5 Before doing so, one told
the judge to "go ahead and enjoy yourself"; another took the
opportunity to unmask the judge's politics and bias:
What I say is this, that you and your hired jackals of the law
have scored a temporary victory, but although you imprison
our bodies, our spirits go marching on, to carry the message of
the new dawn for a new justice. You and your kind have killed
justice, but we who are suffering in jail are creating a new
one....
409 Act of Apr. 30, 1919, ch. 188, 1919 Cal. Stat. 281.
410 Whitten, supra note 18, at 52-53. Many of those not sentenced to prison re-
ceived probation or a suspended sentence; others were out on bail when their
sentences were commuted or their convictions overturned. Id. at 53.
411 See, e.g., Defense Not Afraid as Five L W. W. Are Sentenced 28 Years, INDUS.
WORKER, Mar. 28, 1923, at 1.
412 Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 19, 1920, at 1 (reporting
that two Wobblies were convicted of criminal syndicalism in Eureka, likely under a
local ordinance, and ordered out of the county) [hereinafter Mar. 19 Bulletin].
413 Twenty-Seven Los Angeles Men Convicted; Transport Workers Call Protest, IN-
DUS. WORKER, July 18, 1923, at 1; see also Reform School for Youthful Wobbly, L.A.
TIMES, July 3, 1922, at 13 (reporting that a nineteen-year-old convicted of criminal
syndicalism was being sent to reform school after refusing to renounce the IWW).
414 Veteran to Be Tried on Syndicalism Charge, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 15, 1921,
at 3.
415 Ten I. W. W. Go Singing to Cells After Sacramento Conviction, INDUS. SOLIDAR-
rY, Feb. 3, 1923, at 1 [hereinafter Ten I.W.W. Go Singing]. In 1923, a group of
twenty-seven Wobblies being taken to San Quentin sang "L'Intemationale." Wob-
blies at San Quentin, L.A. TimEs, July 13, 1923, at 111.
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... We came here for justice, and you meet us with the pari-
ahs of our own people, to prove that we are criminals.
41P
All ten defendants were sentenced to one to fourteen years in
prison.4 17
Interestingly, actual criminal prosecution was not the only
means by which California would enforce its criminal syndicalism
law. In August 1923, Judge Charles 0. Busick of the Supreme
Court of Sacramento County issued a temporary injunction spe-
cifically restraining the IWW and various named members from
continuing to commit criminal syndicalism. 418 Busick was notori-
ously hostile to the IWW and the injunction was predictably writ-
ten in a way that identified criminal syndicalism with simple
membership in the organization. 419 This device, which was also
used in several other jurisdictions, would lead to the arrest of a
number of Wobblies on contempt charges.42 °
By 1923, the IWW was beginning to speculate openly that Cali-
fornia's enforcement campaign was petering out,42' and that this
reflected the combined benefits of active legal defense and vigor-
ous protest activity.422 In the same text in which the union's writ-
ers spoke with some evident weariness of the "constant battle"
around these prosecutions, they anticipated a victory over the au-
thorities.423 Nevertheless, the use of these laws against the IWW
remained quite intense through the summer of 1924.424 In Au-
416 Ten I.W.W. Go Singing, supra note 415, at 1.
417 Id.
418 Whitten, supra note 18, at 58-60.
419 See CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 326-42; Whitten, supra note 18, at 58-60, 66; see
also Ex parte Wood, 227 P. 908 (Cal. 1924).
420 See, e.g., Fifteen Wobs Released, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 29, 1924, at 1
(describing arrests of several IWW members for violating Busick's injunction).
421 Dismiss C.S. Case Against 19 . W. W. in L.A. Courtroom, INDUS. WORKER,
Oct. 27, 1923, at 1.
422 See, e.g., Last Round Near in Calif. Fight for Right to Exist, INDUS. SOLIDAR-
ITY, Apr. 19, 1924, at 6.
423 One Constant Battle in Calif. Against Beastly Persecution, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Apr. 26, 1924, at 12.
424 This was especially true on the Los Angeles waterfront. See, e.g., Arrests at
Harbor End "Red" Rally, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1924, at Al; Foil Plans for Strike at
Harbor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1924, at A7; Harbor Police Capture I.W.W. Labor
Agitator, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1924, at 8; I. W. W Open Meeting Is Put to Rout, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1924, at Al (describing raided Los Angeles Harbor IWW meeting);
Port Employee Held on Charge of Syndicalism, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1924, at 17;
Port Police Take Four as LW.W., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1924, at C12; "Wobblies"
Open Drive at Harbor, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1924, at 1.
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gust 1923, one of the union's newspapers matter-of-factly de-
scribed forty-three members awaiting trail for criminal
syndicalism in various venues throughout the state.42 5 As of Oc-
tober of that year, there were at least ninety Wobblies in Califor-
nia convicted and in prison or jail, and forty-five others awaiting
trial.426 There were many more prosecutions in the first part of
1924.427 Beginning in the latter part of 1924, though, new prose-
cutions did decline and an increasing number of pending cases
were dismissed or dropped. 428 However, although prosecutions
did finally wind down at the end of that year, much damage had
already been done to the organization and to the men and wo-
men affiliated with it. By the middle of 1925, California prisons
still held more than seventy Wobblies. 42 9 One was Tom Connors,
who a few years earlier had been the secretary of the union's
California General Defense Committee.430
B. The Pacific Northwest
If any region came close to equaling California in criminal syn-
dicalism prosecution, it was the Pacific Northwest, which includes
Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. If prosecutions in these states
425 Status of California Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 4, 1923, at 2.
426 Criminal Syndicalism Law Goes by the Board Now Admitted Failure, INDUS.
WORKER, July 21, 1923, at 1; One to Fourteen Years of Torture, INDUS. WORKER,
Nov. 28, 1923, at 2; These Are Facts About California, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 27,
1923, at 5.
427 See, e.g., California Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 25, 1924, at 1 (describing
twenty-seven members awaiting trial on criminal syndicalism charges in various
cases); California Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 5, 1924, at 2 (describing twenty-three
members awaiting trial on criminal syndicalism charges in various cases) [hereinafter
Jan. 5 California Cases]; California Cases Still Aggravating, supra note 386; Califor-
nia Frame-Up Artists Try Again to Get Connors, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, May 27, 1925,
at 1 [hereinafter California Frame-Up Artists]; Rush Trial of Three in Sacramento,
INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 2, 1924, at 1; Sacramento Still Forces Convictions, INDUS.
WORKER, Jan. 2, 1924, at 1; Sacramento Trial Set for November 3, INDUS. WORKER,
July 19, 1924, at 2 (describing fourteen members awaiting trial in Sacramento); 16
I. W. W. Members Are Indicted by the Grand Jury of Sacramento, INDUS. WORKER,
Mar. 5, 1924, at 1.
428 See, e.g., Five Wob Cases Dismissed, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Sept. 10, 1924, at 1;
Imperial Drops C.S. in Dark California, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 15, 1924, at 1; One
More County Quashes C.S[.] Law, INDUS. WORKER, Sept. 17, 1924, at 1.
429 Eureka Victims, supra note 392; Our Imprisoned Fellow Workers, INDUS.
UNIONIST, May 2, 1925, at 4; Xmas Presents for LW.W Prisoners, INDUS. WORKER,
Dec. 19, 1925, at 2; see also Ignorant Native Defends C.S. Law, INDUS. UNIONIST,
Apr. 11, 1925, at 2.
430 California Frame-Up Artists, supra note 427; Connors Is 40950; Prison Term
Starts, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, June 24, 1925, at 5; Tom Connors, Defense Secretary, in
Jail at Sacramento, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 21, 1923, at 5.
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did not quite match California's in scale, they certainly matched
California's in intensity. Between 1917 and 1922 in particular,
Pacific Northwest states arrested and prosecuted hundreds of
men (and a few women) on charges of criminal syndicalism. By
the mid-1920s, their prisons, like California's, held scores of
Wobblies.
These states were very much like California, too, in how they
enforced their criminal syndicalism laws. Enforcement was
driven by both the ideology of antiradical reaction and the inter-
ests of local business elites, and it was geared overwhelmingly to
the arrest of people affiliated with the IWW who were, like their
comrades in California, typically snatched off street corners and
roadsides, swept up in raids, ambushed as witnesses at trials, or
booked on criminal syndicalism charges after being initially ar-
rested on lesser charges. As in California, too, those unfortunate
enough to be formally charged and brought to trial faced the dif-
ficult task of overcoming a de facto presumption, backed by
mountains of extrinsic (if fundamentally unreliable) evidence
and engrained bias, that the IWW was actually dedicated to
means of social change criminalized by these statutes and that
anyone who actually belonged to such an organization therefore
must be thoroughly guilty of the charge.
In the summer of 1917, Idaho authorities, armed with that
state's new criminal syndicalism law, began rounding up Wob-
blies and other "idlers" by the hundreds and either driving them
out of town or penning them up in parks and on fairgrounds to
await their fate.431 Most victims of this initial roundup were
eventually deported from the jurisdiction or released after prom-
ising never to return.432 A handful, though, were charged and
tried on criminal syndicalism charges.433 Two of these defend-
ants, J.J. McMurphy, an IWW organizer, and J. Otis Ellis, a sup-
porter of the organization, were convicted and sentenced to
prison.434 McMurphy's particular offense was giving a speech
promoting the IWW and possessing IWW literature; Ellis was
merely alleged on hearsay evidence to have expressed sympathy
for the IWW and its tactics.435 This was only the beginning. In
early 1920, the IWW published a list of all prisoners held nation-
431 Sims, supra note 18, at 516.
432 Id. at 517-18.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 516-18.
435 Id. at 519. On the conviction of these two men, see also Criminal Syndicalism
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wide on a variety of charges.436 Of the 679 individuals described
on the list, forty-three had been charged with criminal syndical-
ism in Idaho, and most of these defendants had already been sen-
tenced to prison.437 From 1917 through the end of the Great
War, Idaho authorities arrested hundreds of other Wobblies (for
the most part) for criminal syndicalism; around 200 were eventu-
ally tried and dozens were convicted and sent to prison.438
Although initially drawing on pro-war hysteria, the use of
Idaho's law against Wobblies continued for quite a time after the
Armistice. In Idaho, as elsewhere, warmongering metastasized
easily and quickly into pure and simple antiradicalism. There
too, civic groups played their usual role. In 1919, the state's
newly created "constabulary," aided by American Legionnaires
and "special agents" charged with gathering evidence against
Wobblies, undertook to prosecute every one of the union's mem-
bers who dared remain in the state.439 Their mission was to
gather evidence of violation of the act that went beyond simple
membership, which the state's attorney general had anomalously
decided was, alone, an insufficient basis for conviction. 440 While
the apparent conclusion of Idaho officials in 1920 that they had
largely accomplished their mission of running the IWW out of
the state was perhaps a bit too optimistic, the authorities had cer-
tainly gone a long way toward achieving that goal.441 Prosecutors
in Idaho did try in 1923 to prosecute Wobblies under the criminal
syndicalism statute merely on the basis of their advocating strikes
or slowdowns. 44' 2 But by 1920, the bulk of enforcement activity
Cases, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 12, 1918, at 8; and What Is Criminal Syndicalism?,
INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 10, 1917 (page number unavailable).
436 The Gruesome Story of American Terrorism: Lest We Forget, ONE BIG UNION
MONTHLY, Mar. 1920, at 5, 5-21.
437 Id.
438 Sims, supra note 18 at 521-22. That relatively few defendants were ultimately
convicted apparently reflected the qualms that many Idaho jurors had about sending
people to prison on evidence, often in the form of hearsay, that consisted only of
proof of their ideas or utterances. Id. at 518; see also State v. Dingman, 219 P. 760,
762 (Idaho 1919) (noting that at trial, jury convicted only one of twenty-three
defendants).
439 Sims, supra note 18, at 524; see also Guarding the Jail, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1918, at I1 (describing incident where armed citizens patrolled Idaho streets after a
sheriff was assaulted by IWW members).
440 Sims, supra note 18, at 524.
441 Id. On other acts of enforcement in Idaho, see also Defense Witnesses Driven
Out of Town, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 20, 1918, at 1.
442 The Idaho Cases, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Feb. 9, 1924, at 2. The prosecutions
were eventually halted by the state supreme court, which ruled that the statute did
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in the region had shifted to Washington and Oregon.
Within only days of coming into effect in February 1919, Ore-
gon's law was used to arrest several people in Portland.443 In
April 1920, the IWW published a series of accounts of arrests in
the region showing that in Portland alone from November 1919
through January 1920, twenty-nine of its members were charged
with (and some already convicted of) criminal syndicalism.444
Many of these arrests, including those resulting in the November
indictment of twenty-two men in Portland, were clearly retribu-
tion for a riotous melee on Armistice Day in Centralia, Washing-
ton, where four members of the American Legion and one
Wobbly were killed during the Legionnaires' attempt to storm
the Wobblies' union hall."45 These arrests also reflected raw class
conflict between the IWW and the timber industry, rooted in the
former's relentless organizing efforts and willingness to resort to
strikes to advance this campaign and back its bargaining de-
mands, and in the latter's ability to influence the enforcement of
these laws.446
When one of the Portland defendants, Joseph Laundy, was
brought to trial in early 1920, he faced the usual professional wit-
ness: a twenty-six-year-old former Wobbly, A.E. Allen, who had
earlier been charged in Washington with criminal syndicalism but
decided to turn state's evidence rather than face prosecution." 7
Despite the efforts of union attorney George Vanderveer to first
discredit Allen's improbable claims of having both engaged in
serious acts of sabotage and advocated this practice on the
union's behalf, and to further contextualize the volumes of IWW
literature purported by the state to demonstrate the organiza-
tion's commitment to such means, Laundy was convicted and
not contemplate such a broad application. Ex parte Moore, 224 P. 662, 665 (Idaho
1924).
443 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 42.
444 The Gruesome Story of American Terrorism, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Apr.
1920, at 12, 12, 14. This account also listed charges and convictions in several other
parts of the state, including La Grande, Condon, and Tillamook. Id.
445 In fact, these twenty-two who were arrested were said to be involved in de-
fending the union hall from the Legionnaires' attack. Jury in Portland Indicts 22
.W. W., INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 29, 1919, at 4; see also Posse Hunts Down I. W. W.,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1919, at I1.
446 On IWW arrests in this context, see, for example, Indict 22 Portland L W. W. for
Criminal Syndicalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1919, at 17; and Legal Persecution Starts
in the West, supra note 367.
447 Professional Witness Used in Portland Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 2, 1920, at
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in448sentenced to two years in prison.
Laundy's trial and conviction were quickly followed by others.
A list of pending cases in the Northwest published by the union
on July 10, 1920, showed that besides Laundy's there had already
been a number of convictions in Oregon, and that thirty-one
members still faced indictments.449 While most of these defend-
ants were charged in Portland, that city was not the exclusive
venue of criminal syndicalism prosecutions in Oregon. Wobblies
were prosecuted in Tillamook, Condon, and Klamath Falls as
well.45 ° Within two years, almost 200 people had been arrested
and formally charged under that state's law, and that was not
quite the end of it.45' In February 1923, two IWW organizers
were arrested in North Bend, Oregon, while handing out litera-
ture advertising a union meeting.452
Enforcement activity in Oregon and Idaho was actually fairly
mild in comparison to the situation in Washington. In January
1919, authorities raided the IWW defense office in Spokane, ar-
resting six members and charging five of them with criminal syn-
dicalism.453 In August of that year, the union reported via
telegram that "many arrests" were being made in the Spokane
area.454 By November, the union reported that in Spokane,
"[f]or the past week raid after raid on rooming houses, hotel[s]
and pool rooms have taken place," resulting in about 120 arrests
and fifty-three members being charged with criminal syndical-
ism.455 In mid-November, these fifty-three Wobblies were con-
victed on municipal charges of criminal syndicalism, sentenced to
thirty days in jail, and given a fine of $100.456
448 Fellow Worker J. Laundy Is Found Guilty in Portland, INDUS. WORKER, Apr.
9, 1920, at 1; Professional Witness Used in Portland Trial, supra note 447; see also
First of Portland's LW.W. Trials Begun, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1920, at I1.
449 Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, July 10, 1920, at 1.
450 Klamath Falls Cases Put Off, INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 18, 1922, at 1; Northwest
Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, June 5, 1920, at 1 (Tillamook case) [hereinafter
June 5 Bulletin]; Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 14, 1920, at 1
(Condon case) [hereinafter Feb. 14 Bulletin].
451 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 42.
452 Two L W. W. Delegates Arrested in North Bend, Ore., Charged with C.S., INDUS.
WORKER, Feb. 21,1923, at 1. Between May 1920 and 1930, this was the only attempt
at prosecuting Wobblies for criminal syndicalism in Oregon. 2 Dowell, supra note
268, at 892.
453 Spokane Oppression, NEW SOLIDARITY, Feb. 8, 1919, at 4.
454 Many Arrests in Spokane District, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 23, 1919, at 1.
455 Vengeance of the Iron Heel in Washington, NEW SOLIDARITY, Nov. 29,1919, at
1.
456 Convict 53 L W. W of Syndicalism, INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 29, 1919, at 4. Al-
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By that time, a statewide campaign was underway to charge
Wobblies with criminal syndicalism. On November 17, thirty-six
members were arrested on criminal syndicalism charges (of the
usual state felony sort) in Tacoma.457  By mid-February, the
weekly "Defense Bulletin" in the union's Industrial Worker
newspaper was reporting dozens of charges and convictions
statewide, which, its editors thought, reflected a concerted cam-
paign by state prosecutors to overwhelm the union with simulta-
neous prosecutions. 458 By the end of that month, the Industrial
Worker listed fifty-six defendants convicted in five different
Washington cities and twenty-three defendants awaiting trial in
five other cities.459  The arrests and prosecutions continued
through the spring.46° Indeed, in November 1919, a group of at-
torneys in Spokane, Tacoma, and Seattle reported that five hun-
dred Wobblies were then under arrest in those areas.46'
During the last few months of 1919 and the first part of 1920
alone, authorities throughout Washington formally charged over
though one authority suggests that Spokane was the only city in the country to enact
a municipal criminal syndicalism statute, Dowell's dissertation, citing work by Roger
Baldwin, identifies twenty cases where such ordinances were enacted during this
period in Oregon alone. Compare 1 Dowell, supra note 268, at 221, with Tyler,
supra note 8, at 137. Duluth, Montana, however, defined vagrancy in such a fashion
as to encompass the traditional elements of criminal syndicalism. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 128.
457 L W. W. Plead Not Guilty to Charge of Criminal Acts, INDUS. WORKER, Nov.
29, 1919, at 4; see also Reds Overflow Tacoma's Jail, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1920, at 13
(describing numerous arrests and convictions in both Tacoma and elsewhere on the
Pacific Coast); Tacoma Syndicalism Cases Up for Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1920, at
12.
458 On the rising tide of prosecutions, see Feb. 14 Bulletin, supra note 450; North-
west Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 7, 1920, at 1; and Northwest District
Defence [sic] Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 20, 1919, at 4. On the union's inter-
pretation of these prosecutions, see Present Status of the L W. W. Persecutions, INDUS.
WORKER, Jan. 24, 1920, at 1.
459 Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 28, 1920, at 1; see also Jury
Finds 36 I.WW.'s Guilty of Syndicalism, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 2, 1920, at 1.
460 Eight Are Guilty of Criminal Syndicalism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1920, at 114;
N.W. Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, May 8, 1920, at 1 [hereinafter May 8 Bulle-
tin]; N. W. Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, May 1, 1920, at 1; N. W. Defense Bulle-
tin, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 23, 1920, at 1; N.W. Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER,
Apr. 16, 1920, at 1; N.W. Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 9, 1920, at 1;
Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 2, 1920, at 1; Northwest Defense
Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 26, 1920, at 1; Mar. 19 Bulletin, supra note 412;
Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 6, 1920, at 1.
461 2 Dowell, supra note 268, at 1055.
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150 Wobblies with criminal syndicalism.4 62  Eighty-six of these
people would eventually be convicted and sentenced to terms
from thirty days in jail (those convicted at the municipal level) to
twenty years in prison.4 63 An unknown number were arrested
throughout the state and never charged. Their arrests reflected a
convergence of tension surrounding particular episodes of unrest
and protest, including the Centralia affair and ongoing strike ac-
tivity, with raw class conflict between the IWW and the timber
industry.4 4
Through the summer months of 1920, there were scores of ad-
ditional prosecutions, many of which culminated in convictions
and prison sentences. In June alone, the union reported sixteen
separate convictions in six different proceedings.465 By January
1921, some sixty-four Wobblies were in Washington prisons, and
others were being arrested or awaiting trial.46 6 Prosecutions in
all of these jurisdictions ebbed quickly after 1921,467 but they did
not end completely; Wobblies were still being prosecuted in
Washington in 1923.468
The dynamics of enforcement in Washington, Oregon, and
Idaho were essentially identical to those in California. Defend-
ants were arrested and charged for their affiliation with the
IWW.
4 6 9 When brought to trial, they were prosecuted under a
theory that the IWW was dedicated to the use of sabotage, vio-
462 See The Gruesome Story of American Terrorism, supra note 444 (listing ar-
rested Wobblies in Pacific Northwest).
463 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 42.
464 On IWW arrests in this context, see, for example, Indict 22 Portland I. W. W. for
Criminal Syndicalism, supra note 446, and Legal Persecution Starts in the West,
supra note 367.
465 Northwest Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, June 26, 1920, at 1; Northwest
Defense Bulletin, INDUS. WORKER, June 19, 1920, at 1; Northwest Defense Bulletin,
INDUS. WORKER, June 12, 1920, at 1 [hereinafter June 12 Bulletin]; June 5 Bulletin,
supra note 450.
466 Iron Heel in Northwest; Status of Cases to Date, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 15, 1921,
at 1; see also A.S. Embree Sentenced in Anti-Labor Court, SOLIDARITY, June 4,1921,
at 3; Four I.WW. Held on Syndicalism Charge, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Oct. 15, 1921, at
4; Police Stop Amnesty Meeting in Spokane, SOLIDARITY, Apr. 13, 1921, at 1.
467 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 55.
468 See, e.g., I. W. W. Wins in Spokane Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 20, 1923, at 1.
469 In early 1919, the IWW published an interesting document relative to this
practice: a letter purportedly from the Seattle district attorney to the chief of police
advising the latter to "have your men at the time of arrest inquire from the defen-
dant if he 'believes in and advocates' the doctrine of the I.W.W." Beliefs Prohibited,
NEW SOLIDARITY, Mar. 29, 1919, at 1. This, the author continued, was important "as
upon trial I can then connect the defendant with everything sent out by the Central
Office of the I.W.W." Id.
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lence, terrorism, or some other criminal means to effect political
or industrial change and that a defendant was therefore guilty of
syndicalism simply by virtue of his or her membership in the or-
ganization. As in California, defendants were not inclined to
deny their membership, often leaving prosecutors with the easier
task of piling on evidence so as to make the criminality of the
IWW seem too obvious to be denied by juries. Typically, too,
this evidence took the form of hearsay, as by the admission of
books, pamphlets, songs, and other expressions of IWW doctrine
and propaganda.47 ° Professional witnesses were used in almost
every case.471 Another similarity to California was the attempt
by at least one Washington court to ban the IWW preemptively
by injunction.472
Defendants' lawyers also had a hard time in this region; it was
in Washington in 1925 that attorney Elmer Smith was eventually
disbarred for supposedly being a criminal syndicalist himself.
473
Nevertheless, the IWW's lawyers did what they could for their
clients, arguing that the IWW and its members were not in fact
committed to using prohibited means to bring about social
change.4 74 On more than a few occasions, these strategies bore
fruit, with defendants gaining either acquittals 475 or (with some
frequency) hung juries.47 6 One particularly notable case featured
470 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 45-49. On the nature of these prosecutions and use
of such evidence at trial, see also State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 (Or. 1922); State v.
Passila, 201 P. 295 (Wash. 1921); State v. Hemhelter, 196 P. 581 (Wash. 1921); and
State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211 (Wash. 1921). For a description of one such trial, see
Verdict of Labor Jury Stands "Not Guilty," INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 27, 1920, at 1; see
also Jury Tampering in Seattle LW.W. Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Sept. 18, 1920, at 1.
471 As in California, these men often readily admitted being paid $20 per day and
witness fees for their services. 2 Dowell, supra note 268, at 1059.
472 See Judge Forbids I.W.W. to Exist, NEW SOLIDARITY, Dec. 20, 1919, at 1.
473 In re Smith, 233 P. 288 (Wash. 1925); Centralia Has Free Speech Once More!,
INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 7, 1923, at 1; Lumber Lords Disbar Elmer Smith, INDUS.
SOLIDARITY, Mar. 4, 1925, at 1; see also Elmer Smith Arrested in Centralia, INDUS.
WORKER, Mar. 24, 1923, at 1 (describing separate arrest of attorney Elmer Smith for
public speaking). Smith had been tried for (and acquitted of) murder in Centralia
for the death of a vigilante on Armistice Day 1919, a matter to which he had no real
connection at all. See GUNNS, supra note 296, at 45.
474 GUNNS, supra note 296, at 46-49; see also State v. McLennen, 200 P. 319
(Wash. 1921) (finding prejudicial error in jury instruction defining the act of "sabo-
tage" as per se prohibited by state laws).
475 See, e.g., I. W. W. Wins in Spokane Trial, supra note 468. "Not Guilty," NEW
SOLIDARITY, Oct. 25, 1919, at 8; Walter Smith Is Acquitted at Everett; Not Guilty of
Criminal Syndicalism, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 11, 1920, at 1; Wobs Freed; Jury Ac-
quits, INDUS. WORKER, Sept. 24, 1921, at 1.
476 On several occasions, defendants were retried multiple times after juries failed
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defendant William Moudy, a delegate arrested in Seattle in 1920.
Moudy took the stand and boldly admitted his membership in
and work for the IWW, and stridently defended the organiza-
tion's aims. The jury took nearly eleven hours to acquit him.477
Such victories notwithstanding, scores of Wobblies were con-
victed and sent to prison on such charges.478
C. The Plains and Midwest
Criminal syndicalism laws were also rather actively enforced in
several Midwest and Plains states. This is not surprising given
the success the IWW enjoyed in the late 1910s organizing migra-
tory harvest workers, timber workers, and miners in these states.
Like in California and the Pacific Northwest, arrests and formal
charges in this region were invariably premised on membership
or organizing activity; with only a few exceptions, so too was
conviction.
Some of the more notable cases occurred in Kansas, where au-
thorities had long brought to bear every means at their disposal
to arrest IWW members and organizers, especially during the
harvest season and its lead-up.4 79 On July 8, 1920, Wobbly Harry
Breen was arrested in Waukeeney upon his admission to an un-
dercover volunteer policeman that he belonged to the IWW.48 °
Breen was convicted partly on the basis of organizing materials
found in his possession and sentenced to thirty years in prison.481
On August 14, 1920, a former member of the IWW's executive
board was convicted of criminal syndicalism in El Dorado.482
Shortly thereafter, another Wobbly was charged in Marion.483
Later that fall, one member was charged with criminal syndical-
to agree on a verdict. See, e.g., June 12 Bulletin, supra note 465 (describing two
defendants in Spokane, Washington, being retried four times); June 5 Bulletin, supra
note 450 (describing five defendants in Yakima, Washington, being scheduled for a
retrial and a defendant in Tillamook, Oregon, being retried); May 8 Bulletin, supra
note 460 (describing a defendant in Pasco, Washington, being scheduled for retrial);
To Try IW.W. Fourth Time, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1920, at 14.
477 Moudy Acquitted of Criminal Syndicalism, INDUS. WORKER, July 3, 1920, at 1.
478 In Washington, there were still thirteen Wobblies in prison as late as 1925. The
Roll Call: Christmas, 1925, INDUS. WORKER, Dec. 26, 1925, at 1.
479 See Koppes, supra note 217, at 338-44.
4 8 0 Kansas Forced to Free .W. W., INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 28, 1922, at 2.
481 Id.
482 William D. Haywood, General Defense, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Sept.
1920, at 58, 58.
483 John Martin, Defense News, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Nov. 1920, at 54, 54.
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ism in Lyons4 84 and two others (of a group of fourteen arrested)
scheduled for trial in Kansas City.485
In one particularly notable case that was eventually reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, a defendant named Harold
Fiske was arrested on June 2, 1923.486 The marshal who arrested
him suspected he was an IWW organizer, searched him, and dis-
covered IWW documents and literature.48' On the basis of this
evidence and his alleged admission to the sheriff that he had
taken two applications for membership, Fiske was charged with
criminal syndicalism.488 The evidence introduced at trial against
Fiske consisted primarily of the following: membership applica-
tions, membership cards, and accounting records found in Fiske's
possession; the bylaws and other records pertaining to the Agri-
cultural Workers' Industrial Union No. 110, an IWW affiliate; the
preamble of the IWW's constitution; and a copy of an IWW
song, which Fiske was alleged to have sung while in jail.489 For
his part, Fiske defended the IWW's program of social revolution
and admitted his role as an organizer, but denied that the IWW
was committed to unlawful means of change and that he had re-
cruited workers in the county in which he was charged.49 ° Fiske
was convicted and sentenced to one to ten years in prison.49 1
The reported cases alone reveal a number of other Kansas
prosecutions besides these. In some it is not possible to tell ex-
actly what circumstances caused defendants to be arrested and
charged.492 In every case in which the circumstances are clear,
though, it is obvious that defendants were charged with criminal
syndicalism purely on the basis of their membership in, or re-
cruitment activity on behalf of, the IWW. 493 Such prosecutions
484 The Defense Situation, ONE BiG UNION MONTHLY, Dec. 1920, at 60, 60.
485 The Kansas City defendants were apparently participants in a speaking en-
gagement concerning the issue of political prisoners. Id.
486 State v. Fiske, 230 P. 88, 89 (Kan. 1924).
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 Id. at 89-90.
49 0 
Id. at 90.
491 Id. at 88. But see Fiske Freed by Supreme Court, INDUS. WORKER, May 28,
1927, at 1 (reporting that the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Kansas decision).
492 See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 212 P. 654, 654 (Kan. 1923) (reversing denial of
defendant's motion to quash information for failure to state an offense).
493 See, e.g., Ex parte Clancy, 210 P. 487, 487 (Kan. 1922) (an IWW defendant
charged with criminal syndicalism and vagrancy and convicted of the latter); State v.
Breen, 205 P. 632, 632, 634-35 (Kan. 1922) (an IWW defendant charged with crimi-
nal syndicalism); State v. Berquist, 199 P. 101 (Kan. 1921) (same); In re Danton, 195
2006]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
were still not enough, however, for the Kansas Attorney Gen-
eral, who in 1920 sought to enjoin the IWW from violating Kan-
sas' criminal syndicalism statute.494
This kind of enforcement occurred in other parts of the region
as well. In November 1919, for example, the governor of Ne-
braska ordered law enforcement officials to "take into custody
any member of the I.W.W. who may be found within your juris-
diction ' 495 and to prosecute her or him for criminal syndical-
ism.496 In so doing, he followed the lead of the state attorney
general, who had advocated such a campaign the prior sum-
mer.497 Indeed, even before the governor's proclamation, Scotts-
bluff authorities had arrested at least sixteen Wobblies, including
one who had come to town to check on the fate of the others
arrested before him. 498 Within a few days of the governor's plea,
police raided IWW offices in Omaha, arresting more than a
dozen.4 99 That same month, in Marion, Iowa, an IWW organizer
named Henry Tonn got himself in trouble by attempting to cash
an IWW check; this led to his being arrested by the deputy sher-
iff as "suspicious," taken to jail, and subjected to searches of his
person and luggage that produced other IWW documents."'
Tonn was then charged with criminal syndicalism, convicted on
this evidence, and sentenced to up to three years in prison.50 '
P. 981 (Kan. 1921) (same); see also State v. Dilgar, 208 P. 620, 620 (Kan. 1922)
(IWW defendants challenging charges of escape while being held for criminal
syndicalism).
494 See State ex rel. Hopkins v. IWW, 214 P. 617 (Kan. 1923). On this strategy in
California, see Whitten, supra note 18, at 58-60.
495 All Nebraska LW.W.'s Are Ordered Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1919, at 3.
496 Id.; Northwest and West Will Make Red Sweep Clean, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov.
14, 1919, at 3.
497 Nebraska Prepares Terror, INDUS. WORKER, July 23, 1919, at 4.
498 Cronin Arrested, NEW SOLIDARITY, Oct. 18, 1919, at 3; Special Telegram, NEW
SOLIDARITY, Oct. 11, 1919, at 1.
499 Capitalism Run Mad, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Dec. 1919, at 8, 8.
500 State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 532-33 (Iowa 1923).
501 State v. Tonn, 180 N.W. 164 (Iowa 1920) (setting out trial court facts and re-
quiring county to pay for transcript for appeal). The Iowa Supreme Court later re-
versed the trial court's conviction. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530; Iowa High Court Reverses
. W. W. Syndicalism Conviction, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Feb. 10, 1923, at 5; "Sabotage"
Defined by Iowa Supreme Court as "Destruction of Property," INDUS. WORKER,
Feb. 7, 1923, at 2. November 1919 was perhaps the most important month in crimi-
nal syndicalism enforcement. Not only were Charlotte Anita Whitney and several
other California defendants arrested during this period, but in that same month,
authorities in Youngstown, Ohio, charged several union leaders with syndicalism for
their role in organizing a strike. Hold 3 Steel Organizers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1919,
at 17.
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While neither Nebraska nor Iowa seemed to have hosted a great
number of prosecutions beyond these, in Nebraska, at least,
Wobblies were still being arrested on such charges as late as
1922.502
In Minnesota, amid continuing organizing efforts in both tim-
ber and small-grain agriculture, authorities lost no time charging
Wobblies with criminal syndicalism. On the last day of Septem-
ber 1917, a lumberjack named Jesse J. Dunning, who served as
secretary of the IWW local, was arrested in Bemidji.5" 3 Authori-
ties found in Dunning's possession two books, each entitled Sab-
otage.5" On this basis, it was Dunning's misfortune to be the
first person in history convicted of criminal syndicalism. He was
sentenced to two years in prison.5 °5
IWW leaders in Minneapolis were charged with criminal syndi-
calism as they awaited transportation to Chicago to face wartime
conspiracy charges. 506 Authorities were active in Duluth as well.
In January 1920, six Wobblies as well as the Workers' Socialist
Publishing Company were indicted there for criminal syndical-
ism. 5° 7 St. Louis County prosecutors eventually obtained convic-
tions of several of the Wobblies and the publishing company on
the predictable grounds that they published and distributed IWW
literature.508
There was also significant enforcement in Oklahoma, where
IWW gains in both agriculture and oil and gas inspired vigorous
anti-Wobbly activity. The State arrested its first defendants on
June 15, 1919, in Enid, amid a new IWW organizing campaign
among harvest workers; the arrestees were four organizers
scooped up in a vagrancy dragnet of harvest hands.50 9 The prose-
cution focused from the outset on Jack Terrell, a thirty-five-year-
old with only a fifth grade education who had nonetheless risen
502 The Spirit That Cannot Be Broken, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 29, 1922, at 8.
503 Lee, supra note 202, at 74-75.
504 Id. at 74. The two books, one by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the other by Emil
Pouget, were the same two named in the Chicago conspiracy indictment of that same
summer. Id.
505 Id.; see also Convicted as Criminal Syndicalist, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 6, 1917,
at 3.
506 The charges, which were probably never formalized, were apparently filed by
the landlords who owned the headquarters of the union's agricultural affiliate.
GREG HALL, HARVEST WOBBLIES: THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD
AND AGRICULTURAL LABORERS IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1905-1930, at 139 (2001).
507 Gruesome Story Installment No. 4, supra note 329.
508 State v. Worker's Socialist Pub. Co., 185 N.W. 931 (Minn. 1921).
509 SELLARS, supra note 8, at 135-37.
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to be elected to the General Organizing Committee of the
IWW's agriculture affiliate.510 After Terrell's brief trial, during
which he apparently surprised spectators with his speaking ability
and his insistence on his and the IWW's commitment to peace-
able radicalism, and during which the prosecution summoned up
the usual evidence of supposed IWW outrages, he was convicted
and then essentially allowed by the judge to flee the state.511 Ter-
rell was later convicted of criminal syndicalism in California and
sentenced to one to fourteen years in prison.512
Another notable Oklahoma case involved the prosecution of a
thirty-eight-year-old itinerate oil field and harvest worker named
Arthur Berg. Originally arrested by railroad police in Haileyville
on December 27, 1922, and booked on vagrancy charges, Berg
was also charged with criminal syndicalism when a police search
of his person turned up IWW literature, a membership book, and
other documents.513 Early the next year, Berg was formally
charged with advocating criminal syndicalism and with criminal
syndicalism by membership in the IWW.51 4 While he did admit
to membership in the IWW, Berg denied being an organizer.515
The ensuing prosecution featured the usual claims about the
IWW's radicalism, including the introduction of IWW literature
and the ubiquitous preamble, combined with testimony designed
to prove that Berg was in fact an organizer and not simply a
member.516 Berg, who was indeed an organizer, was convicted
and sentenced to ten years in prison and fined $5000.
511
A fate similar to Berg's befell organizer Homer Wear, who was
arrested in Miami, Oklahoma, charged initially with vagrancy,
510 Id. at 137.
511 Id. at 137-39.
512 On Jack Terrell's prosecution for criminal syndicalism, see id. at 133-40; see
also Oklahoma "Justice," SOLIDARrrY, Mar. 13, 1920, at 4. George Aldridge, one of
the other organizers arrested with Terrell, somehow escaped conviction on those
charges only to be charged a few months later with the murder of a railroad police-
man that he did not commit. SELLARS, supra note 8, at 146. At some point while
being held for the murder, Aldridge and his fellow suspects were apparently offered
their freedom if they agreed to pay seventy-five cents for each day they had been
held in custody. Haywood, supra note 482.
513 See Oklahoma Holds 2 Delegates in Pen, INDUS. WORKER, Aug. 20, 1924, at 2.
514 Von Russell Creel, The Case of the Wandering Wobblie: The State of
Oklahoma v. Arthur Berg, 73 CHRONIC. OKLA. 404, 406 (1995).
515 Id. at 414.
516 Berg v. State, 233 P. 497, 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925); Creel, supra note 514,
at 404.
517 See Creel, supra note 514; see also Berg, 233 P. at 503.
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charged subsequently with and convicted of criminal syndicalism,
and then sent to prison.518 The next summer, authorities in Qua-
paw, Oklahoma, arrested yet another Wobbly organizer, Oscar
Citron.519 Like Berg and Terrell, Citron was initially arrested for
vagrancy and later charged with criminal syndicalism when au-
thorities claimed-somewhat dubiously, as the document may
well have been a forgery-to have discovered on his person a
handwritten handbill obliquely advocating violence against mine
owners.5 20 Citron was convicted and sentenced to six years in
prison and fined $650.521
IV
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LAWS IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
Appellate courts at the state and federal levels heard dozens of
cases involving criminal syndicalism prosecutions of Wobblies in
the late 1910s and 1920s. While the outcomes of these cases were
quite varied, a review of them supports several generalizations.
First, some courts, particularly at the state level, were uncomfort-
able with the kind of evidence used to convict at trial; in particu-
lar, they disfavored the resort to uncorroborated hearsay and the
reliance on membership as such to establish culpability. Second,
the tendency to overturn convictions on such grounds was more
common among intermediate courts of appeal than supreme
courts. Third, no courts questioned the essential legality of the
criminal syndicalism concept, whether on constitutional or any
other grounds. In this respect, too, no courts ever really ques-
tioned the basic idea that the IWW was properly seen by legisla-
tors and trial courts as embodying the crime of syndicalism.
In these respects, the courts' opinions reflect a distinctive ide-
ology that assumed the essential criminality of the IWW and its
program of economic radicalism while-at least on occasion-
adhering to and upholding norms of procedural propriety. For
those convicted of criminal syndicalism, this could mean an op-
portunity to leave prison. In some instances, the courts' scruples
518 CS. Charge in Oklahoma, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Sept. 1, 1923, at 6.
519 SELLARS, supra note 8, at 171-72.
520 Id. at 172.
521 Id. at 171-72. There would be a few other criminal syndicalism prosecutions in
this period in other jurisdictions. Dowell describes, for example, a few Wobblies
being arrested in Nevada in the 1920s and Ohio in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but
few of these cases actually resulted in formal charges, much less trial and conviction.
2 Dowell, supra note 268, at 971-74, 982.
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even altered actual enforcement practices. Ultimately, however,
the appellate courts did not significantly diminish the ability of
authorities to use these laws to harass the IWW and visit enor-
mous hardship on a huge number of its members and supporters.
By this approach, the courts were able to maintain their opposi-
tion to the IWW, both practically (by upholding the basic utility
of the statutes as anti-IWW devices) and ideologically (by af-
firming, and even augmenting, the statutes' condemnation of the
IWW), while also preserving their own legitimacy as arbiters of
procedural fairness and the legitimacy of a system nominally
bound by legal rules.
A. The State Courts
By 1918, state appellate courts were already deciding the legal-
ity of criminal syndicalism convictions. By the mid 1920s, there
would be more than fifty reported cases of this type, most of
which originated in the states of most intensive enforcement:
California, the Pacific Northwest states, Kansas, and Oklahoma.
The legal issues presented to these courts were quite diverse, in-
cluding all manner of very technical claims of the sort that, on the
surface, revealed little of the courts' overall attitudes toward the
criminal syndicalism question.522 At the same time, though,
many of the cases did tend to revolve around a relatively narrow
set of issues that concerned, on a rather basic level, how these
laws were being enforced. In this more readily revealing cate-
gory are six main types of claims: constitutional claims involving
both vagueness or other shortcomings in the definition of essen-
522 Many examples of this type involved claims of some sort of formal defect in
the information or indictment, including charging too many offenses jointly, or fail-
ing to identify the alleged crime with sufficient specificity. On claims involving a
lack of specificity in the indictment or information, see, for example, People v. Stee-
lik, 203 P. 78, 82 (Cal. 1921); People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85, 86-87 (Cal. 1921); People v.
Malley, 194 P. 48, 49-50 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Wear v. State, 235 P. 271, 272
(Okla. Crim. App. 1925); State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211, 214 (Wash. 1921); and com-
pare People v. Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. 358, 362 (Mich. 1925) (defendant prosecuted
for Communist Party affiliation). On claims involving the inclusion of multiple
counts in the same indictment, see, for example, Steelik, 203 P. at 80-81 (holding that
inclusion of such counts that are inherent in charge of criminal syndicalism crime
and can be committed in multiple ways constitutes irreversible error); State v. Ding-
man, 219 P. 760, 762 (Idaho 1923) (same); Hennessy, 195 P. at 212-13 (same). Other
issues of this kind included complaints about the nature of jury instructions given or
the failure of the court to give instructions requested by the defendant. See, e.g.,
Taylor, 203 P. at 90-91 (affirming trial court refusal to instruct jury on "[t]he general
right of the masses to strike, and the propriety or impropriety of extending sympathy
to the soviet government of Russia").
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tial concepts like sabotage and syndicalism; sufficiency of evi-
dence claims, which were often closely related to the vagueness
issue; constitutional claims premised on the use of these statutes
to criminalize speech and association; constitutional claims that
these statutes were an impermissible form of class legislation; ev-
identiary claims regarding the use of hearsay evidence to obtain
convictions; and the related issue of whether proof of member-
ship alone would suffice to establish culpability.
The argument that these statutes offered an inadequate defini-
tion of key terms like sabotage was raised in the earliest reported
case and continued to be raised throughout the period discussed
in this Article. In line with modern void-for-vagueness doctrine,
the argument was typically that defendants had no way of relia-
bly determining whether or not their conduct was actually pro-
hibited by the jurisdiction's statute. On each of these issues, the
courts consistently decided against defendants. They held that
terms like sabotage had an obvious meaning, one embedded in
common knowledge if not also adequately elaborated by the stat-
utes themselves.523 Indeed, in several instances, the courts went
so far as to cite popular dictionary and encyclopedia definitions
of these terms, in particular, definitions that conveniently defined
sabotage with specific reference to the IWW.52 4 In other cases,
the courts' strategy was to shift the focus of the analysis from
inherently uncertain terms, like sabotage or terrorism, to crime,
which then allowed these courts to present the means of social
change prohibited by the statutes as self-evident. 2 5 In yet an-
other instance, the Washington Supreme Court simply declared
that the uncertainty argument proved too much and that "it
would be easy to find many statutes now on the books which are
open to the object of uncertainty, but which have heretofore
never been suspected of that fault." '526 In the few cases in which
523 See, e.g., Steelik, 203 P. at 83-84; People v. Wieler, 204 P. 410, 411-12 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1922); State v. McLennen, 200 P. 319, 320 (Wash. 1921).
524 See, e.g., Dingman, 219 P. at 762-64; McLennen, 200 P. at 320 (ordering a new
trial on other grounds).
525 See, e.g., Steelik, 203 P. at 83; cf Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. at 361 (defendant
prosecuted for Communist Party affiliation).
526 Hennessy, 195 P. at 216 (quoting State v. Brown, 182 P. 944 (Wash. 1919)).
The court's basis for this statement was that the criminal syndicalism statute, like the
others invoked, was certain in the results that it prohibited, though not in the acts,
and that this must suffice lest a contrary rule call into question much of the criminal
code. Id. at 215-16. There are several problems with this reasoning. Besides the
fact that the other crimes mentioned, including vagrancy, malicious mischief, and
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defendants were able to prevail on grounds involving how terms
like sabotage were defined, this was not because of the inherent
uncertainty of such terms, but rather because the trial courts had
embellished the meaning of these terms in their instructions to
the jury. 27 In other cases, though, the denial of requests for in-
structions that clarified such terms to the jury by trial courts was
upheld. This included cases in which defendants asked for in-
structions requiring the jury to actually find that the IWW itself
was committed to using means of social change prohibited by the
statutes.528
Embedded in such arguments about the inadequate definition
of terms like sabotage was often an ancillary evidentiary claim
about the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove that the
IWW was actually committed to using the prohibited means of
social change, and that the defendants were thereby properly
convicted based on their affiliation with the IWW. In weighing
such claims, the courts were equally unsympathetic to defend-
ants. In some instances, they again invoked dictionaries and en-
cyclopedias to uphold juries' conclusions on this question. 529 The
courts also confirmed the value of IWW literature, songs, and the
like as bases for affirming its commitment to criminal tactics.53°
"willfully disturb[ing] any religious meeting," id. at 216 (quoting Brown, 182 P. 944),
might also be problematic, these crimes are also minor offenses, quite unlike the
criminal syndicalism statute. Moreover, terms like sabotage and terrorism proved
especially vague and ambiguous in actual practice. Finally, the true result element
of the crime was not sabotage or the like, but rather the bringing about of industrial
or political change. Id. at 212.
527 There are several examples of this. In a habeas case, the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that the criminal syndicalism statute's prohibition of sabotage did not encom-
pass simply advocacy of striking. Ex parte Moore, 224 P. 662, 665 (Idaho 1924). The
court noted that nothing prevented the legislature from defining sabotage more ex-
plicitly to include advocacy of strikes. Id. Indeed, that is exactly what the Idaho
legislature did; early in 1925, it redefined sabotage under the statute to include,
among other things, "loitering at work; slack work; [and] slowing down work or
production." Act of February 21, 1925, ch. 51, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws 76; see also
State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 538 (Iowa 1923); State v. Aspelin, 203 P. 964, 965
(Wash. 1922) (reversing a criminal syndicalism conviction for overembellishment of
the meaning of sedition in instructions).
528 See, e.g., People v. Eaton, 213 P. 275, 276-77 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (af-
firming trial court's refusal to instruct jury that, in order to convict, they must find
that the IWW advocated and taught criminal syndicalism).
529 On such references to dictionaries and encyclopedias, see, for example, Ding-
man, 219 P. at 762-63 (Idaho 1923). But see People v. Ware, 226 P. 956, 959-60 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (rejecting such evidence as impermissibly expanding the notion
of culpability).
530 In People v. Taylor, 203 P. 85 (Cal. 1921), for example, the California Supreme
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Similarly, the courts were quite comfortable with the practice of
allowing juries to infer individual culpability from the acts attrib-
uted (usually by professional witnesses and other modes of hear-
say) to the IWW.-31 Indeed, in several instances, courts upheld
this practice even where the evidence of IWW wrongdoing pre-
dated the enactment of the relevant criminal syndicalism
statute.532
Perhaps the most familiar legal argument against criminal syn-
dicalism prosecution involved claims that these laws unconstitu-
tionally impinged on rights of speech and association. Indeed,
such claims appear fairly frequently in the case law. However, in
not a single reported case from this period did any state court
overturn a criminal syndicalism conviction because of its impair-
ment of speech or association rights. Even in rejecting such
claims, the courts were consistently perfunctory and even dismis-
sive. On the few occasions that the courts acknowledged some
abstract right to speech or association, they were quick to declare
the IWW and its affiliates beyond the purview of such right. The
California Supreme Court explained in its 1921 decision People v.
Taylor that such rights have "no application to a statute such as
ours, which denounces organizations formed for the purpose of
committing crimes against persons and property in furtherance of
political or industrial changes.
'5 33
Court reviewed at length an array of such evidence in the course of pronouncing it
sufficient to justify the jury's determination that the organizations-in this case, the
IWW and the Communist Labor Party-were dedicated to the means of social
change prohibited by the statute. Id. at 87-89. This court, like most others, usually
saw no problem in the fact that on this very question, the evidence was, at best,
highly equivocal. See id.; see also People v. Lesse, 199 P. 46, 47 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1921). But see People v. Erickson, 226 P. 637, 637 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (stating
that literature introduced into evidence was too vague on the use of prohibited
means to accomplish social change to support a conviction); People v. Leonard, 225
P. 461, 462 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (determining that possession of IWW button
and literature was insufficient to sustain conviction).
531 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 230 P. 221, 224 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (stating
that defendant's own disbelief in prohibited means was irrelevant in face of evidence
of IWW's dedication to such means); People v. Roe, 209 P. 381, 383-84 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1922).
532 People v. Powell, 236 P. 311, 314 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Roe, 209 P. at 384.
But see Ware, 226 P. at 959.
533 Taylor, 203 P. at 88; see also People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 84 (Cal. 1921) ("The
right of free speech does not include the right to advocate the destruction or over-
throw [of] the government or the criminal destruction of property."); People v. Cox,
226 P. 14, 15-16 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People v. Wagner, 225 P. 464, 466-67
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211, 216 (Wash. 1921); cf Peo-
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A similar fate befell arguments that such laws constituted an
unconstitutional brand of class legislation. The idea was that
these statutes impermissibly singled out for criminalization those
who sought by the prohibited means to bring about a change in
the industrial or political order, while failing to criminalize those
who used the very same means to preserve the existing industrial
or political order. On its face, this idea was not without merit;
the very Wobblies who were prosecuted under these laws were
far more likely to be victims of violence and the like at the hand
of reactionary vigilantes and public officials than they were ever
to use these means to advance their radical ideas.534 But for the
courts, this equal protection-type argument was without merit.
Employing a kind of vanguard notion of rational relation scru-
tiny, the courts simply declared that the distinction in the statute
between proponents of revolution and reaction was rational and
therefore constitutional.535
One kind of claim that did with some frequency result in crimi-
nal syndicalism convictions being overturned was the assertion
that the trial court prejudiced the defendant by admitting hearsay
evidence. Even in these cases, the courts were seldom troubled
by the admission of literature, songs, and other IWW documents.
Such evidence was regularly regarded as acceptable proof of the
organization's supposed commitment to sabotage and other pro-
hibited means of social change, particularly where the state dis-
tinguished this use from the more problematic idea of using such
evidence to impute actions to the defendant himself.5 36 In other
cases, the admission of objectionable hearsay was nonetheless
deemed harmless error.537 The kind of hearsay evidence whose
pie v. Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. 358, 360 (Mich. 1925) (defendant prosecuted for Com-
munist Party affiliation).
534 This emerges clearly from any review of the history of the IWW. See generally
DUBOFSKY, supra note 7.
535 See People v. Wieler, 204 P. 410, 411 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); State v. Ding-
man, 219 P. 760, 764 (Idaho 1923); Hennessy, 195 P. at 215.
536 See Taylor, 203 P. at 90; Dingman, 219 P. at 766-67. In many of these cases,
including Dingman and Taylor, this evidence consisted in part of two books entitled
Sabotage, one by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and the other by Emil Pouget, that had
been named in earlier cases against the IWW, including the 1917 Chicago conspiracy
indictment. See, e.g., State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 537 (Iowa 1923) (deeming letter
addressed to defendant properly admitted where offered to prove defendant's con-
nection to IWW, not his belief in underlying ideas); State v. Payne, 200 P. 314, 315-
16 (Wash. 1921) (same); see also Powell, 236 P. at 313-14; Cox, 226 P. at 17-18;
People v. Lesse, 199 P. 46, 47 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
537 On hearsay as harmless error in these cases, see, for example, Cox, 226 P. at 17
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admission the courts did find unacceptable with some regularity
was that which consisted of oral testimony, especially where, as
was often the case, such testimony had no direct connection to
the defendant.538 Likewise, on occasion, the courts rejected
hearsay derived from unofficial sources.539 Some courts found
the use of such testimony particularly troubling in the light of
trial courts' habit of excluding precisely the same kind of testi-
mony where offered by defendants to disprove allegations about
the IWW or their affiliation with it.54°
Another issue on which the courts sometimes sided with de-
fendants was whether membership alone (or something akin to
it) could suffice for conviction. This was an important question
because it concerned the dominant theory on which defendants
were charged under the statutes. Generally, courts had no prob-
lem with convictions premised merely on affiliation or associa-
tion with, employment by, or membership in the IWW, and not
actual advocacy or proof of a connection between the fact of
membership and the organization's purported commitment to
criminal means of social change.541 Even courts that recognized
a need to modify the element by a mens rea standard-to require
proof of knowledge of the nature of the organization or member-
ship in it-were often easily satisfied that this subjective element
could be inferred, circularly, from the circumstances of member-
ship.542 Nevertheless, a number of intermediate courts over-
turned convictions on grounds that guilt could not be premised
on such evidence alone. In People v. Thornton, for example,
California's Second District Court of Appeals overturned a con-
viction premised on a defendant's membership in the IWW
where the state failed to show any nexus between the defendant's
membership and the supposedly criminal orientation of the
(finding that defendant's inability to cross-examine a professional witness on his past
was harmless, despite appellate court's admission that the witness was "one of the
most reprehensible characters thinkable"); Wagner, 225 P. at 467-68; People v. La
Rue, 216 P. 627, 630-31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
538 See, e.g., Dingman, 219 P. at 769-70; State v. Pettilla, 200 P. 332, 333 (Wash.
1921); State v. Gibson, 197 P. 611, 611-12 (Wash. 1921).
539 See People v. Flanagan, 223 P. 1014, 1017-19 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
540 See, e.g., Dingman, 219 P. at 769-70.
541 See, e.g., Taylor, 203 P. at 89-90.
542 See, e.g., Cox, 226 P. at 16; Wagner, 225 P. at 470-71 (determining that vague
instructions on scienter requirement were not grounds for reversal); Flanagan, 223
P. at 1015-16.
543 219 P. 1020 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
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IWW.5 44 A few courts took a similar attitude toward evidence of
defendants' production and possession of IWW documents, hold-
ing that such evidence alone could not satisfy a theory of culpa-
bility premised on organizing.545
In addition to these arguments, other, less typical claims were
raised from time to time. Among these were allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct; 546 objections sometimes invoking the
ex post facto clauses to the admission of evidence of IWW rheto-
ric prior to the enactment of the criminal syndicalism statutes;
547
and even arguments that punishment under these statutes was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.548 These arguments were
generally rejected by the courts.5 49 So too was the claim that de-
fense witnesses were unfairly intimidated by the threat of prose-
cution 550 or that such witnesses were wrongly convicted based on
their testimony.55' On the other hand, in a few cases defendants
also had their convictions overturned on grounds of jury bias or
other disqualifications. 2 In other cases, defendants raised con-
stitutional claims about the manner in which evidence was ob-
tained by searches of their person or property. 3 In still other
544 Id. at 1021-22. But see Flanagan, 223 P. at 1015 (deciding that knowledge of
organization's alleged criminality was properly inferred from membership and re-
versing the conviction on other grounds).
545 See, e.g., People v. Thurman, 216 P. 394, 396-97 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923).
546 People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 84-85 (Cal. 1921).
547 The use of such evidence was routinely sustained by courts on the grounds that
it was offered to show the character of the IWW and not the criminality of the
defendant prior to the enactment of the statute. See, e.g., Steelik, 203 P. at 84; State
v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530, 537-38 (Iowa 1923).
548 See, e.g., State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211, 215 (Wash. 1921) (rejecting argument
that statute was imposing cruel and unusual punishment by not sufficiently fixing the
possible sentence); see also State v. Dingman, 219 P. 760, 764-65 (Idaho 1923) (re-
jecting arguments that statute was unconstitutional on several grounds, including
cruel and unusual punishment).
549 See, e.g., Dingman, 219 P. at 765; Hennessy, 195 P. at 215.
550 People v. Casdorf, 212 P. 237, 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922).
551 People v. Johansen, 226 P. 634, 636 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (rejecting a
claim that county lacked jurisdiction over defendant where jurisdiction was pre-
mised on involuntary, subpoenaed presence in jurisdiction).
552 See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 211 P. 467, 468-69 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (hold-
ing that prejudicial error resulted from the trial court's disallowing of defendant's
challenges to jurors for actual bias); People v. Wismer, 209 P. 259, 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1922) (reversing where one juror served in an earlier criminal syndicalism
trial).
553 In State v. Tonn, 191 N.W. 530 (Iowa 1923), for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court ruled that the evidence obtained in the course of the unlawful search of a
Wobbly's luggage was nonetheless admissible because the Wobbly waived his right
to exclude evidence otherwise unlawfully obtained by failing to object at the time
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cases, defendants argued that criminal syndicalism convictions
were invalid as "constructive treason"-that is, as impermissible
attempts by states to usurp the exclusive authority of the federal
government to punish treasonous behavior.554
These decisions by the state courts are not remarkable for their
jurisprudential insights. Rather, they reveal something more ba-
sic about the role of the courts in this affair. Defendants put
before these courts a number of legal claims that the courts could
have used to limit the use of these laws to punish mere associa-
tion with the IWW, irrespective of any real evidence involving
the advocacy of violence, sabotage, or the like. With only a few
exceptions involving rather technical procedural or evidentiary
issues, the courts refused to endorse these claims. The result was
to leave these laws and most of the enforcement and
prosecutorial techniques developed to enforce them quite intact,
but only after giving the appellants their day in court.
B. The United States Supreme Court
In the course of the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court
decided three cases concerning the legality of convictions under
criminal syndicalism laws. Two of these, Whitney v. California555
and Fiske v. Kansas,556 involved prosecutions directly under the
respective states' laws.557 The third, Burns v. United States,558
indirectly concerned California's law as it involved the enforce-
ment of that law under a federal statute that imported state crim-
inal law to conduct in Yosemite National Park not otherwise
addressed by federal law.559 While the convictions in Whitney
and Burns were upheld, the defendant in Fiske prevailed and
had his conviction overturned. Yet in all three cases, the general
thrust of the Court's reasoning was to uphold the essential legal-
ity of criminal syndicalism laws as well as their enforcement on
the basis primarily of membership in or affiliation with the IWW.
and because he had a remedy in a trespass action against these authorities. Id. at
532-36; see also Hennessy, 195 P. at 218 (holding that defendant's objection to law-
fulness of seizure not timely raised); cf. People v. Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. 358, 362-63
(Mich. 1925) (stating that defendant prosecuted for Communist Party affiliation
waived right to examine evidence produced at trial).
554 This claim was rejected out of hand. Hennessy, 195 P. at 214-15.
555 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
556 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
557 See Fiske, 274 U.S. at 381; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359.
558 274 U.S. 328 (1927).
559 Id. at 330.
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In other words, the Court followed most of the state courts in
endorsing the notion that involvement with the IWW could be
criminalized in the absence of any credible proof of its actual en-
gagement in or commitment to violent or criminal means of so-
cial change.
The defendant in Fiske prevailed on grounds that his convic-
tion constituted a denial of due process in that it was based upon
insufficient evidence of guilt. In particular, the Court ruled
unanimously that the introduction of the IWW's preamble, which
constituted the state's only evidence of the union's commitment
to criminal syndicalism, was insufficient evidence of guilt, partic-
ularly given Fiske's testimony at trial in contradiction of this very
notion.56 ° This ruling did not, however, reflect anything in the
way of a more skeptical view of how criminal syndicalism statutes
were being enforced. Whitney and Burns clearly demonstrated
that the Fiske decision reflected a concern for the quantitative
sufficiency of evidence, not the qualitative sufficiency of IWW
rhetoric, membership, or affiliation as bases for prosecution and
conviction.
William Burns was an IWW member who had spent time as a
logger, construction worker, and deep-water sailor. He was ar-
rested in Yosemite in April 1923 while walking through the park
on a railroad track on his way to a lumber job and possessing
IWW credentials and literature.561 Procedural issues aside, the
key distinction between the circumstances of Burns's conviction
and Fiske's was that, in prosecuting Burns, the government not
only introduced evidence of the defendant's IWW membership
and work as an organizer and introduced the preamble; it also
put into evidence other IWW documents as well as the testimony
of a witness (who was clearly paid) who testified at some length
as to what he had read and heard in speeches about the IWW's
supposed willingness to use sabotage to advance its agenda of
social change.562 The accusations of sabotage were mostly to do
560 Fiske, 274 U.S. at 383-87.
561 Conviction of Bill Burns Upheld by U.S. Supreme Court; Arrested While Hik-
ing on Railroad Track, INDUS. WORKER, May 28, 1927, at 3 [hereinafter Burns Con-
viction Upheld]; Strange Case of Wm. Burns, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Nov. 19, 1924, at
1; Worker Waits 18 Months for Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 18, 1924, at 2. A few
months after Burns was arrested and charged in this fashion, so was "Fellow
Worker" William Rackle. More Persecutions in California, INoUS. WORKER, Dec. 1,
1923, at 2. It appears the Rackle was indicted, but the matter was eventually
dropped. Jan. 5 California Cases, supra note 427.
562 Compromise Ends Burns C.S. Trial, INDUS. WORKER, Nov. 29, 1924, at 1;
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with tactics of disruption and inefficiency, not actual violence or
destruction; Burns himself was never in any way directly impli-
cated in the use of any of these tactics.563 Moreover, in uphold-
ing Burns's conviction, the Court found no fault at all with the
fact that he was charged for being a member and an organizer
and convicted by a jury that had been invited in the trial judge's
instructions to associate striking with sabotage.564 That the Cali-
fornia statute itself limited the meaning of sabotage to the "wilful
and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property
565
was, as Justice Louis Brandeis noted in his dissent, essentially ir-
relevant to the Court in its rejection of Burns's central claim that
the statute was applied to him in a manner unauthorized by the
text.566
Whitney is not only the most notorious of these decisions; it is
also the one in which the Court reveals most clearly its essential
agreement with the concept of criminal syndicalism and its use as
a means of criminalizing membership in, and affiliation with, the
IWW. Unlike Burns and Fiske, which the Court disposed of on
the basis of one or two fairly narrow issues, Whitney decided an
array of issues, many of which had been rehearsed by state courts
in earlier cases. Before speaking to these issues, the Court revis-
ited the facts adduced at trial and did so in a manner that made
clear from the outset its view that Whitney was somehow closely
tied to the IWW-which was not actually true-and that both
the IWW and Whitney's conduit to it, the Communist Labor
Party, were committed to the methods of social change pro-
scribed by California's criminal syndicalism act.5 67 Although the
Court cannot be criticized for embracing facts established at trial,
the confident manner in which it presented them as unquestiona-
bly true made clear how it would decide the legal questions.568
Burns Conviction Upheld, supra note 561; Prosecutor Rests in Burns' Trial, INDUS.
WORKER, Nov. 26, 1924, at 1.
563 See sources cited supra note 562.
564 Burns, 274 U.S. at 331-34. The Court was clear in its view that "[s]abotage, as
the evidence indicates it to have been advocated and taught by the organization, is
not confined, as in the definition contained in the Act, to physical damage and injury
:o physical property." Id. at 333. It then pointed to IWW literature introduced at
trial that reflected the organization's own ambiguous and blusterous understanding
of the concept. Id. at 333-34. In this light, it concluded, the defendant's conviction
on the instructions given was not constitutionally problematic. Id. at 336.
565 Burns, 274 U.S. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
566 Id. at 338-41.
567 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 363-66 (1927).
568 Id. at 359-61.
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The Court rejected each of the defendant's claims of error.
Whitney's claim that her participation in the founding of the
Communist Labor Party could not fairly render her culpable for
the party's subsequent endorsements was rejected as both a fac-
tual question improper for reconsideration on appeal and as in-
consistent with what the Court took to be the clear facts of the
case. 569 For Justice Edward Sanford, the proof of this was not
only that Whitney could have left the party; in his view, her advo-
cacy within the party of nonviolent means of protest, which had
been established at trial, was irrelevant in that it did not advance
this position "to the exclusion of violent or unlawful means. "570
In other words, Whitney's factual guilt was rooted in her failure
to sufficiently repudiate the party's ideology and (presumably, as
the Court did not explicitly discuss this aspect of the state's case)
the party's brief endorsement of the IWW.
5 71
The Court was equally clear that the statute presented no due
process difficulties because of its vagueness or "uncertainty of
definition." '572 Indeed, Sanford concluded from the outset that
the statute's definition of criminal syndicalism was both "clear"
and "specific," adequately informing those at risk of prosecution,
and not so vague as to be insusceptible to interpretation by those
of common intelligence. 3 Sanford based this conclusion not on
actual reflection on the text of the statute, but rather on recita-
tion of the applicable legal doctrines combined with examples of
state court cases that held similar criminal syndicalism statutes
not to be void for indefiniteness. 4
Just as perfunctory was the Court's disposition of Whitney's
equal protection claim. Hewing to the class legislation argument
made by a number of defendants in state courts, Whitney had
argued to the Court that the statute offended the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by criminalizing the words and actions of those who
sought to change the prevailing political and industrial condi-
tions, while not in any way criminalizing the same kinds of words
or actions directed at preserving the status quo.575 The argument
was by no means implausible, but for the Court, this was simply a
56 9 Id. at 367.
570 Id.
571 Id. at 366-68.
572 Id. at 368.
573 Id. at 368-69.
574 Id.
575 Id. at 369.
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nonissue. A state may freely make such distinctions, it said, so
long as they are at least rational.576 Moreover, in Sanford's
words, there was "nothing indicating any ground to apprehend
that those desiring to maintain existing industrial and political
conditions did or would advocate such methods.
5 77
Finally, the Court came to terms with Whitney's arguments
that the statute unconstitutionally criminalized speech and asso-
ciation. For Sanford, the issue was very clear. The Constitution,
he said, "does not confer an absolute right to speak, without re-
sponsibility, whatever one may choose. 578 A state may there-
fore "punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical
to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the pub-
lic peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government
and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means. '5 79 Further, for a
state to criminalize membership in an organization found to em-
body such abuses was equally within its prerogatives.58 ° Indeed,
for Sanford, "every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity"58' of such a statute.582
While Justice Brandeis did not dissent in Whitney, he wrote a
concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Justice Holmes. In
a fashion typical of his and Holmes's First Amendment jurispru-
dence, Brandeis's concurrence goes on at great length about the
virtues of freedom of speech and association and the need for the
Court to confine the regulation of speech and association to that
which presents an imminent danger to the legitimate interests of
public safety or state security.583 Yet, for Brandeis, the evidence
was clear enough that the IWW did indeed constitute just such a
danger, making Whitney's support for the organization, however
attenuated, adequate grounds for her conviction.584 In this re-
spect, Brandeis's concurrence serves as a reminder of just how
thoroughly ambivalent and even hostile he (like Holmes) was to-
ward the actual practice of radical social change,585 despite the
attempt by some to cast both Brandeis and Holmes as voices of
576 Id. at 370.
577 Id.
578 Id. at 371.
579 Id.
580 Id.
581 Id. (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)).
582 Id.
583 Id. at 372-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
584 Id. at 379-80.
585 On the hostility to the IWW and other radical causes that underlay Brandeis's
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reason and justice on the criminal syndicalism issue.586
Brandeis's rhetoric is a stark demonstration of something evi-
dent throughout the jurisprudence of criminal syndicalism in this
period: that, contrary to any progressivist reading of the devel-
opment of the law in this area that would explain these decisions
by the immaturity of civil libertarian doctrine, judges at all levels
were not without ample grounds in established jurisprudence
from which to substantially limit the way these laws were being
used against the IWW. These grounds were available. The
courts, for the most part, simply refused to accept them, resorting
to legal rhetoric or factual axioms dripping with class biases to
obscure what was really going on: their complicity in the use of
criminal syndicalism laws to destroy the IWW.
V
THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LAWS ON
THE IWW
It is not possible to quantify the effect that criminal syndical-
ism laws had on the IWW. Nor is it feasible to assert in too
broad terms the impact these laws had on the organization's fate;
for example, one cannot likely argue that but for criminal syndi-
calism laws, the IWW would have realized its radical social
agenda. What is clear, though, is that criminal syndicalism laws
played a key role in eroding the IWW's viability as a labor organ-
ization and advocate of radical economic change.
Criminal syndicalism accomplished this destructive effect in
several ways. First, the enforcement of criminal syndicalism laws
made it much more difficult for IWW organizers to recruit mem-
bers, propagandize, and manage the organization's business af-
fairs. In some instances, the union was ousted from its local halls
by landlords fearful of being prosecuted.587 Worse for the union,
these laws struck at the very heart of the traveling delegate sys-
tem that was crucial to the organization's recruitment efforts.
Recruiting in this fashion required organizers to travel around,
meeting workers at their workplaces and on the streets, carrying
with them membership cards, union propaganda, and other docu-
limited view of civil liberties, see, for example, DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN
ITs FORGOTrEN YEARS 359-63 (1997).
586 See, e.g., Rohde, supra note 18, at 329-38 (discussing Brandeis's concurrence
in Whitney).
587 Portland I.W.W. Are Ousted by Landlord, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1919, at I1.
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ments identifying them as committed members of the organiza-
tion. All of this exposed these delegates to criminal syndicalism
prosecution. They were arrested while organizing workers or oc-
cupying union halls, selling newspapers, and traveling between
locations; when arrested even on minor charges, the discovery of
union papers on their persons frequently led to criminal syndical-
ism charges. Arrests were also made in union halls, at job sites,
on picket lines, and in other places where the disruptive effect on
union activities was magnified. There is ample reason to think,
and some evidence in the record to suggest, that all of this tended
to drive Wobblies out of certain areas.
588
To be arrested and taken to jail was, of course, a huge source
of disruption in its own right, even if the case was never brought
to trial. Arrests that took Wobbly organizers off the streets and
worksites and out of union halls obviously compromised those
Wobblies' abilities to do the union's work. Moreover, arrested
Wobblies had to be bailed out if possible, which cost the union
considerable money and effort.5 89 Those who were charged had
to be defended and represented on appeal, often costing the or-
ganization even more resources, and exposing both witnesses and
attorneys to the risk of being charged themselves. An indication
of the magnitude of these expenses is evident in the union's claim
that by April 1920, it had already spent $10,000 on defense in
California alone.590 The union repeatedly issued desperate pleas
for money to use for defense purposes.
591
Many Wobblies who were brought to trial on these charges
were convicted. All told, the number meeting this fate ran into
the hundreds. Most of those convicted were sent to prison-over
588 See, e.g., Throws Scare into Wobblies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1920, at 119
(describing Wobblies leaving western towns in the wake of court decisions and
arrests).
589 Bail amounts could be quite large for the time. See, e.g., Criminal Syndicalism
Laws in California Persecute L W. W., NEW SOLIDARITY, June 21, 1921, at 1 (report-
ing that thirteen defendants' bail was set at $500 cash or $1000 property each); Wear
Released on Bond, INDUS. SOLIDARrrY, May 22, 1925, at 1 (stating that Oklahoma
defendant Homer Wear was released on $500 bond).
590 California and "Criminal Syndicalism," supra note 330.
591 See, e.g., I. W. W in California to Stay!; Funds Must Be Rushed to California to
Win the Many Cases Being Fought, INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 23, 1924, at 1; Urgent
Need of Funds in California to Beat Down Criminal Syndicalism, INDUS. WORKER,
Dec. 12, 1923, at 2. Money was required for appeals as well as trial defense. Crimi-
nal Syndicalism, ONE BIG UNION MONTHLY, Sept. 1920, at 7, 7; LW.W. Active De-
spite Arrests; Defense Is Needed for Imprisoned Men, INDUS. WORKER, Oct. 3, 1917,
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200 in California, Washington, and Idaho combined.592 Those
sent to prison often languished for years, enduring barbaric con-
ditions before eventually being freed. 593 This undoubtedly had a
powerful deterrent effect. Though decentralized and resistant to
the bureaucratic tendencies that afflicted other labor unions, the
IWW did have several levels of leadership, from top level leaders
like Haywood and top-notch organizers like Little, to its corps of
ground-level organizers (its traveling delegates) and local lead-
ers, to its rank and file.594 While the other main expressions of
official repression, the conspiracy prosecutions, were focused al-
most entirely on the top leadership, the criminal syndicalism
prosecutions had a far more democratic effect.595 Victims were
typically from the organization's lower rungs-if not traveling
delegates like Jack Terrell, then local leaders like Tom Connors
as well as rank-and-filers. While this focus had a certain benefi-
cial effect in sparing the top leadership further ravages, it also
worked to the union's disadvantage. These arrests served as a
clear warning to others of the risks of involvement with the
IWW, to the point that it apparently became a common, tongue-
in-cheek saying among members in California, when asked about
the entitlements of a membership card, that, "If they catch you
with it, it entitles you to two to fourteen [years] in San Quentin
or Fulsom [sic]." '596
Imprisonment was also a reminder to the organization itself
that many of its members were, in effect, held hostage by the
state and its backers in business. The union appeared to worry
592 In his dissertation, Dowell counted 135 imprisoned in California, 52 in Wash-
ington, and 31 in Idaho. 2 Dowell, supra note 268, at 935, 1010, 1063. By Whitten's
count, the number in California should be 128. Whitten, supra note 18, at 52-53.
593 Several Wobblies were confined to asylum wards while in prison. See, e.g., Joe
Neil Released-Rearrested, INDUS. WORKER, June 30, 1928, at 1. Others were in soli-
tary confinement. See, e.g., Convicts on Strike, Lonesome, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1922,
at I1 (reporting that eight San Quentin convicts were in solitary for refusing to
work). In several cases, this was punishment for attempts to support fellow Wob-
blies in prison. See, e.g., Dungeon for Wobblies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1923, at I1;
Wobblies in Solitary, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1923, at I1. Those jailed awaiting charge
or trial were subjected to barbarous treatment. See, e.g., Jail Conditions Inhuman,
INDUS. WORKER, Jan. 10, 1920, at 1 (reporting overcrowded cells); Police Use Clubs
on 22 Jailed Wobs!, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 19, 1924, at 1 (reporting beatings at the
Los Angeles city jail).
594 DUBOFSKY, supra note 7, at 49, 198-99; 4 FONER, supra note 138, at 133-34,
144-45.
595 See supra text accompanying notes 215-46 and Part IV.
596 SOLIDARITY FOREVER, supra note 134, at 43 (recollections of Wobbly Joseph
Murphy).
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that the fate of imprisoned members might be affected by the
union's level of activism.597 With those in prison at the mercy of
discretionary relief, usually at the hands of state governors
(something from which many ended up benefiting), this was not
at all an unreasonable concern. Moreover, taking care of impris-
oned members, a function to which the organization was admira-
bly dedicated, imposed a huge cost on the organization, both
financially and administratively, leaving fewer resources for ac-
tivism and organizing work.598
The IWW was well aware of the corrosive effect of criminal
syndicalism laws on its organization and well aware, too, that this
was precisely the purpose of these statutes. Particular accounts
of members being arrested, convicted, and sentenced reflected a
practical awareness that the union was absorbing an accumula-
tion of real blows. At the same time, the union and its members
were often circumspect about whether criminal syndicalism had
such deleterious impacts on the organization, a position clearly
couched in the IWW's stridently defiant stance in the face of au-
thority. A common reaction in the union's newspapers to the
overall campaign of criminal syndicalism enforcement was one of
disdain accompanied by the view that these laws had actually
made the organization stronger.599 Only in more oblique ways
did the IWW come to acknowledge how difficult these laws made
it for the union and its members to prosecute their campaign of
industrial unionization and radical social change.6" Indeed, defi-
597 As an editorial in one of the union's papers put it, imprisonment of members
on such charges "enable[d] the bandits of big business not only to rob the worker,
but to hold him for ransom." California C.S.-Tragedy, INDUS. WORKER, Feb. 28,
1923, at 3.
598 The union did its best to provide Christmas gifts (usually $25) to members
imprisoned on criminal syndicalism charges. Christmas Funds Must Be Got for the
Men in Masters' Jails, INDUS. SOLIDARIrY, Nov. 5, 1924, at 4; Class War Prisoners
Get $25 Apiece for Christmas, INDUs. SOLIDARITY, Dec. 24, 1924, at 1; Xmas
Presents for L W. W. Prisoners, supra note 429. For this and other support the in-
mates expressed great appreciation. Boys Still Imprisoned Send Greetings to Those
Outside, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Jan. 12, 1924, at 3; Class-War Prisoners Write to Thank
Workers Who Gave to Christmas Fund, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Jan. 13, 1926, at 6; More
Letters from the L W.W. in Prison to Those Outside, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Jan. 19,
1924, at 4.
599 See, e.g., Criminal Syndicalism Law Fails to Stem Tides of Revolutionary Indus-
trial Unionism, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Apr. 14, 1923, at 1; LW.W. Booming in Cal.;
Wobblies 500 Per Cent Stronger in L.A. District in Spite of Persecution, INDUS.
WORKER, Sept. 8, 1923, at 1.
600 Wobblies themselves mention these laws as a factor that undermined their ef-
forts in the 1910s and 1920s, but only (in the available records) in fairly casual ways.
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ance aside, by 1927 or so the union's organizing efforts had es-
sentially collapsed in all the states where its members faced
criminal syndicalism enforcement. While this was part of a na-
tionwide trend influenced undoubtedly by other factors, such as
conspiracy trials, vigilantism, and the like, it was also the case
that the IWW had been in the late 1910s and early 1920s most
active and vital in precisely those states where criminal syndical-
ism laws were enacted and where the most intensive enforcement
occurred.6 °1 It is in this respect that one of the most salient and
destructive features of criminal syndicalism manifested itself: the
ability of the authorities armed with these laws to focus repres-
sion spatially where the greatest threats to class interests and so-
cial order seemed to appear.
The IWW did not simply roll over in the face of this repres-
sion. Instead, the organization fought back, both legally and by
activist means; when this failed and defendants were convicted,
members responded with an impressive level of solidarity and
ideological resilience. If anything, criminal syndicalism enforce-
ment seemed to have bolstered the organization's critical-and
contemptuous-understanding of the nature of state and law in
capitalist society.
602
Convicted Wobblies exalted a spirit of defiance by repeatedly
failing to surrender their principles in exchange for more lenient
treatment. Wobblies often defied the courts upon conviction or
sentence. A similar thing occurred among members in prison or
on their way to prison. On several occasions, convicted Wobblies
rejected offers of pardon or commutation on the grounds that
this would have either implied or required outright a confession
of guilt or would have required them to leave behind their fellow
workers.60 3 In December 1921, for example, Howard Welton,
This can be taken, though, as either a suggestion of disinterest in or unawareness of
their effects, but it can also be read as a reflection of how much the victims took for
granted the destructive impact of these laws. See, e.g., SOLIDARITY FOREVER, supra
note 134, passim.
601 One of the few authorities to draw an explicit connection between this collapse
of IWW organizing strength and the role of criminal syndicalism prosecutions is
Nigel Sellars, who attributes the mid-1920s collapse of the IWW in Oklahoma to the
combined effects of such prosecutions as well as internal schisms and intensified
vigilantism. SELLARS, supra note 8, at 163-84.
602 See, e.g., The I W. W. and the Law, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 3, 1923, at 3.
603 See, e.g., Criminal Syndicalism Prisoners Refuse to Leave Centralia Boy, IN-
DUS. SOLIDARrrY, Apr. 29, 1925, at 3; Walla Walla Men Scorn Parole Offer, INDUS.
WORKER, July 9, 1924, at 2.
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imprisoned at California's San Quentin prison, rejected the trial
judge's offer of clemency, even if granted unconditionally, on the
grounds that "asking for, or accepting a pardon implies, to my
mind, the admission that one has committed some crime.
6 °
Further, Welton told the judge that he could not in good con-
science leave behind his fellow Wobblies who were "no more
guilty of any crime than I am.",60 5 While he went to great lengths
to disclaim any insult, Welton also offered the judge this
statement:
You are today, Your Honor, a Judge in the Superior Court;
well-to-do, respected, and honored. I am a convicted felon,
poor, and in the eyes of many people, disgraced and an out-
cast, and yet had I the power to do so, I would not today
change places with you....
• By your refusal to grant us an arrest of judgment, or at
least a new trial, in the face of the ludicrous, preposterous ver-
dict rendered by the jury, I consider that you have definitely
aligned yourself with the forces of reaction and repression.
While as for myself, it is my firm conviction that I am fighting
together with millions of ... men and women ... in a great
fight for human happiness and betterment .... 606
Although the IWW stood by while liberals and civil libertari-
ans attempted unsuccessfully to repeal California's statute, the
union did attempt to bring pressure to bear on state and local
authorities in California by engineering a boycott of the state's
products.60 7 The IWW also redoubled its efforts, already begun
in the face of the conspiracy prosecutions, to clarify its ideology
to the public and to imprint in its public face that the organiza-
tion was not actually committed to the use of sabotage, violence,
or other prohibited means to achieve . its goal of social
revolution.6 °8
Mostly, though, the IWW and its members suffered through




607 See DOWELL, supra note 11, at 122-23; California's Persecution of Union Men
Can Be Stopped by the Boycott, INDUS. WORKER, Mar. 12, 1924, at 1. The union's
press also proposed to use direct action-strike activity-to gain its members' re-
lease. General Strike Agitation Should Be Made for Release of IWW in Prisons,
INDUS. WORKER, Apr. 12, 1924, at 2. Neither of these efforts appears to have
yielded much direct benefit. See Labor Men Rise Against I. W. W. Boycott of State,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1925 at B1.
608 See, e.g., The L W. W. and the Law, supra note 602.
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these prosecutions and the prison sentences that often followed.
Fortunately, sentences at that time were far more subject than
they are today to reduction by parole, commutation, and other
forms of discretionary release.6 °9 In addition, the union's own
receding influence in the mid- and late 1920s gradually reduced
the fear of its ideology and its organizing threats. And so it was
that by the middle of the decade, official animosity toward the
organization faded considerably and the number of Wobblies
serving time on criminal syndicalism charges began to diminish.
By 1926 and 1927, the state prisons finally began to empty of
Wobblies convicted of criminal syndicalism.61 0 By the time they
were released, some of these people had served upward of seven
years in prison.6 11 The last member in prison for criminal syndi-
calism, Leo Ellis, who had been convicted by a California jury
eight years earlier, was released on September 29, 1928.612
VI
CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM ENFORCEMENT IN THE
LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY
Ellis's release would not mark the end of criminal syndicalism
enforcement. The use of these laws against radicals continued
through the 1930s and 1940s. What changed was the identity of
their victims. Instead of Wobblies, the ranks of defendants in this
period were comprised of communists or socialists, populist
farmers,613 and, on occasion, fascists.614 Such prosecutions oc-
609 See, e.g., Five I. W. W. Prisoners Free Again, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1922, at I1.
610 See, e.g., Fellow Workers Leave Prisons in Syndicalism State, INDUS. WORKER,
Apr. 2, 1927, at 2; John Bruns Is Out of Quentin, INDUS. SOLIDARITY, Nov. 23, 1927,
at 1; Membership Must Not Forget Prisoners of the Class War, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Sept. 15, 1926, at 1 ("From Two to Nine I.W.W. Released Each Month from Califor-
nia Bastiles."); More Class War Prisoners Leave California Pens, INDUS. WORKER,
Feb. 26, 1927, at 4.
611 See, e.g., Frank Nash Completes Long Prison Sentence, INDUS. SOLIDARITY,
Oct. 6, 1925, at 1 (reporting prisoner's release after seven years).
612 Last Cal. C.S. Prisoner Freed, INDUS. WORKER, Sept. 29, 1928, at 1.
613 See, e.g., Michigan Farmers Held, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1933, at 6 (reporting
arrests of seven farmers for demonstrating at an auction); Ten Farmers Held in Iowa
Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1933, at 3 (reporting arrests of ten farmers "for
alleged participation in farm riots").
614 Black Legion Head Surrenders in Ohio, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1937, at 6; 19
Black Legion Men Face Trial for Syndicalism, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 12, 1936, at 9;
22 Indicted for Syndicalism in Terrorist Quiz, CI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 22, 1936, at 14;
22 Raiders Seize Bund Chief and Anti-Jewish Circulars, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1939, at
6.
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curred in many of the jurisdictions that were at the forefront in
the persecution of Wobblies: California, Oklahoma, and Ore-
gon.615 In fact, the early 1930s saw fairly considerable use of
criminal syndicalism laws against labor activists in California's
farming regions.616 Other notable prosecutions occurred amid
labor unrest in the coal mining regions of Ohio and Kentucky.617
Some of these cases were rather infamous. In 1931, novelists
Theodore Dreiser and John Dos Passos were indicted for crimi-
nal syndicalism in Kentucky, where they had gone to support
striking coal miners.618 However, neither was ever brought to
trial.619 In 1932, William Z. Foster, chairman of the Communist
Party (and onetime Wobbly, already the subject of one criminal
syndicalism prosecution) was charged with criminal syndicalism
in Los Angeles.620  Later in the decade, California authorities
briefly linked actor James Cagney to a group of Communists who
were tried and convicted of criminal syndicalism.621 In a few
other cases, Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) leaders
615 See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); People v. Chambers, 72
P.2d 746 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); People v. Horiuchi, 300 P. 457 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1931); State v. Denny, 53 P.2d 713 (Or. 1936); State v. Boloff, 4 P.2d 326 (Or.
1931); Asserted Red Chiefs Jailed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20,1931, at Al (reporting arrests
in Los Angeles); Communists Get Prison Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1935, at 3
(reporting California convictions); Held for Syndicalism: 8 Men, 4 Women in
Oklahoma City Face Prison as Reds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1940, at 21; Richard L.
Neuberger, Oregon's Syndicalism Fight Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1937, at 67;
Oklahoma Jury Decrees Prison for Communist, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 12, 1940, at
10; Raiders Press Hunt for Reds in California, CHI. DAILY TRIB., July 21, 1934, at 2;
"Red" Guilty in Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1940, at 10; Red Sentenced for Ten
Years, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1931, at 1 (reporting conviction in Portland, Oregon);
Syndicalism Is Charged, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1934, at 2 (reporting criminal syndical-
ism charges in Portland, Oregon).
616 See, e.g., El Centro Convicts Nine Reds, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1930, at 1; Nine
Radicals Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1930, at 10.
617 See, e.g., Eight Are Arrested at Pineville, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1932, at 18 (re-
porting Kentucky arrests); Jail 13 in Mine Strike; Officers in Ohio Charge Five with
Criminal Syndicalism, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1931, at 14; Mine Reds Warned by Ken-
tucky Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1921, at 16; New Clashes Mark Ohio Miners'
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1931, at 14.
618 Dreiser Indicted for Syndicalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1931, at 14; Indict Drei-
ser, Aids on Charge of Syndicalism, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 17, 1931, at 18.
619 Dreiser Indictments Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1933, at 15 (reporting that
cases were later dropped).
620 Foster, Communist Candidate, Seized by Los Angeles Police, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., June 29, 1932, at 4; Foster, Leader of Reds, Jailed, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1932,
at Al.
621 Actor Named in Red Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1935, at 3; Police Involve James
Cagney with Red Cause, CHI. DAILY TRIm., Aug. 18, 1934, at 3.
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were also charged with, and sometimes convicted of, criminal
syndicalism.622
Though they worked considerable hardship on their victims,
who were often as innocent as the Wobbly defendants before
them, these and scattered prosecutions elsewhere were never as
extensive or as focused as was the earlier campaign against the
IWW. By the 1950s and 1960s, criminal syndicalism prosecutions
had become truly sporadic, with only the occasional rightist or
civil rights worker facing charges.623 And yet, through all of this,
there remained no clear reason to question the basic constitu-
tionality of these laws.624 Not until 1969 in Brandenburg v.
Ohio625 did the United States Supreme Court finally rule that
the criminalization of mere advocacy of radical change, absent
the actual threat of "imminent lawless action," could not be rec-
onciled with the First Amendment.626 Brandenburg followed on
the heels of a number of lower courts' decisions that invoked a
similar logic to invalidate the use of criminal syndicalism laws
against civil right activists.627
Most states that enacted criminal syndicalism laws in the 1910s
and 1920s have since repealed their statutes.628 This includes the
622 C.l.O. Red Found Guilty in Strike; Faces Ten Years, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 7,
1939, at 11. The unionist convicted in this case, William Sentner, was a CIO regional
director. His conviction, which was overturned by the Iowa Supreme Court,
stemmed from his role in a sit-down strike at a Maytag plant. Iowa v. Sentner, 298
N.W. 813 (Iowa 1941).
623 See, e.g., Negro Arraigned as 'Revolutionist,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1966, at 3;
20 Negroes in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1964, at 26 (reporting criminal syndicalism
charges against civil rights workers in Mississippi).
624 In 1937, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the conviction
of a Communist, Dirk De Jonge, under Oregon's amended criminal syndicalism law.
However, it did so essentially on the grounds that the defendant's conviction was
premised almost entirely on his attendance at a Communist Party meeting, and with-
out there being adequate evidence of either the meeting's endorsement of criminal
syndicalism or De Jonge's advocacy of prohibited means of social change. De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937). The Court did not answer the question
whether such advocacy, if shown, could provide a basis of culpability, or if De
Jonge's membership in the Party, if made an element of the crime, would suffice
either.
625 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
626 Id. at 447.
627 See, e.g., Barber v. Kinsella, 277 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1967); Ware v. Nichols,
266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967). In fact, the case responsible for the so-called
Younger Abstention Doctrine, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), involved a
three-judge panel's injunction of a local prosecutor's attempt to prosecute a civil
rights activist, id. at 40.
628 Only a few states still have criminal syndicalism laws on the books. See Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-7-21, 97-7-23 to -27 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.117 (2006);
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states where major use was made of these laws such as Califor-
nia. There remain a few holdouts, however; contemporary prose-
cutors still attempt from time to time to charge and convict
people of criminal syndicalism. Often these defendants have
been radicals of the right, including, for example, the so-called
Montana Freemen, several of whom were charged with, and in
some instances convicted of, syndicalism in the mid-1990s. 629 On
another relatively recent occasion, a labor activist was targeted as
well.6 3 ° In any case, the issue that bears reflection is not whether
we will see a return to widespread enforcement of criminal syndi-
calism laws as such against radicals of whatever stripe, but rather
whether the concept of antiradical repression embodied in these
statutes endures in contemporary society, despite the apparent
advances in constitutional jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
This Article tells the story of a conflict between capital and
labor in which the state (in its various jurisdictional forms),
armed with the authority of the law, intervened decisively on the
side of capital, advancing the interests and the ideology of em-
ployers against those of a radical union. Armed with criminal
syndicalism laws, the state set out to smash the IWW, punish its
members and supporters, and articulate very clearly an official
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1261-1264 (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-901
to -904 (2003). Two other states still maintain "criminal anarchy" statutes, which are
similar. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:115 (2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.15 (Mc-
Kinney 2000). Although it provides a rare example of a major strike won by labor in
the last twenty years, the 1989 to 1990 Pittston coal strike offers a telling example of
the highly intrusive and coercive role that the law and the police play in contempo-
rary labor disputes. See RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., A STRIKE LIKE No OTHER
STRIKE: LAW AND RESISTANCE DURING THE PITTSTON COAL STRIKE OF 1989-1990
(2002). For an in-depth description of another relatively recent strike in which the
enforcement of limits on strikers' behavior played an important role, see DAVE
HAGE & PAUL KLAUDA, No RETREAT, No SURRENDER: LABOR'S WAR AT HOR-
MEL (1989).
629 See Lawrence F. Reger, Note, Montana's Criminal Syndicalism Statute: An
Affront to the First Amendment, 58 MONT. L. REV. 287 (1997); Brad Knickerbocker,
Taxes, Rights Fuel Montana's Militant Groups, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 29,
1996, at 1; see also Montana v. Holland, 955 P.2d 1360 (Mont. 1998); Jim Beck,
Conviction of Shirley Holland Upheld, EVANSVILLE COURIER (Ind.), Nov. 13, 1998,
at A10.
630 Conrad Defiebre, The Hormel Strike: Rogers Is Cleared but Back in Jail on
New Charges, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Apr. 12, 1986, at 5B (re-
porting district judge's ruling of state criminal syndicalism law unconstitutional and




denunciation of the IWW's radical challenge to industrial capital.
It did all of that and more, in the name of peace and security, and
with the full knowledge that none of the victims of these laws
actually violated them, let alone constituted any threat to state
security or public safety.
That this campaign against the IWW represented proof of the
state's fundamental class bias is beyond dispute. What remains
to be pondered is whether this bias persisted beyond the 1920s-
whether, in some sense, this business of criminal syndicalism
should be understood as an archaic expression of the class polit-
ics of state and law, no longer typical of modern practices; or
whether something more enduring is reflected in this history of
criminal syndicalism. On one level, the answer to this seems ob-
vious. The state's biased resort to explicitly repressive practices
in the context of labor disputes faded dramatically in the middle
decades of the last century. In fact, since the 1930s, the rights of
labor have been protected by law. Most workers nowadays enjoy
the legal rights to organize unions free of employer interference,
provoke collective bargaining with employers, and (in limited
ways) engage in strikes and other acts of collective protest.
These rights exist alongside an array of other legal protections in
the workplace involving minimum wage and overtime, health
and safety, and the prohibition of racial, gender, and other forms
of discrimination, among other issues. All this has been accom-
panied by a series of apparently dramatic civil libertarian reforms
in criminal procedure, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.63 1
The weight given to these changes in comparing the era of
criminal syndicalism to the present day must be qualified, how-
ever. The right to strike exists subject to employer prerogative to
permanently replace-in effect, to fire-strikers, provided only
that the strikers are not engaged in protest of illegal activity on
the part of the employer. 632 This rule, which is not at all man-
dated by the literal terms of the National Labor Relations Act,
was made clear by the courts very soon after the statute's enact-
ment.63 3 Furthermore, by amendment to the Act as well as court
and administrative decisions, the law identifies a number of cir-
631 See, e.g., DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: TiH ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27-70
(2003).
632 The doctrine has its origins in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304
U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
633 For a description of this doctrine and a critique of its bases in the statute, see,
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cumstances under which strikes may be unprotected from em-
ployer reprisal or even illegal if they have an improper object or
are conducted in an improper fashion (even if not violent or oth-
erwise criminal).634 The right to strike is likewise significantly
limited by interpretations of the law of collective bargaining
agreements, under which the courts have assumed the authority
to compel arbitration of disputes (even where not expressly
agreed by the parties) and to enjoin strikes in defiance of this
requirement. Similarly, labor and employment laws are widely
underenforced and carry inadequate remedies, leaving employ-
ers with a significant, unremedied prerogative simply to ignore
their requirements.635 Moreover, laws and the administrative
structures for enforcing the rights provided by these laws are ac-
corded to workers in lieu of other rights either left unprotected
by law or explicitly denied to workers. That is to say, workers
may be thought to have ceded many of their prerogatives in ex-
change for the protections of the law, even though those protec-
tions are substantially ineffectual. At the same time, when it
comes to policing against illegal strikes, the state has never been
more willing to act or capable of acting with decisive force; an
illegal strike nowadays will be ended by whatever means prove
necessary.636 Not that this has been necessary, either. In the
midst of these realities, strikes, overall labor activism, and union
membership have all declined steadily and significantly since the
middle part of the last century.637
In light of these realities, a number of scholars have described
post-New Deal labor law as a fundamentally conservative re-
for example, JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 21-24 (1983).
634 See James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and
Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 527-34 (2004).
635 See, e.g., RICHARD N. BLOCK ET AL., LABOR LAW, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
AND EMPLOYEE CHOICE: THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE 1990s 79-93
(1996); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOY-
MENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 151-204 (1993).
636 Unions and their members are subject to a number of forms of criminal and
civil liability for incidents stemming from illegal strikes, including liability for com-
mitting unfair labor practices, conspiracy, assault and battery, and trespass. See, e.g.,
J.R. Carby-Hall, Industrial Conflict: The Criminal Liability and Statutory Immuni-
ties of Trade Unions and Their Officials, 29 MANAGERIAL L. 2 (1987) (describing
potential liability under the common law in England). Illegal strikes may also be
enjoined and the injunction enforced by contempt proceedings.
637 On the critique of the antilabor functions of modern labor law, see, for exam-
ple, Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
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gime, one that funnels labor conflict into institutional mecha-
nisms that mute the voice of protest and limit the range of
possible reformist, let alone revolutionary, outcomes 63 8-and
that remains quite capable of redressing the kind of militancy
and radicalism that the IWW practiced, even if the risks are
likely to involve a so-called fair trial on charges far less crude
than criminal syndicalism. Others have been equally keen to
qualify the meaning of criminal procedure reforms, in some cases
casting these reforms as covertly reactionary devices that have
legitimated the authority of the criminal justice system without
much limiting the habits of the state.6 39 To this circumspect view
of criminal procedure reforms must be added a critical reflection
on the massive expansion of the criminal justice system as a vehi-
cle of social control-measured, for example, in cases, sentences,
and people incarcerated-as well as its own obvious function (if
not intended design) as a means of containing the socially
marginalized.640 Taken together, these critiques suggest that, in
the transition from a realm of criminal syndicalism prosecutions
and labor injunctions to that of unfair labor practices, govern-
ment-sponsored elections, and arbitration proceedings, the state
may have become, not less class-repressive, but repressive in
more rational, legally bound, and (in the modern context) politi-
cally legitimate ways.
To the extent that this depiction of the continuity of the state's
class-repressive function is accurate, it closely validates the Wob-
blies' critique of a state-sponsored regime of labor relations
grounded in positive legal rights and of the inherent bias of the
state generally in matters of class conflict. Considered alongside
the history of criminal syndicalism laws, it also suggests some-
thing important about the nature of the modern state and its le-
gal system: namely, how little these realms have changed over
the last eighty or ninety years.
638 See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 63 at 247-328; Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradical-
ization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Holly J. McCammon, From Repressive
Intervention to Integrative Prevention: The U.S. State's Legal Management of Labor
Militancy, 1881-1978, 71 Soc. FORCES 569 (1993).
639 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal
Procedure, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 361 passim (1986).
640 The literature on this issue is extensive. For helpful reviews, see, for example,
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF
CRISIS (2000); PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA'S POOR (Tara
Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2003).
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In the Communist Manifesto, Marx famously described the ex-
ecutive of the modern state simply as a committee of the bour-
geoisie." The implication is, of course, that the modern state
and its legal system not only act as agents of capitalist interest,
but also serve this function in a manner unmediated by their own
institutional identity or ideological norms. The metaphor sug-
gests a notion of the state as a comprehensive conspiracy on be-
half of capitalist interest, which may be true on occasion, but is
difficult to reconcile with the complexity of modern state action.
In fact, the Manifesto's forceful rhetoric aside, it is quite clear
that the relationship between state (and law) on the one hand,
and capital on the other, is rather more nuanced. However
strong the bias of state and law toward the interests and ideology
of capital and against those of labor, this relationship is also me-
diated to a considerable extent by the state's own institutional
interests and ideological commitments. Both the state and the
law, in other words, are independent, at least in a relative sense,
from capital, at the same time that they are aligned with it via
shared ideology, interests, personality (in the literal sense), finan-
cial influence, and broad-ranging economic interdependency. By
this view, the state is not simply a committee of the bourgeoi-
sie-at least, not usually-so much as it is a staunch, reliable,
semiautonomous ally in this class' struggle to maintain its advan-
tages over labor.
Through this relationship with the state, capitalists dominate
the state and its legal system without exercising absolute control
over either. This leaves the modern state, at least in its liberal
iterations, able to function as a forum of debate and discourse, in
which more or less democratic decisions are reached. The state
can thus accommodate conflicts and rivalries among capitalists,
or between capitalists and other groups. It can advance capitalist
interests about which the capitalists themselves are ignorant or
indifferent. This includes redressing the various tendencies to-
ward crisis and disorder that inhere in capitalism itself by amelio-
rating the effects of poverty, maintaining law and order,
managing banking and monetary policy, and funding research
projects and other such things. In accomplishing these ends, the
state can compromise the interests of capitalists for something
approximating a greater good, as by the imposition of taxes or




regulatory regimes. On occasion, these functions can go so far as
to involve according limited advantages to labor in the form of
statutory labor standards and other kinds of protective legisla-
tion, such as that just mentioned.642 But in every case, such ac-
tions remain within the bounds of the established order, leaving
intact existing social hierarchies and the interests of economic
elites.643
In fact, nothing about the current liberal state suggests a fun-
damental repudiation of the kind of class politics evident in the
time of criminal syndicalism. Critical theorist Franz Neumann
wrote that the modern, liberal state is far from weak; in his
words, "The liberal state has always been as strong as the politi-
cal and social situation and the interests of society demanded....
It has been a strong state precisely in those spheres in which it
had to be strong and in which it wanted to be strong. '6 44 Neu-
mann went on to locate the areas in which this strength has mat-
tered: maintaining order, advancing imperial aims, and breaking
strikes.645 What Neumann means to say is this: first, the modern
state enjoys considerable powers of repression within its normal,
legitimate framework. It can act in ways that are both repressive
and biased in the interests of capital and compatible with rule of
law and civil libertarian norms, democratic commitments, and so
forth. The modern state can sustain its commitments to capital in
ways that are perfectly legal and normative and that benefit from
the legitimacy accorded by operating in this fashion.
Neumann's second point is that there also remains for the state
the possibility simply of flouting the rule of law, civil liberties,
and democracy in the course of protecting its own interests or
those of capital. The state can invoke exceptional circumstances,
or emergencies, under which normal constraints on its power,
whether legal, .moral, or political, are held to no longer apply.
There is often a greater price to be paid, of course, by this route,
642 Claus Offe has aptly called the state's discharge of its "crisis management"
role, evident for example in the state's provision of social welfare, as a means of
warding off social disorder. See CLAUS OFFE, 'Crises of Crisis Mangement': Ele-
ments of a Political Crisis Theory, in CONTRADICIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 35,
35-36 (John Keane ed., 1984).
643 On this account of the state, see RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY (1969).
644 Franz L. Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in
THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND
OTTo KIRCHiHEIMER 101, 101 (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996).
645 Id. at 101-03.
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a price accounted mainly in the diminution of legitimacy that
tends to follow when the state uncloaks its authority. But just as
surely, there can be significant advantages for the state to take
this course against its enemies or the enemies of a constituency
with which it is closely allied.
These reflections on the nature of state and law illuminate
much about the history of criminal syndicalism and the IWW. In
particular, they call into question a tendency among some schol-
ars, especially civil libertarians, to cast this episode in aberra-
tional terms: as part of the post-Great War Red Scare, infected
with the hysteria of anti-Bolshevism; as an overreaction to IWW
bluster; as the work of overzealous, career-minded prosecutors;
as the product of an era not yet in possession of a well-developed
concept of First Amendment doctrine and other notions of civil
liberty; or as anything but a normal exercise of modern state
power. Such a view is hardly warranted, let alone necessary.
One can see the persecution of the IWW by means of criminal
syndicalism laws as fundamentally normal in the sense that it rep-
resented something that the modern state quite typically does
and that the contemporary state may well remain poised to do:
stamping out challenges to the reign of capital and to its own
authority. The fact that, in carrying out its campaign against the
IWW, the state flouted established norms of civil liberty and
criminal justice was, too, an unremarkable and thoroughly nor-
mal occurrence, as was the acquiescence of the courts in this
campaign. At the end of the day, to speak in Neumann's terms,
the state needed to be stronger in responding to the IWW than
conventional, liberal conceptions of the limits of its power sug-
gested. It employed radical means of repression not because it
did not know better, so to speak, but because it perceived a radi-
cal threat to its interests and to those of its constituents.
When, by the late 1920s, the enforcement of criminal syndical-
ism laws against the IWW faded, this was not due to the discov-
ery or rediscovery of civil libertarian principles or First
Amendment doctrine; nor did it reflect the prevailing of "cooler
heads" or "more reasonable" minds, as some have suggested.
What this more likely reflected, instead, was the essential success
of the state's project of destroying the organization, which made
further enforcement efforts seem less necessary, and, in turn,
paved the way for a gradual repudiation of these laws in official
circles, culminating in the Brandenburg decision. Of course, this
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repudiation has not been entirely complete. Despite Branden-
burg, prosecutors still attempt, from time to time, to use these
laws against radicals of one sort or another. This suggests, rather
ominously, something of Neumann's other insight: for all its
rhetoric about the rule of law and free society, the modern state
remains poised to embark on the most aggressive course of class
repression. This observation is extremely relevant in the context
of the current war on terrorism.
In the end, it was not merely a labor organization or a set of
ideas that were sacrificed to these laws. The victims of criminal
syndicalism laws were people, men and women who endured
enormous hardship because of their commitment to their union
and their ideals, and who risked and often surrendered the best
years of their lives for their dedication to equality, social justice,
and the moral claim that those who toil in society deserve to en-
joy the fruits of their labor and exercise some sovereignty over
their own work. And yet the human story of these laws is not
merely one of victimization and passive oppression. It is also a
story of the triumph of courage and principle in the face of these
realities. Those Wobblies and their supporters who were prose-
cuted and imprisoned under these statutes clung tenaciously to
their political beliefs and to a spirit of resistance and rebellion
even as they suffered in prison. They showed real solidarity in
their support for one another, often at great costs. These victo-
ries cannot be ignored even as the destructive effect of these stat-
utes on these people and their cause is tolled up, not least
because this underlying spirit of resistance has perhaps proved to
be the Wobblies' most enduring legacy to the American
experience.
This genuinely tragic convergence of hardship and triumph, of
repression and resistance, is perhaps nowhere better expressed
than in the text of a letter by a Wobbly named Joe Neil that was
published in the union's Industrial Worker newspaper in 1928,
upon Neil's release after six years in a Kansas prison. An Aus-
trian by birth, Neil had joined the IWW in the late 1910s. He had
already been jailed several times on minor charges related to his
membership and deported by federal authorities before being ar-
rested for asking a man for a quarter while looking for work in
Hutchinson, Kansas, in the summer of 1922. When police discov-
ered he was a Wobbly, Neil was charged with, and eventually
convicted of, criminal syndicalism. He was then sent to prison,
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where he spent part of the time in the asylum ward.6 4 6 In his
letter, Neil first thanked the union's General Defense Committee
for its efforts on his behalf, and then politely complained that he
had not received enough mail from his fellow workers and had
been left without "rest from the extreme brutality which I en-
dured."' 7 But he said this, too: "One who goes to prison for the
I.W.W. should be proud of his sacrifice for the principle of indus-
trial unionism, and I am justly proud of mine."648
646 Joe Neil Released-Rearrested, supra note 593.
647 Joe Neil Thanks Fellow Workers, INDUS. WORKER, July 14, 1928, at 1.
648 Id.
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